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This paper tackles the fundamental questions arising when looking at argumentation 
frameworks as interacting components, characterized by an Input/Output behavior, rather 
than as isolated monolithical entities. This modeling stance arises naturally in some 
application contexts, like multi-agent systems, but, more importantly, has a crucial 
impact on several general application-independent issues, like argumentation dynamics, 
argument summarization and explanation, incremental computation, and inter-formalism 
translation. Pursuing this research direction, the paper introduces a general modeling 
approach and provides a comprehensive set of theoretical results putting the intuitive 
notion of Input/Output behavior of argumentation frameworks on a solid formal ground. 
This is achieved by combining three main ingredients. First, several novel notions are 
introduced at the representation level, notably those of argumentation framework with 
input, of argumentation multipole, and of replacement of multipoles within a traditional 
argumentation framework. Second, several relevant features of argumentation semantics 
are identiﬁed and formally characterized. In particular, the canonical local function provides 
an input-aware semantics characterization and a suite of decomposability properties 
are introduced, concerning the correspondences between semantics outcomes at global 
and local level. The third ingredient glues the former ones, as it consists of the 
investigation of some semantics-dependent properties of the newly introduced entities, 
namely S-equivalence of multipoles, S-legitimacy and S-safeness of replacements, and 
transparency of a semantics with respect to replacements. Altogether they provide the 
basis and draw the limits of sound interchangeability of multipoles within traditional 
frameworks. The paper develops an extensive analysis of all the concepts listed above, 
covering seven well-known literature semantics and taking into account various, more 
or less constrained, ways of partitioning an argumentation framework. Diverse examples, 
taken from the literature, are used to illustrate the application of the results obtained and, 
ﬁnally, an extensive discussion of the related literature is provided.
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This paper deals with modularity in abstract argumentation. The “Merriam-Webster Learner’s Dictionary” deﬁnes modular
as “having parts that can be connected or combined in different ways” while the “Free Dictionary online” remarks that 
modularity is intended “for easy assembly and repair or ﬂexible arrangement and use”. As such, modularity is a highly 
desirable property, often enforced by design, in any kind of either material (like the popular Lego toys) or immaterial (like 
programs developed according to the object-oriented paradigm) artifacts, including knowledge representation and reasoning 
formalisms.
Roughly speaking, modularity involves two main properties, namely separability and interchangeability of modules. As to 
the former, it has to be possible to describe and analyze the global behavior of an artifact in terms of the combination 
of the local behaviors of the modules composing it. Each local behavior can be characterized individually in a way which 
is independent of the internal details of the other modules (and, in a sense, of the module itself) and captures only the 
connections and mutual interactions between the module and the other ones. To put it in other words, each module can 
be described as a black-box whose Input/Output behavior fully determines its role in the global behavior of any artifact it 
is plugged in. As to the latter, the interest in replacing a module with another one is very common and arises from a large 
variety of motivations, either at the operational or design level. Interchangeability of two modules requires ﬁrst of all that 
they are compatible as far as the connections with the rest of the artifact are concerned, i.e. that the interfaces they expose 
are such that wherever one of the modules can be “plugged in”, the other can too. Besides this plug-level interchangeability, 
it is of great interest to characterize the behavior-level interchangeability of modules, namely to identify the situations where 
internally different modules can be freely interchanged without affecting the global behavior of the artifact they belong to, 
since their Input/Output behavior is equivalent in this respect.
While the formalism of abstract argumentation frameworks [25] and the relevant argumentation semantics (see [3]
for a survey) do not appear to have been designed with modularity in mind, investigating their relevant properties is an 
important research topic which, after having been somehow overlooked, is attracting increasing attention in recent years. 
An argumentation framework is basically a directed graph representing the conﬂicts between a set of arguments (the nodes 
of the graph) and an argumentation semantics can be regarded as a method to answer (typically in a non-univocal way, i.e. 
producing a set of alternative answers) the “justiﬁcation question”: “Which is the justiﬁcation status of arguments given the 
conﬂict?”
Referring to a representative set of semantics proposed in the literature, (namely admissible, complete, grounded, 
preferred, stable, semi-stable and ideal semantics) this paper provides a systematic and comprehensive assessment of mod-
ularity in abstract argumentation, by identifying and analyzing in this context the formal counterparts of the general notions 
of separability and interchangeability described above.
Given a partition of an argumentation framework into partial (or local) interacting subframeworks, analyzing separability 
consists in addressing the following issues:
• Is it possible to deﬁne a local counterpart of the notion of semantics? i.e. Is there a method to produce local answers 
to the justiﬁcation question, taking into account the interactions with other subframeworks?
• Can the set of justiﬁcation answers prescribed by the (global) semantics be obtained by properly combining (in a 
bottom-up fashion) the sets of local answers produced in the subframeworks by its local counterpart?
• symmetrically, Can the sets of local answers be obtained (in a top-down fashion) as projections onto the subframeworks 
of the global answers?
As to the ﬁrst issue, we introduce the notion of local function for a subframework1 and show that under very mild 
requirements, satisﬁed by all semantics considered in this paper, it is possible (and easy) to identify the canonical local func-
tion for a global semantics. As to the second and third issues, we introduce the formal notions of top-down and bottom-up 
decomposability, which, jointly, correspond to the notion of (full) decomposability of an argumentation semantics.
Strong as it may seem, full decomposability with respect to every arbitrary partition of every argumentation framework 
is not unattainable. Indeed, we show that it is satisﬁed by some of the semantics considered in this paper, while some 
others are able to achieve at least top-down decomposability and the remaining ones lack all decomposability properties.
As arbitrary partitions correspond to a completely free (if not anarchical) notion of modularity, we also consider a “tidier” 
style of partitioning, involving the graph-theoretical notion of strongly connected components. It turns out that, restricting the 
set of partitions this way, helps some, but not all, semantics to recover full decomposability.
Turning to interchangeability, we deal with both its plug-level and behavior-level aspects. As to the plug-level, borrowing 
some terminology from circuit theory, we introduce the notion of argumentation multipole as a generic replaceable argu-
mentation component, namely a partial framework interacting through an input and output relation with an external set of 
invariant arguments.
Plug-level compatibility of two multipoles is a very relaxed notion, since it is only required that two multipoles refer to 
the same set of external arguments. This is motivated by the fact that imposing a tighter correspondence between Input/
1 Technically, a subframework is captured by the formal notion of argumentation framework with input provided in Deﬁnition 11.
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compatibility. In fact, our analysis shows that a sensible notion of behavioral equivalence between multipoles (called Input/
Output equivalence) can be introduced by requiring that the effect of the multipoles on the external arguments is the same: 
it may well be the case that multipoles with different “terminals” have the same effect in behavioral terms. Of course, 
Input/Output equivalence is a semantics-dependent notion since the behavior of a multipole can only be deﬁned by referring 
to a speciﬁc semantics using the notion of local function mentioned above. In particular, it may be the case that two 
multipoles are equivalent with respect to some semantics and not equivalent with respect to another semantics.
Input/Output equivalence is the basis for the analysis of the operation of replacement within an argumentation frame-
work. Basically, a replacement consists in substituting a part of the framework with a plug-level compatible multipole. While 
this notion per se allows for arbitrary substitutions, one is interested in analyzing those replacements which have a sound 
basis. In this perspective, building on multipole equivalence, it is possible to identify the semantics-dependent notions of 
legitimate and contextually legitimate replacement. Brieﬂy, a replacement is legitimate if it involves “fully” equivalent multi-
poles, while it is contextually legitimate if it involves multipoles which are equivalent in the context where the replacement 
takes place, while not necessarily being equivalent in other contexts. Cleary, legitimate replacements are a (typically strict) 
subset of contextually legitimate replacements.
One might expect that, given a semantics, legitimate (with respect to that semantics) replacements ensure that the 
invariant part of the framework is unaffected (in a sense, that it does not notice the change). This property is called 
semantics transparency. A stronger expectation (since the requirement on the replacements is weaker) would be that the 
invariant part of the framework is unaffected for any contextually legitimate replacement: this property is called strong 
transparency.
Natural as it may seem, transparency is not achieved by all semantics and requires a detailed analysis, showing that 
different levels of transparency are achieved by the semantics considered in this paper, also taking into account different 
restrictions on the set of allowed replacements.
These results provide a reference context and fundamental answers to modularity-related issues in abstract argumenta-
tion, which, up to now, have been considered in the literature focusing on speciﬁc aspects and hence obtaining partial and 
problem-speciﬁc results. Moreover, while being theoretical by nature, the achievements of this paper have several signiﬁcant 
application-oriented implications.
On the one hand, semantics decomposability properties provide a sound basis for exploiting various forms of incremen-
tal computation which may deliver important eﬃciency gains in two main respects. First, they enable (and characterize 
the limits of) the application of divide-and-conquer strategies in the design of algorithms for computational problems in 
abstract argumentation frameworks. As most of these problems are intractable in the worst case, facing reduced-size sub-
problems separately and then combining the partial results in an eﬃcient manner may signiﬁcantly improve performances 
on the average. Second, there is a signiﬁcant application interest in argumentation dynamics, which captures all contexts 
where a given framework is updated incrementally, as a consequence of the acquisition of new information and/or of the 
actions of the participants to a multi-agent system. Clearly, if the modiﬁcation to the initial framework is limited, one is in-
terested to partially reuse the results of previous computations in the new framework rather than redoing all computations 
from scratch. Again, decomposability properties enable (and characterize the limits of) the use of incremental computation 
techniques based on the separation between modiﬁed and unmodiﬁed parts in the updated framework.
On the other hand, the notions and properties concerning multipole equivalence and semantics transparency are appli-
cable in all contexts where there is an interest in replacing a part of a framework with another one. As an example, the 
activities of summarization and explanation involved in reasoning and communicating at different levels of granularity are, 
basically, alternative forms of replacement. In the former, a complex part of an argumentation process (e.g. the analysis 
and discussion of factual evidences in a legal case) is summarized (i.e. replaced) by a more synthetic representation (e.g. 
focusing on the facts which turn out to have an actual impact on the case decision) which, while leaving out unnecessary 
details, must ensure that the global outcome is preserved. Dually, explanation can be regarded as the replacement of a syn-
thetic representation with a more detailed/articulated one, again ensuring that this does not induce undesired side-effects 
outside the replaced part. Further, and more speciﬁc of the abstract argumentation ﬁeld, the basic formalism of argumen-
tation frameworks is often used as a “ground level” representation for other richer and/or more speciﬁc formalisms. For 
instance, formalisms involving the explicit representation of preferences, values, and attacks to attacks can be translated (or 
ﬂattened) to the basic formalism through suitable procedures. As these procedures typically consist of a set of local replace-
ment rules, multipole equivalence and semantics transparency are very effective tools to analyze their behavior, soundness 
and applicability under various semantics.
The paper is organized as follows. After recalling the necessary background in Section 2, the general notions concerning 
semantics decomposability are introduced and discussed in Section 3, while Section 4 provides decomposability results for 
the seven semantics considered in this paper. Section 5 deals with the key technical notion of effect-dictated semantics and 
Section 6 then introduces the fundamental concepts concerning interchangeability, namely argumentation multipoles, their 
Input/Output equivalence, the replacement operator and the properties of semantics transparency. Section 7 analyzes the 
relationships between decomposability and transparency at a general level, while Section 8 provides transparency results 
for the seven semantics considered in this paper. Application examples are given in Section 9, Section 10 discusses related 
works and, ﬁnally, Section 11 concludes the paper. All proofs are given in Appendix A.
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We follow the traditional deﬁnition of argumentation framework introduced by Dung [25] and deﬁne its restriction to a 
subset of arguments.
Deﬁnition 1. An argumentation framework is a pair AF = (Ar, att) in which Ar is a ﬁnite set of arguments and att ⊆ Ar × Ar. 
An argument A such that there is no B such that (B, A) ∈ att is called initial. An argument B such that (B, B) ∈ att is 
called self-attacking. Given a set Args⊆ Ar, the restriction of AF to Args, denoted as AF↓Args is the argumentation framework 
(Args, att ∩ (Args× Args)).
In this paper we use the labelling-based approach to the deﬁnition of argumentation semantics. As shown in [21,3], for 
the semantics considered in this paper there is a direct correspondence with the “traditional” extension-based approach, 
hence the results presented in this paper are valid in both approaches. The labelling-based deﬁnitions have been adopted 
only because they allow simpler proofs.
A labelling assigns to each argument of an argumentation framework a label taken from a predeﬁned set Λ. For technical 
reasons, we deﬁne labellings both for argumentation frameworks and for arbitrary sets of arguments.
Deﬁnition 2. Let Λ be a set of labels. Given a set of arguments Args, a labelling of Args is a total function Lab : Args −→ Λ. 
The set of all labellings of Args is denoted as LArgs . Given an argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att), a labelling of AF is a 
labelling of Ar. The set of all labellings of AF is denoted as L(AF). For a labelling Lab of Args, the restriction of Lab to a set 
of arguments Args′ ⊆ Args, denoted as Lab↓Args′ , is deﬁned as Lab ∩ (Args′ × Λ).
We adopt the most common choice for Λ, i.e. {in, out, undec}, where the label in means that the argument is 
accepted, the label out means that the argument is rejected, and the label undec means that the status of the argument 
is undecided. As explained after Deﬁnition 8, an exception is made for stable semantics, which can be more conveniently 
deﬁned assuming Λ = {in, out}. Given a labelling Lab, we write in(Lab) for {A | Lab(A) = in}, out(Lab) for {A | Lab(A) =
out} and undec(Lab) for {A | Lab(A) = undec}.
A labelling-based semantics prescribes a set of labellings for each argumentation framework.
Deﬁnition 3. Given an argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att), a labelling-based semantics S associates with AF a subset of 
L(AF), denoted as LS(AF).
In general, a semantics encompasses a set of alternative labellings for a single argumentation framework. However, 
a semantics may be deﬁned so that a unique labelling is always prescribed, i.e. for every argumentation framework AF , 
|LS(AF)| = 1. In this case the semantics is said to be single-status, while in the general case it is said to be multiple-status.
In the labelling-based approach, a semantics deﬁnition relies on some legality constraints relating the label of an argu-
ment to those of its attackers.
Deﬁnition 4. Let Lab be a labelling of the argumentation framework (Ar, att). An in-labelled argument is said to be legally
in iff all its attackers are labelled out. An out-labelled argument is said to be legally out iff it has at least one attacker 
that is labelled in. An undec-labelled argument is said to be legally undec iff not all its attackers are labelled out and it 
does not have an attacker that is labelled in.
We now introduce the deﬁnitions of labellings corresponding to traditional admissible2 and complete semantics.
Deﬁnition 5. Let AF = (Ar, att) be an argumentation framework. An admissible labelling is a labelling Lab where every 
in-labelled argument is legally in and every out-labelled argument is legally out.
Deﬁnition 6. A complete labelling is a labelling where every in-labelled argument is legally in, every out-labelled argument 
is legally out and every undec-labelled argument is legally undec.
On this basis, the labelling-based deﬁnitions of several argumentation semantics can be introduced. To simplify the 
technical treatment in the following, grounded and preferred semantics are deﬁned by referring to the commitment relation 
between labellings [3].
2 It can be remarked that (unlike the other semantics) admissible labellings are not in a one-to-one correspondence to admissible sets since several 
admissible labellings might correspond to the same admissible set.
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in(Lab1) ⊆ in(Lab2) and out(Lab1) ⊆ out(Lab2).
Deﬁnition 8. Let AF = (Ar, att) be an argumentation framework. A stable labelling of AF is a complete labelling without 
undec-labelled arguments. The grounded labelling of AF is the minimal (w.r.t. 	) labelling among all complete labellings. 
A preferred labelling of AF is a maximal (w.r.t. 	) labelling among all complete labellings. The ideal labelling of AF is the 
maximal (under 	) complete3 labelling Lab that is less or equally committed than each preferred labelling of AF (i.e. for 
each preferred labelling LabP it holds that Lab 	 LabP ). A semi-stable labelling of AF is a complete labelling Lab where 
undec(Lab) is minimal (w.r.t. set inclusion) among all complete labellings.
While stable semantics is deﬁned by assuming Λ = {in, out, undec}, the deﬁnition of stable labelling entails that stable 
semantics can be equivalently deﬁned with reference to the set of labels Λ = {in, out}. In this case, a stable labelling is 
simply a complete labelling, since the codomain Λ does not include undec. In the sequel we implicitly assume that, for 
stable semantics only, Λ = {in, out}: this allows a simpler treatment of such semantics without any loss of generality.
The uniqueness of the grounded and the ideal labelling has been proved in [22]. Accordingly, grounded and ideal seman-
tics are single-status, the other semantics are multiple-status. Admissible, complete, stable, grounded, preferred, ideal and 
semi-stable semantics are denoted in the following as AD, CO, ST, GR, PR, ID and SST, respectively.
We also recall the traditional notions of skeptical and credulous justiﬁcation of an argument with respect to a semantics.
Deﬁnition 9. Given a labelling-based semantics S and an argumentation framework AF , an argument A is skeptically justiﬁed
under S if ∀Lab ∈ LS(AF) Lab(A) = in; an argument A is credulously justiﬁed under S if ∃Lab ∈ LS(AF) : Lab(A) = in.
Finally, a comment is in order on a special case of argumentation framework that is explicitly considered in the paper, 
i.e. the empty argumentation framework AF∅  (∅, ∅). By deﬁnition the only possible labelling of AF∅ is the empty set, 
thus a semantics can either prescribe ∅ for AF∅ or it can prescribe no labelling at all. In this respect, for any semantics S
introduced above it holds LS(AF∅) = {∅}, i.e. the empty set is actually prescribed by S. Note in particular that ∅ is a stable 
labelling, since it is complete and does not include undec-labelled arguments.
3. Decomposability of argumentation semantics
3.1. The notion of local function
The ﬁrst step to deﬁne the notion of semantics decomposability is to introduce a formal setting to express the inter-
actions between the partial frameworks induced by an arbitrary partitioning of an argumentation framework. Intuitively, 
given an argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att) and a subset Args of its arguments, the elements affecting AF↓Args include 
the arguments attacking Args from the outside, called input arguments, and the attack relation from the input arguments to 
Args, called conditioning relation.
Deﬁnition 10. Given AF = (Ar, att) and a set Args ⊆ Ar, the input of Args, denoted as Argsinp, is the set {B ∈ Ar \ Args | ∃A ∈
Args, (B, A) ∈ att}, the conditioning relation of Args, denoted as ArgsR , is deﬁned as att ∩ (Argsinp × Args).
Example 1. Consider AF = ({A, B, C, D}, {(A, B), (B, C), (C, A), (A, D), (D, A)}) with reference to the partial frameworks in-
duced by the sets {A, B, C} and {D} (see Fig. 1). It holds that {A, B,C}inp = {D} and {A, B,C}R = {(D, A)}, while {D}inp = {A}
and {D}R = {(A, D)}.
Given a partial argumentation framework AF↓Args (possibly AF itself) affected by a (possibly empty) set of arguments 
Argsinp attacking Args according to ArgsR , one may wonder whether ﬁxing the labelling assigned to the input arguments 
allows one to determine the set of labellings of AF↓Args . As shown in the following, this question cannot be answered once 
and for all, since different semantics exhibit different behaviors in this respect, and, for some semantics, a dependency holds 
under speciﬁc constraints on the considered partition of the argumentation framework. In order to express such a depen-
dency (whenever it holds), we introduce the notions of argumentation framework with input, consisting of an argumentation 
framework AF = (Ar, att) (playing the role of a partial argumentation framework), a set of external input arguments I , a la-
belling LI assigned to them and an attack relation RI from I to Ar, and of a local function which, given an argumentation 
framework with input, returns a corresponding set of labellings of AF .
3 Literally, the original deﬁnition refers to an admissible labelling rather than a complete labelling. However, the deﬁnition adopted here is equivalent to 
the original one, since it can be shown that the ideal labelling is a complete labelling [22].
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Deﬁnition 11. An argumentation framework with input is a tuple (AF, I , LI , RI ), including an argumentation framework4
AF = (Ar, att), a set of arguments I such that I ∩Ar = ∅, a labelling LI ∈ LI and a relation RI ⊆I ×Ar. A local function
assigns to any argumentation framework with input a (possibly empty) set of labellings of AF , i.e. F (AF, I , LI , RI ) ∈
2L(AF) .
For any semantics, a “sensible” local function, called canonical local function, is the one that describes the labellings of 
the so-called standard argumentation frameworks.
Deﬁnition 12. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ), the standard argumentation framework w.r.t. 
(AF, I , LI , RI ) is deﬁned as AF
′ = (Ar ∪I ′, att ∪ R ′I ), where I ′ =I ∪ {A′ | A ∈ out(LI )} and R ′I = RI ∪ {(A′, A) |
A ∈ out(LI )} ∪ {(A, A) | A ∈ undec(LI )}.
Roughly, the standard argumentation framework puts AF under the inﬂuence of (I , LI , RI ), by adding I to Ar and RI
to att, and by enforcing5 the label LI for the arguments of I in this way:
• for each argument A ∈I such that LI (A) = out, an unattacked argument A′ is included which attacks A, in order to 
get A labelled out by all labellings of AF′;
• for each argument A ∈I such that LI (A) = undec, a self-attack is added to A in order to get it labelled undec by 
all labellings of AF ′;
• each argument A ∈I such that LI (A) = in is left unattacked, so that it is labelled in by all labellings of AF ′ .
Deﬁnition 13. Given a semantics S, the canonical local function of S (also called local function of S) is deﬁned as 
FS(AF, I , LI , RI ) = {Lab↓Ar | Lab ∈ LS(AF′)}, where AF = (Ar, att) and AF′ is the standard argumentation framework w.r.t. 
(AF, I , LI , RI ).
Note that in the case of stable semantics undec /∈ Λ, thus R ′I does not include self-attacks.
In case I = ∅ (entailing LI = ∅ and RI = ∅) the canonical local function returns the labellings of AF , as shown by 
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Given a semantics S and an argumentation framework AF, FS(AF, ∅, ∅, ∅) = LS(AF).
While the canonical local function is deﬁned for any semantics, its deﬁnition is best suited for complete-compatible
semantics, i.e. semantics satisfying a number of intuitive constraints.
Deﬁnition 14. A semantics S is complete-compatible iff the following conditions hold:
1. For any argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att), every labelling L ∈ LS(AF) satisﬁes the following conditions:
• if A ∈ Ar is initial, then L(A) = in
• if B ∈ Ar and there is an initial argument A which attacks B , then L(B) = out
• if C ∈ Ar is self-attacking, and there are no attackers of C besides C itself, then L(C) = undec
2. for any set of arguments I and any labelling LI ∈ LI , the argumentation framework AF′ = (I ′, att′), where I ′ =
I ∪ {A′ | A ∈ out(LI )} and att′ = {(A′, A) | A ∈ out(LI )} ∪ {(A, A) | A ∈ undec(LI )}, admits a (unique) labelling, i.e. 
|LS(AF′)| = 1.
4 In the following, unless otherwise speciﬁed, we will implicitly assume AF = (Ar, att).
5 Actually, the enforcement is a bit different for admissible semantics. This exception has no consequences on the technical development of the paper.
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It should be noted that, in case undec /∈ Λ, the third bullet of condition 1 entails that there is no labelling if a self-
attacking argument C is attacked by C only, and in condition 2 it necessarily holds that undec(LI ) = ∅.
As shown by Proposition 2, the requirements of the previous deﬁnition guarantee that the construction of the standard 
argumentation framework makes sense, i.e. given a standard argumentation framework w.r.t. (AF, I , LI , RI ), a complete-
compatible semantics enforces the labelling LI for the arguments of I as described above.
Proposition 2. Let S be a complete-compatible semantics and let AF′ = (Ar ∪I ′, att ∪ R ′I ) be the standard argumentation frame-
work w.r.t. an argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ). Then for any Lab ∈ LS(AF′) it holds that Lab↓I ′ = {(A′, in) |
A ∈ out(LI )} ∪ LI and Lab↓I = LI .
Moreover, when applied to the empty argumentation framework (which by deﬁnition does not receive attacks from I ) 
the canonical local function of a complete-compatible semantics always returns the empty set as a unique labelling.
Proposition 3. Given a complete-compatible semantics S, a set of arguments I and a labelling LI ∈ LI , it holds that 
FS(AF∅, I , LI , ∅) = {∅}.
Taking into account Proposition 1 this result entails that LS(AF∅) = {∅}, corresponding to the second requirement of 
Deﬁnition 14 with I = ∅.
All the semantics considered in the paper are complete-compatible, with the exception of admissible semantics.
Proposition 4. GR, CO, ST, PR, SST, ID are all complete-compatible semantics.
Admissible semantics is not complete-compatible, as it can be seen by considering e.g. the argumentation framework 
AF = ({A}, ∅), where LAD(AF) = {(A, undec), (A, in)}.
The following example clariﬁes the notion of canonical local function, considering in particular complete semantics.
Example 2. Let us refer again to the argumentation framework AF of Fig. 1. For the canonical local function of complete 
semantics it holds that FCO(AF↓{A,B,C}, {D}, {(D, out)}, {(D, A)}) = {{(A, undec), (B, undec), (C, undec)}}, due to the fact 
that the standard argumentation framework w.r.t. (AF↓{A,B,C}, {D}, {(D, out)}, {(D, A)}), shown in Fig. 2, admits as the 
unique complete labelling {(D ′, in), (D, out), (A, undec), (B, undec), (C, undec)}. In a similar way, it is easy to show that 
FCO(AF↓{A,B,C}, {D}, {(D, in)}, {(D, A)}) = {{(A, out), (B, in), (C, out)}} and FCO(AF↓{A,B,C}, {D}, {(D, undec)}, {(D, A)}) =
{{(A, undec), (B, undec), (C, undec)}}. Considering the application of FCO to AF↓{D} , FCO(AF↓{D}, {A}, {(A, out)},
{(A, D)}) = {{(D, in)}}, FCO(AF↓{D}, {A}, {(A, in)}, {(A, D)}) = {{(D, out)}} and FCO(AF↓{D}, {A}, {(A, undec)}, {(A, D)}) =
{{(D, undec)}}.
As shown in Section 4, for any semantics considered in this paper the local function admits a compact representation, 
without the need to refer to standard argumentation frameworks.
3.2. Decomposability properties of argumentation semantics
We now aim at introducing a formal notion of semantics decomposability. To this purpose, consider a generic argu-
mentation framework AF = (Ar, att) and an arbitrary partition of Ar, i.e. a set {P1, . . . , Pn} such that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} Pi ⊆ Ar
and Pi = ∅, ⋃i=1...n Pi = Ar and Pi ∩ P j = ∅ for i = j. Such a partition identiﬁes the restricted argumentation frameworks 
AF↓P1 , . . . , AF↓Pn , that affect each other with the relevant input arguments and conditioning relations as stated in Deﬁni-
tion 10. Intuitively a semantics S is decomposable if S can be put in correspondence with a local function F such that:
• every labelling prescribed by S on AF , namely every element of LS(AF), corresponds to the union of n “compatible” 
labellings LP1 , . . . , LPn of the restricted argumentation frameworks, all of them obtained applying F ;
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to a labelling of AF .
The “compatibility” constraint mentioned above reﬂects the fact that any labelling of a restricted framework is used by F
for computing the other ones: LPi plays a role in determining LP1 , . . . , LPi−1 , LPi+1 , . . . , LPn and vice versa. This means that 
LP1 , . . . , LPn are “compatible” if each LPi is produced by F for AF↓Pi with the input arguments Pi inp labelled according to 
LP1 , . . . , LPi−1 , LPi+1 , . . . , LPn . Deﬁnition 15 synthesizes all these considerations.
Deﬁnition 15. A semantics S is fully decomposable (or simply decomposable) iff there is a local function F such that for 
every argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att) and every partition P = {P1, . . . , Pn} of Ar, LS(AF) = U (P, AF, F ) where 
U (P, AF, F )  {LP1 ∪ . . . ∪ LPn | LPi ∈ F (AF↓Pi , Pi inp, (
⋃
j=1...n, j =i L P j )↓Pi inp , Pi R)}.
Example 3. Considering again the argumentation framework AF of Fig. 1 and the partition {{A, B, C}, {D}}, full decompos-
ability of complete semantics requires a local function such that the labellings of AF are exactly those obtained by the 
union of the compatible labellings of AF↓{A,B,C} and AF↓{D} given by the local function itself. Let us consider the canonical 
local function6 of CO (refer to Example 2). The labelling {(A, out), (B, in), (C, out)} is compatible with {(D, in)}, since 
the ﬁrst is obtained by FCO with D labelled in, and the latter is obtained by FCO with A labelled out. On the other hand, 
the labelling {(A, out), (B, in), (C, out)} is not compatible e.g. with {(D, out)}. Overall, exactly two global labellings arise 
from the combinations of the compatible outcomes of FCO , namely {(A, undec), (B, undec), (C, undec), (D, undec)} and 
{(A, out), (B, in), (C, out), (D, in)}, corresponding to the complete labellings of AF .
The behavior of complete semantics in this example is not incidental: we will prove in Section 4 that complete semantics 
is fully decomposable.
Proposition 5 shows that, if a complete-compatible semantics S is fully decomposable, then the local function appearing 
in Deﬁnition 15 coincides with the canonical local function FS .
Proposition 5. Given a complete-compatible semantics S, if S is fully decomposable then there is a unique local function satisfying the 
conditions of Deﬁnition 15, coinciding with the canonical local function FS.
Full decomposability can be viewed as the conjunction of two partial decomposability properties, namely top-down 
decomposability and bottom-up decomposability.
In words, a semantics is top-down decomposable if the procedure to compute the global labellings identiﬁed by Def-
inition 15 is complete, i.e. all of the global labellings can be obtained by combining the labellings prescribed by FS for 
the restricted subframeworks, even if putting together labellings of the restricted subframeworks may give rise to some 
“spurious” labellings besides the correct ones. The following deﬁnition formalizes this intuition.
Deﬁnition 16. A complete-compatible semantics S is top-down decomposable iff for any argumentation framework AF =
(Ar, att) and any partition P = {P1, . . . , Pn} of Ar, it holds that LS(AF) ⊆U (P, AF, FS).
While top-down decomposability corresponds to completeness of the procedure identiﬁed by Deﬁnition 15, bottom-up 
decomposability requires its soundness, i.e. that any combination of local labellings is a global labelling, while it is not 
guaranteed that all global labellings can be obtained in this way.
Deﬁnition 17. A complete-compatible semantics S is bottom-up decomposable iff for any argumentation framework AF =
(Ar, att) and any partition P = {P1, . . . , Pn} of Ar, it holds that LS(AF) ⊇U (P, AF, FS).
A comment on the two deﬁnitions above is in order. While the deﬁnition of full decomposability applies to any kind of 
semantics and requires the existence of a local function satisfying the decomposability property, Deﬁnitions 16 and 17 are 
restricted to complete-compatible semantics and refer to the canonical local function FS to avoid triviality: the local function 
returning all the possible labellings of AF trivially satisﬁes the inclusion condition of Deﬁnition 16 for any semantics, while 
the local function always returning the empty set trivially satisﬁes the condition of Deﬁnition 17. This is the reason why 
both deﬁnitions refer to the speciﬁc canonical local function, which makes sense for complete-compatible semantics in the 
light of Proposition 5. If a semantics is not complete-compatible7 then the notion of canonical local function is meaningless, 
since the labelling LI would not be in general enforced for the arguments of I in the standard argumentation framework 
w.r.t. (AF, I , LI , RI ) (see Proposition 2).
6 It is shown in Proposition 5 that considering the canonical local function is without loss of generality.
7 Besides admissible semantics, in the literature there are a few examples of non-complete-compatible semantics, like stage semantics [42] and various 
forms of prudent semantics [24].
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composability. Moreover, there are semantics that do not satisfy either of them: in this case it is interesting to investigate 
whether decomposability holds by restricting the possible partitions of the argumentation frameworks to those satisfying a 
given set of constraints. To express this restriction, we ﬁrst introduce the notion of partition selector.
Deﬁnition 18. A partition selector F is a function receiving as input an argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att) and return-
ing a set of partitions of Ar.
A partition selector is deﬁned as a function of argumentation frameworks, since different argumentation frameworks with 
the same set of arguments may allow different sets of partitions, depending on the attack relation.
The decomposability notions introduced so far can then be extended to take into account a speciﬁc restriction on the 
considered partitions.
Deﬁnition 19. Let F be a partition selector. A complete-compatible semantics S is top-down decomposable w.r.t. F iff 
for any argumentation framework AF and any partition P = {P1, . . . , Pn} ∈ F (AF), it holds that LS(AF) ⊆ U (P, AF, FS). 
A complete-compatible semantics S is bottom-up decomposable w.r.t. F iff for any argumentation framework AF and any 
partition {P1, . . . , Pn} ∈ F (AF), LS(AF) ⊇ U (P, AF, FS). A complete-compatible semantics is fully decomposable (or simply 
decomposable) w.r.t. a partition selector F iff it is both top-down and bottom-up decomposable w.r.t. F .
Of course, full decomposability, top-down decomposability and bottom-up decomposability as introduced in Deﬁni-
tions 15, 16 and 17, respectively, are equivalent to the corresponding decomposability properties w.r.t. FALL , i.e. the selector 
returning all possible partitions.
Deﬁnition 20. For any argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att), FALL(AF)  {{P1, . . . , Pn} | {P1, . . . , Pn} is a partition of Ar}.
Apart from this limit case, a particular partition selector that has received attention in the literature and will be consid-
ered in this paper is the one based on the notion of strongly connected component (SCC) of an argumentation framework. 
Its importance is due to the fact that most argumentation semantics in the literature are SCC-recursive [10], which, brieﬂy, 
means that the semantics can be deﬁned in terms of a base function operating at the level of single strongly connected 
components. Roughly, this also implies that an incremental computation procedure based on the decomposition of the 
framework into its strongly connected components can be deﬁned, a property exploited in several subsequent works [33,40,
23]. Here we introduce the necessary basic deﬁnitions, leaving further discussion on this subject to Section 10.
Deﬁnition 21. Given an argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att), the set of strongly connected components of AF , denoted as 
SCCSAF , consists of the equivalence classes of arguments induced by the binary relation of path-equivalence, i.e. the relation 
ρ(A, B) deﬁned over Ar× Ar such that ρ(A, B) holds if and only if A = B or there are directed paths from A to B and from 
B to A in AF .
For instance, the argumentation framework of Fig. 1 has a unique strongly connected component including all of the 
arguments, while for the argumentation framework AF of Fig. 2 it holds that SCCSAF = {{D ′}, {D}, {A, B, C}}.
At least two partition selectors based on strongly connected components can be considered. The simplest selector, de-
noted as FSCC , includes for each argumentation framework AF the unique partition consisting of the strongly connected 
components SCCSAF . A second selector, denoted as F∪SCC , includes all the partitions such that every element is the union 
of some (possibly unconnected) strongly connected components.
Deﬁnition 22. For any argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att), FSCC(AF)  {SCCSAF} \ {∅}, F∪SCC(AF)  {{P1, . . . , Pn} |
{P1, . . . , Pn} is a partition of Ar and ∀i ((S ∈ SCCSAF ∧ Pi ∩ S = ∅) → S ⊆ Pi}).
It is immediate to see that, for any AF , FSCC(AF) ⊆ F∪SCC(AF). As to the ﬁrst part of the deﬁnition, note that the set 
SCCSAF includes ∅ only in case AF = AF∅ , which does not admit any partition (since all the elements of a partition must be 
nonempty), thus FSCC(AF∅) = ∅.
4. Analyzing semantics decomposability
In this section we discuss the decomposability properties of the semantics reviewed in Section 2. A synthetic view of 
the results is given in Table 1 (note that for all semantics full, top-down and bottom-up decomposability w.r.t. F∪SCC turn 
out to be satisﬁed if and only if full, top-down and bottom-up decomposability w.r.t. FSCC are satisﬁed, respectively). Since 
admissible semantics is not complete-compatible, only the notion of full decomposability is applicable to it.
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Decomposability properties of argumentation semantics.
AD CO ST GR PR ID SST
Full decomposability (Deﬁnition 15) Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Top-down decomposability (Deﬁnition 16) – Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Bottom-up decomposability (Deﬁnition 17) – Yes Yes No No No No
Full decomposability w.r.t. F∪SCC and FSCC (Deﬁnition 19) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Top-down decomposability w.r.t. F∪SCC and FSCC (Deﬁnition 19) – Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Bottom-up decomposability w.r.t. F∪SCC and FSCC (Deﬁnition 19) – Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
4.1. Admissible and complete semantics
We ﬁrst analyze admissible and complete semantics, since they are the basis for the other ones considered in this paper: 
according to Deﬁnition 8, stable, grounded, preferred, ideal, and semi-stable semantics select labellings among the complete 
ones, which are admissible by deﬁnition. Given this, it would be very unpleasant if complete (and thus admissible) semantics 
would not be decomposable. As shown by Theorems 1 and 3, luckily both admissible and complete semantics turn out to 
be fully decomposable.
The following deﬁnition introduces the canonical local function of admissible semantics, by extending the deﬁnition of 
admissible labelling in order to account for “external” input arguments in the obvious way. The proof that the deﬁnition is 
correct is provided by Theorem 2.
Deﬁnition 23. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ), FAD(AF, I , LI , RI )  {Lab ∈ L(AF) |
Lab(A) = in → ((∀B ∈ Ar : (B, A) ∈ att, Lab(B) = out) ∧ (∀B ∈ I : (B, A) ∈ RI , LI (B) = out)), Lab(A) = out → ((∃B ∈
Ar : (B, A) ∈ att ∧ Lab(B) = in) ∨ (∃B ∈I : (B, A) ∈ RI ∧ LI (B) = in))}.
Theorem 1 proves that admissible semantics is fully decomposable, showing that the local function FAD introduced in 
Deﬁnition 23 satisﬁes the conditions of Deﬁnition 15.
Theorem 1. Admissible semantics AD is fully decomposable, with FAD satisfying the conditions of Deﬁnition 15.
The following theorem conﬁrms that Deﬁnition 23 actually corresponds to the canonical local function of admissible 
semantics.
Theorem 2. The canonical local function of admissible semantics is FAD, as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 23.
Also the canonical local function of complete semantics can be guessed on the basis of the deﬁnition of complete 
labelling.
Deﬁnition 24. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ), FCO(AF, I , LI , RI )  {Lab ∈ L(AF) |
Lab(A) = in→ ((∀B ∈ Ar : (B, A) ∈ att, Lab(B) = out) ∧ (∀B ∈I : (B, A) ∈ RI , LI (B) = out)), Lab(A) = out→ ((∃B ∈ Ar :
(B, A) ∈ att ∧ Lab(B) = in) ∨ (∃B ∈ I : (B, A) ∈ RI ∧ LI (B) = in)), Lab(A) = undec→ (((∀B ∈ Ar : (B, A) ∈ att, Lab(B) =
in) ∧ (∀B ∈I : (B, A) ∈ RI , LI (B) = in)) ∧ ((∃B ∈ Ar : (B, A) ∈ att∧ Lab(B) = undec) ∨ (∃B ∈I : (B, A) ∈ RI ∧ LI (B) =
undec)))}.
It is easy to see that FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ) ⊆ FAD(AF, I , LI , RI ), i.e. every “locally complete” labelling is also “locally 
admissible”.
Theorem 3 shows that also complete semantics is fully decomposable.8 Since the proof adopts FCO as the local function 
and CO is complete-compatible, by Proposition 5 it holds that FCO is actually the canonical local function of complete 
semantics.
Theorem 3. Complete semantics CO is fully decomposable and FCO is its canonical local function.
4.2. Stable semantics
Stable semantics inherits full decomposability from complete semantics: the reason is that the deﬁnition of stable la-
belling corresponds to that of complete labelling with the additional requirement that no argument is labelled undec, and 
8 Proposition 3 of [40] proves a weaker property of complete semantics, corresponding to bottom-up decomposability in the extension-based approach.
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evant local function can easily be identiﬁed by taking into account this requirement (again, the fact that such local function 
is the canonical one holds in virtue of Proposition 5).
Deﬁnition 25. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ), FST(AF, I , LI , RI )  {Lab ∈ FCO(AF, I ,
LI , RI ) | ∀A ∈ Ar, Lab(A) = undec}.
Theorem 4. Stable semantics ST is fully decomposable and FST is its canonical local function.
Example 4. Consider again the running example of Fig. 1. Taking into account the results provided in Example 2
for the local function of complete semantics, it is easy to see that FST(AF↓{A,B,C}, {D}, {(D, out)}, {(D, A)}) = ∅, that 
FST(AF↓{A,B,C}, {D}, {(D, in)}, {(D, A)}) = {{(A, out), (B, in), (C, out)}}, and for AF↓{D} that FST(AF↓{D}, {A}, {(A, out)},
{(A, D)}) = {{(D, in)}}, FST(AF↓{D}, {A}, {(A, in)}, {(A, D)}) = {{(D, out)}}. Accordingly, there is just a pair of compatible 
local labellings, namely {(A, out), (B, in), (C, out)} and {(D, in)}, giving rise to the unique stable labelling {(A, out),
(B, in), (C, out), (D, in)}.
4.3. Grounded and preferred semantics
As in the previous cases, the canonical local functions of grounded and preferred semantics can be obtained by ex-
tending the deﬁnition of grounded and preferred labelling, respectively. Proposition 6 identiﬁes these functions, also 
showing that the relevant deﬁnitions are well-founded, in particular, that there is always a unique minimal labelling in 
FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ) and that FPR(AF, I , LI , RI ) is nonempty.
Proposition 6. The canonical local function of grounded and preferred semantics are deﬁned as
• FGR(AF, I , LI , RI )  {L∗}, where L∗ is the minimal (w.r.t. 	) labelling in FCO(AF, I , LI , RI )
• FPR(AF, I , LI , RI )  {L | L is a maximal (w.r.t. 	) labelling in FCO(AF, I , LI , RI )}.
Differently from stable semantics, grounded semantics and preferred semantics do not inherit decomposability from 
complete semantics. The reason is that the deﬁnition of grounded/preferred labelling includes a minimization/maximization 
requirement, and satisfying this requirement in all of the subframeworks does not entail satisfying it at the level of the 
whole framework. To show this, consider the following counterexample.9
Example 5. We have shown in Example 2 that in the running example of Fig. 1 the outcome of FCO is a unique labelling 
in all cases, thus by deﬁnition it coincides with the outcome of FGR and FPR . Given the compatibility constraint, exactly 
two global labellings arise from the combinations of the outcomes of FCO , namely {(A, undec), (B, undec), (C, undec),
(D, undec)} and {(A, out), (B, in), (C, out), (D, in)}. The former is the grounded labelling, the latter is the preferred 
labelling: it turns out that the combination of two “locally grounded” labellings gives rise not just to the “global” grounded 
labelling but also to the preferred labelling, and analogously that the combination of two “locally preferred” labellings gives 
rise not just to the “global” preferred labelling but also to the grounded one. This shows that grounded and preferred 
semantics are not bottom-up decomposable.
Now, a question arises as to whether satisfying the minimization/maximization requirement at the level of the whole 
argumentation framework entails that such requirement is satisﬁed at the local level, i.e. whether grounded and preferred 
semantics are top-down decomposable. This result turns out to be true and is achieved through some intermediate steps.
First, Lemma 1 shows that if a labelling produced by FAD does not belong to FCO then there is an undec-labelled 
argument which can be labelled in or out obtaining a labelling still in FAD .
Lemma 1. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ), where AF = (Ar, att), let L be a labelling such that 
L ∈ FAD(AF, I , LI , RI ) and L /∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ). Then there is an argument A ∈ Ar such that L(A) = undec and a labelling 
LA ∈ FAD(AF, I , LI , RI ) such that LA(A) ∈ {in, out} and ∀B ∈ Ar : B = A, LA(B) = L(B).
Lemma 2 shows that for every labelling produced by FAD there is a more or equally committed labelling produced by 
FCO .
Lemma 2. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ), for every labelling L1 ∈ FAD(AF, I , LI , RI ) there 
exists a labelling L2 ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ) such that L1 	 L2 .
9 A counterexample to decomposability of grounded semantics is provided also in [40].
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Proposition 7 shows a sort of monotonicity property of FCO with respect to the 	 relation.
Proposition 7. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ), let LI 1, LI 2 ∈ LI be two labellings of I such 
that LI
1 	 LI 2 . Then it holds that
1. ∀L1 ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI 1, RI ), ∃L2 ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI 2, RI ) such that L1 	 L2; and
2. ∀L2 ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI 2, RI ), ∃L1 ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI 1, RI ) such that L1 	 L2 .
Building on the above results (more speciﬁcally, using the ﬁrst point for Theorem 6 and the second point for Theorem 5) 
we are now in a position to prove that grounded and preferred semantics are top-down decomposable.
Theorem 5. Given an argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att), let L be the grounded labelling of AF. For any set P ⊆ Ar, L↓P ∈
FGR(AF↓P , P inp, L↓P inp , P R).
Theorem 6. Given an argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att), let L be a preferred labelling of AF. For any set P ⊆ Ar, L↓P ∈
FPR(AF↓P , P inp, L↓P inp , P R).
While preferred and complete semantics fail to achieve bottom-up decomposability for arbitrary partitions, they turn 
out to be bottom-up decomposable (thus fully decomposable) w.r.t. F∪SCC . The result, proved in Theorem 7, is based 
on a preliminary lemma, which roughly states that if a semantics S is top-down decomposable then a kind of top-down 
decomposability relation holds for any labelling L ∈ FS(AF, I , LI , RI ) w.r.t. any set of arguments P in AF . More speciﬁcally, 
given such a labelling L and P , it is possible to refer to a “restricted” argumentation framework with input based on P , 
namely (AF↓P , P F-inp, (L∪ LI )↓P F-inp , P RF ), where intuitively P F-inp, (L∪ LI )↓P F-inp , and P RF are obtained by considering 
both I and AF (outside P ). Then, the restriction of L to P is produced by FS when applied to the restricted argumentation 
framework with input mentioned above.
Lemma 3. Let S be a complete-compatible semantics which is top-down decomposable, with the canonical local function FS. Given an 
argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ), consider a labelling L ∈ FS(AF, I , LI , RI ) and let P ⊆ Ar be an arbitrary 
set of arguments of AF. Then, letting P F-inp  P inp ∪ {A ∈I | ∃B ∈ P , (A, B) ∈ RI } and P RF  P R ∪ (RI ∩ (I × P )), it holds that 
L↓P ∈ FS(AF↓P , P F-inp, (L∪ LI )↓P F-inp , P RF ).
Theorem 7. Grounded and preferred semantics are decomposable w.r.t. F∪SCC.
Example 6. Consider AF = ({A, B, C, D, E}, {(A, B), (B, C), (C, D), (D, C), (D, B), (C, E), (D, E)}) and the partition {P1, P2} ∈
F∪SCC(AF) where P1 = {A, E} and P2 = {B, C, D} (see Fig. 3). It holds that P1inp = {C, D}, P1R = {(C, E), (D, E)}, 
P2inp = {A}, P2R = {(A, B)}. Note that the partition is not “acyclic”, in that P1 attacks P2 and P2 attacks P1. We 
show that both in the case of grounded semantics and of preferred semantics the union of compatible local labellings 
gives rise to the grounded labelling or a preferred labelling, respectively. First, note that any labelling returned by FGR
and FPR applied to AF↓P1 prescribes that A is labelled in, therefore it suﬃces to consider the labelling {(A, in)}
for the unique input argument of P2. As to grounded semantics, it turns out that FGR(AF↓P2 , {A}, {(A, in)}, {(A, B)}) ={{(B, out), (C, undec), (D, undec)}}, while FGR(AF↓P1 , {C, D}, {(C, undec), (D, undec)}, {(C, E), (D, E)}) = {{(A, in),
(E, undec)}}. We have a unique pair of compatible local labellings which give rise to the global labelling {(A, in), (B, out),
(C, undec), (D, undec), (E, undec)}, i.e. the grounded labelling of AF . As to preferred semantics, FPR(AF↓P2 , {A}, {(A, in)},{(A, B)}) returns two labellings, i.e. {(B, out), (C, in), (D, out)} and {(B, out), (C, out), (D, in)}, while FPR(AF↓P1 , {C, D},
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{(C, in), (D, out)}, {(C, E), (D, E)}) = FPR(AF↓P1 , {C, D}, {(C, out), (D, in)}, {(C, E), (D, E)}) = {{(A, in), (E, out)}}. Ac-
cordingly, the union of compatible local labellings gives rise to {(A, in), (B, out), (C, in), (D, out), (E, out)} and 
{(A, in), (B, out), (C, out), (D, in), (E, out)}, i.e. the preferred labellings of AF .
4.4. Ideal semantics
Similarly to the cases analyzed in the previous sections, the canonical local function of ideal semantics corresponds to 
an extension of the deﬁnition of ideal labelling. The following proposition identiﬁes the relevant deﬁnition, also showing 
that it is well founded (in particular, that F ID(AF, I , LI , RI ) always returns a unique labelling).
Proposition 8. The canonical local function of ideal semantics is deﬁned as F ID(AF, I , LI , RI )  {L∗}, where L∗ is the maximal 
(w.r.t. 	) labelling in FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ) such that for each LP ∈ FPR(AF, I , LI , RI ) it holds that L∗ 	 LP .
Ideal semantics has some common features both with preferred and with grounded semantics: on the one hand, its 
deﬁnition is based on the preferred labellings, on the other hand it yields a unique labelling, like the grounded semantics. As 
a matter of fact, a formal skepticism comparison between semantics shows that ideal semantics lies between grounded and 
preferred semantics [9]. Ideal semantics does not inherit any decomposability property from them: the following example 
shows that ideal semantics is neither top-down nor bottom-up decomposable even w.r.t. FSCC .
Example 7. AF = ({A, B, C, D, E}, {(A, B), (B, A), (A, C), (C, A), (B, C), (C, B), (C, D), (D, E), (E, D)}) has the unique partition 
{S1, S2} ∈FSCC(AF), where S1 = {A, B, C} and S2 = {D, E} are the strongly connected components of AF (see Fig. 4). There 
are 5 preferred labellings of AF and there is no argument which is labelled in in all of them, thus the ideal labelling 
L∗ leaves all of the arguments undecided. To show that ideal semantics is not top-down decomposable w.r.t. FSCC , it is 
suﬃcient to note that L∗↓S2 = {(D, undec), (E, undec)}, while it turns out that F ID(AF↓S2 , {C}, {(C, undec)}, {(C, D)}) ={{(D, out), (E, in)}}.
To show that ideal semantics is not bottom-up decomposable w.r.t. FSCC , consider ﬁrst the application of F ID to AF↓S1 : 
it is easy to see that F ID(AF↓S1 , ∅, ∅, ∅) = {(A, undec), (B, undec), (C, undec)}, since AF↓S1 admits the three preferred 
labellings where one of the three arguments {A, B, C} is in and the others are out. Moreover, we already know that 
F ID(AF↓S2 , {C}, {(C, undec)}, {(C, D)}) = {{(D, out), (E, in)}}, thus the labellings {(A, undec), (B, undec), (C, undec)}
and {{(D, out), (E, in)}} are compatible. However, the union of these two labellings does not coincide with the ideal 
labelling L∗ .
The previous example contradicts10 a result presented in [33], according to which ideal semantics is decomposable w.r.t. 
partitions including two elements one of which is unattacked (i.e. does not receive attacks from outside, S1 in Fig. 4). The 
reason why ideal semantics is not decomposable is that, considering a strongly connected component P , the restriction of 
the ideal labelling to the input arguments of P does not always carry enough information to compute the restriction of the 
ideal labelling to P . In the previous example, argument C is labelled undec by the ideal labelling while it is labelled in or 
out by the preferred labellings, i.e. those which actually determine the ideal labelling according to Deﬁnition 8.
4.5. Semi-stable semantics
The deﬁnition of semi-stable semantics somewhat resembles that of preferred semantics, in that semi-stable labellings 
correspond to those preferred labellings which satisfy the additional requirement of minimizing the set of arguments la-
belled undec. The following proposition shows that the canonical local function is deﬁned accordingly.
10 A detailed discussion of this matter is given in [11].
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Proposition 9. The canonical local function of semi-stable semantics is deﬁned as FSST(AF, I , LI , RI )  {L | L ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI ,
RI ) such that undec(L) is minimal w.r.t. set inclusion}.
Differently from all semantics considered above, semi-stable semantics is not directional [8], i.e. given an unattacked set 
of arguments S the labellings computed in AF↓S do not correspond to the restrictions of the labellings of AF in S . As shown 
in the following two examples, this behavior prevents the satisfaction of top-down and bottom-up decomposability even 
w.r.t. FSCC .
Example 8. To show that semi-stable semantics is not top-down decomposable w.r.t. FSCC , consider AF = ({A, B, C, D},
{(A, B), (B, A), (B, C), (C, B), (C, C), (A, D), (D, D)}), where SCCSAF = {P1, P2} with P1 = {A, B, C} and P2 = {D} (see 
Fig. 5). There are two semi-stable labellings in AF , namely L1 = {(A, in), (B, out), (C, undec), (D, out)} and L2 =
{(A, out), (B, in), (C, out), (D, undec)}. Consider then the partition {P1, P2} ∈ FSCC(AF) where P1 is unattacked. Note 
in particular that L1↓P1 = {(A, in), (B, out), (C, undec)}, which however does not belong to FSST(AF↓P1 , ∅, ∅, ∅), since the 
only semi-stable labelling in AF↓P1 is {(A, out), (B, in), (C, out)}.
Example 9. To show that semi-stable semantics is not bottom-up decomposable w.r.t. FSCC , consider the argumenta-
tion framework AF = ({A, B, C}, {(A, B), (B, A), (B, C), (C, C)}) and the partition {P1, P2} ∈ FSCC(AF) with P1 = {A, B} and 
P2 = {C} (see Fig. 6). It is easy to see that {(A, in), (B, out)} ∈ FSST(AF↓P1 , ∅, ∅, ∅), and that FSST(AF↓P2 , {B}, {(B, out)},{(B, C)}) = {{(C, undec)}}. Now, the union of these compatible labellings, i.e. {(A, in), (B, out), (C, undec)}, is not a semi-
stable labelling of AF , since the unique semi-stable labelling of AF is {(A, out), (B, in), (C, out)}.
5. Effect-dictated semantics
This short section introduces the simple concept of effect-dictated semantics, which is crucial for the analysis to be 
carried out in the next section. For every semantics S analyzed in Section 4, it can be noted that FS(AF, I , LI , RI ) may 
return the same result given different I , LI and RI . For instance, if an argument A of AF is attacked by an argument 
of I which is labelled in, then FS returns the same set of labellings independently of the presence and the number of 
additional attackers of A in I . The effect of (I , LI , RI ) on the arguments Args of AF can be modelled as the labelling 
that would be induced on Args by neglecting the attacks inside AF . For instance, if an argument A of AF is only attacked 
through RI by out-labelled arguments according to LI , then A would be in in the case that it does not receive other 
attacks inside AF .11 The following deﬁnition formalizes this intuition.
Deﬁnition 26. Given a set of arguments I , a labelling LI ∈ LI , a set of arguments Args such that I ∩ Args = ∅ and a 
relation RINP ⊆I × Args, the effect of (I , LI , RINP) on Args, denoted as effArgs(I , LI , RINP), is deﬁned as
11 The effect is a bit different for admissible semantics, but this does not affect its technical treatment, as well as the subsequent results.
158 P. Baroni et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 217 (2014) 144–197Fig. 7. Summarizing a chain of arguments (Example 10).
{
(A,out) | A ∈ Args,∃B ∈I : (B, A) ∈ RINP ∧ LI (B) = in
} ∪
{
(A,undec) | A ∈ Args,∃B ∈I : (B, A) ∈ RINP ∧ LI (B) = undec,C ∈I : (C, A) ∈ RINP ∧ LI (C) = in
} ∪
{
(A,in) | A ∈ Args,B ∈I : (B, A) ∈ RINP ∧ LI (B) ∈ {in,undec}
}
By deﬁnition, effArgs(I , LI , RINP) only depends on the labelling of the arguments in I that attack Args through RINP . 
Moreover each argument in Args not receiving attacks from I is labelled in according to effArgs(I , LI , RINP). Thus, in 
the particular case where I = ∅ (thus also LI and RINP are empty), it turns out that effArgs(∅, ∅, ∅) = {(A, in) | A ∈ Args}.
The following lemma proves a monotonic relation between labellings and effects.
Lemma 4. Given a set of arguments I , two labellings L1I , L
2
I ∈ LI , a set of arguments Args such that I ∩ Args = ∅ and a relation 
RINP ⊆I × Args, if L1I 	 L2I then effArgs(I , L1I , RINP) 	 effArgs(I , L2I , RINP).
A semantics S is said to be effect-dictated if, given AF = (Ar, att), FS(AF, I , LI , RI ) only depends on effAr(I , LI , RI ), 
rather than on the whole labelling LI and the speciﬁc relation RI .
Deﬁnition 27. A semantics S is effect-dictated if (effAr(I1, LI1 , RI1 ) = effAr(I2, LI2 , RI2 )) ⇒ FS(AF, I1, LI1 , RI1 ) =
FS(AF, I2, LI2 , RI2 ) for every AF, I1, I2, LI1 , LI2 , RI1 and RI2 , where AF = (Ar, att) is an argumentation framework, 
I1 and I2 are two sets of arguments such that I1 ∩ Ar = ∅ and I2 ∩ Ar = ∅, LI1 ∈ LI1 and LI2 ∈ LI2 two labellings of 
I1 and I2 respectively, and RI1 ⊆I1 × Ar and RI2 ⊆I2 × Ar two relations.
All the semantics considered in this paper are effect-dictated as shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 10. Every semantics S ∈ {AD, CO, ST, GR, PR, ID, SST} is effect-dictated.
6. Argumentation multipoles and their interchangeability
In this section, we introduce argumentation multipoles, that are conceived as modular components equipped with a 
well-deﬁned interface to connect with each other and may play the role of “partial” frameworks in the context of a global 
one. This yields the possibility of replacing a component with another one which is equivalent as far as the Input/Output 
behavior is concerned.
6.1. The notion of argumentation multipole
The ﬁrst step to provide a systematic treatment of argumentation multipoles is to identify a deﬁnition to capture their 
structure in the most general way. To this aim, we consider a number of examples, starting from a common component, i.e. 
a chain of arguments.
Example 10. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Fig. 7. AF2 can be obtained from AF1 by “sum-
marizing” the component M1, including the arguments A1, A2, A3, A4, with the component M2, including the arguments 
A1 and A2: according to any complete-compatible semantics considered in this paper, the labellings restricted to E1 and E2, 
i.e. the arguments common to AF1 and AF2, are the same in the two frameworks, i.e. E1 is labelled in and E2 is labelled 
out. More generally, consider a ﬁnite sequence of n arguments A1, . . . , An such that each argument attacks the subsequent 
one, i.e. Ai attacks Ai+1 with 1 ≤ i < n and suppose that only A1 can receive further attacks from other arguments and 
only An can attack other arguments. Then it is intuitive to see that the “black-box behavior” of a sequence of arguments of 
this kind, whose external “terminals” are A1 and An , only depends on whether n is even or odd. In fact, the behavior of 
any even-length sequence is the same as in the case n = 2 (if A1 is in then An is out, if A1 is out then An is in, if A1
is undec then An is undec), while for any odd-length sequence the behavior is the same as the one of A1 alone (with n
odd, An gets necessarily the same label as A1).
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Fig. 9. Summarizing two contradicting arguments attacking an argument O (Example 12).
On the basis of the previous example, a modular component may tentatively be deﬁned as an argumentation frame-
work12 where the “input terminals” and the “output terminals” are explicitly identiﬁed (e.g. AF1↓{A1,...,A4} in the example, 
where A1 is the unique input terminal and A4 in the unique output terminal). Two components can be interchanged only 
if they have the same input and output terminals, and this interchange does not modify the attacks relating these terminals 
with the unchanged arguments (E1 and E2 in the example). However, the following two examples show that this approach 
is too restrictive, since there are cases where it is useful to modify both the set of input and output terminals as well as the 
relevant attack relation.
Example 11. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Fig. 8. AF2 can be obtained from AF1 by sum-
marizing the component M1, including the arguments A1, A2, B1, B2, O , with the component M2 including the argument 
O only: according to all complete-compatible semantics considered in this paper the arguments E1, E2 and E3 are labelled 
in both in AF1 and AF2. More generally, the black-box behavior of M1 is the same as the one of M2, since in M1 A2 gets 
the same label as E1 and B2 gets the same label as E2, thus the label of O is the same as in M2. As a consequence, one 
may expect that M1 can be interchanged with M2 also in more articulated examples. Note that while M1 has two input 
terminals, M2 has only one input terminal coinciding with the unique output one.
Example 12. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Fig. 9 and assume preferred semantics is 
adopted. AF2 can be obtained from AF1 by summarizing the component M1, including the arguments A1, A2 and O , with 
the component M2 including the arguments I and O : both in AF1 and AF2 the argument E1 is labelled in, E2 is labelled 
out and E3 is labelled in. More generally, under preferred semantics the black-box behavior of M1 is the same as the one 
of M2: if E2 is in then O is in, if E2 is out then O is out (in particular M1 admits a labelling where A1 is in, A2
is out and O is out, and a labelling where A1 is out, A2 is in and O is out), if E2 is undec then O is undec. As a 
consequence, one may expect that M1 can be interchanged with M2 also in more articulated examples. Note that while 
M1 receives two attacks from E2 in AF1, M2 receives one attack only in AF2.
The previous examples show that the deﬁnition of a modular component should include the input attack relation RINP , 
consisting of the attacks from the arguments that are not part of the component to the arguments that belong to the 
component itself: this way, the deﬁnition leaves room for replacements of modular components that lead to changes in the 
input attack relation, as in the previous example. A similar reasoning concerns the output attack relation ROUTP , including 
the attacks from a modular component towards the outside arguments. In any case, there is no need to explicitly model 
the input and output terminals, since they can easily be derived from the input and output attack relations. Inspired by the 
12 This approach has been followed in our paper [2], leading to the notion of Input/Output Argumentation Framework.
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digital logic ﬁeld, we call the resulting structure an Argumentation Multipole. In order to express RINP and ROUTP , without 
loss of generality we deﬁne an Argumentation Multipole w.r.t. a set E , i.e. w.r.t. the set of arguments that are not part of the 
multipole and thus remain unchanged if the multipole is replaced.
Deﬁnition 28. An Argumentation Multipole (or, brieﬂy, multipole) M w.r.t. a set E is a tuple (AF, RINP, ROUTP), where letting 
AF = (Ar, att) it holds that Ar∩ E = ∅, RINP ⊆ E ×Ar, and ROUTP ⊆ Ar× E . Extending the notation introduced in Deﬁnition 10, 
we denote as M inp the set {A ∈ E | ∃B ∈ Ar, (A, B) ∈ RINP}, i.e. including the arguments of E which attack Ar through RINP . 
Moreover, we denote as M outp the set {A ∈ Ar | ∃B ∈ E, (A, B) ∈ ROUTP}, i.e. including the arguments of AF attacking E
through ROUTP .
Fig. 10 provides a graphical representation of the deﬁnition. For instance, in Example 10 M1 = (AF1↓{A1,A2,A3,A4},{(E1, A1)}, {(A4, E2)}) and M2 = (AF2↓{A1,A2}, {(E1, A1)}, {(A2, E2)}), in Example 11 it holds that M1 = (AF1↓{A1,A2,B1,B2,O },{(E1, A1), (E2, B1)}, {(O , E3)}) and M2 = (AF2↓{O }, {(E1, O ), (E2, O )}, {(O , E3)}), in Example 12 M1 = (AF1↓{A1,A2,O },{(E2, A1), (E2, A2)}, {(O , E3)}) and M2 = (AF2↓{I,O }, {(E2, I)}, {(O , E3)}).
A particular multipole which is useful to consider in some practical examples is the empty multipole M∅  (AF∅, ∅, ∅), 
i.e. including the empty argumentation framework AF∅ . It is easy to see that M∅ inp =M∅outp = ∅.
6.2. Input/Output equivalence of argumentation multipoles
After having introduced the deﬁnition of argumentation multipole, the next step is to formally characterize the relevant 
“black-box behavior”: this way, the Input/Output equivalence relation between multipoles can be identiﬁed as the one 
relating the multipoles having the same behavior.
When a multipole w.r.t. a set E is “connected to the external world” it “receives” some input from outside through 
the relation RINP and “produces” an output which is induced by the labellings of the multipole and transferred to the 
set E through the relation ROUTP . Technically speaking, the labellings and thus the relation between input and output 
are determined by a (semantics speciﬁc) local function, thus the equivalence relation between argumentation multipoles 
depends on the considered semantics S, and is called S-equivalence to reﬂect this dependency. For instance, in Example 12
M1 and M2 are PR-equivalent (i.e. equivalent under preferred semantics), while they are not GR-equivalent, since under 
grounded semantics if E2 is labelled out then O in M1 is labelled undec, while O in M2 is labelled out. Intuitively, M1
is GR-equivalent e.g. to a multipole M ′2 obtained from M2 by adding a self-attack from I to I itself.
According to the above examples, two argumentation multipoles w.r.t. the same set E may be tentatively deﬁned as 
S-equivalent if for any possible input, i.e. any labelling of E , FS produces the same labellings of the output terminals in 
the two argumentation multipoles. For instance, in Example 12 under preferred semantics O is in for any labelling where 
E2 is in, it is out for any labelling where E2 is out and it is undec for any labelling where E2 is undec. However, 
this approach works only in case the two multipoles have the same output terminals. Moreover, as the following example 
shows, the way E is affected by the labellings of an argumentation multipole (AF, RINP, ROUTP) also depends on the attack 
relation ROUTP .
Example 13. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Fig. 11 and the application of preferred seman-
tics. The multipole M1 = (AF1↓{O1,O2}, ∅, {(O 1, E), (O 2, E)}) w.r.t. {E} in AF1 affects the argument E by means of the two 
arguments O 1 and O 2, while M2 = (AF2↓{O }, ∅, {(O , E)}) in AF2 affects E by means of the argument O . Intuitively, under 
preferred semantics M1 and M2 are equivalent: in M1 there are two preferred labellings, i.e. {(O 1, in), (O 2, out)} and 
{(O 1, out), (O 2, in)}, thus in any case an argument labelled in attacks E making it out, and similarly M2 interacts with 
E making it out, since M2 admits the unique labelling {(O , in)}.
We can formalize these intuitions by extending the notion of effect to multipoles (see Deﬁnition 26). Let us consider a 
semantics S. Given a multipole M w.r.t. a set E , for any “input” labelling LE ∈ LE the local function FS prescribes a set of 
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labellings for M . Each of these labellings has its own effect on E , therefore the global effect of the multipole receiving an 
input LE is a set of labellings of E whose members are all the single effects.
Deﬁnition 29. Let M = (AF, RINP, ROUTP) a multipole w.r.t. a set E and S an argumentation semantics. Given a labelling 
LE ∈ LE , the S-effect of (M , LE) on E , denoted as S-effE (M , LE ), is deﬁned as {effE (M outp, L↓M outp , ROUTP) | L ∈
FS(AF, M inp, LE↓M inp , RINP)}.
Note that if FS(AF, M inp, LE↓M inp , RINP) = ∅, i.e. the local function prescribes no labelling, then S-effE (M , LE ) = ∅.
Example 14. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Fig. 12, and the multipoles M1 =
(AF1↓{A1,A2,A3,A4}, ∅, {(A3, E)}) w.r.t. {E} and M2 = (AF2↓{B1,B2}, ∅, {(B2, E)}) w.r.t. {E}. M1 has two preferred labellings, one 
where A3 is in and another where A3 is out, hence PR-eff{E}(M1, ∅) = {{(E1, in)}, {(E1, out)}}. Similarly, M2 has two 
preferred labellings, one where B2 is in and another where B2 is out, leading to PR-eff{E}(M1, ∅) = PR-eff{E}(M2, ∅).
It is worth considering the effect of the empty multipole M∅ . Intuitively, M∅ should have no effect on the arguments 
of E , i.e. all of them should be assigned the label in according to the effect itself. Technically, this is guaranteed if the 
semantics is deﬁned in such a way as to prescribe the unique possible labelling ∅ to the empty argumentation framework 
AF∅ , as it happens for any semantics considered in this paper. Intuitively, if this were not the case the empty multipole 
would prevent the identiﬁcation of any labelling for the whole argumentation framework, yielding to a pathological be-
havior. Accordingly, the condition LS(AF∅) = {∅} is required in all the following propositions and theorems13 referring to a 
generic semantics S.
Proposition 11. Consider a semantics S such that LS(AF∅) = {∅}. Given a set of arguments E and a labelling LE ∈ LE , it holds that 
S-effE (M∅, LE ) = {{(A, in) | A ∈ E}}.
13 The reader may wonder why this condition has never been considered in the context of decomposability properties. The reason is that decomposability 
refers to partitions of the argumentation framework, which by deﬁnition include nonempty sets only.
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Two multipoles M1 and M2 w.r.t. E can be considered S-equivalent if, for any possible labelling LE ∈ LE , S-effE(M1, LE )
= S-effE (M2, LE ). For reasons that will be clear later, it is also useful to identify multipoles that have the same effect only 
for a subset of input labellings: in order to capture this possibility, we deﬁne equivalence under a set of labellings of E .
Deﬁnition 30. Two multipoles M1 and M2 w.r.t. a set E are Input/Output S-equivalent (or simply S-equivalent) under a set 
of labellings L′ ⊆ LE iff for any labelling LE ∈ L′ it holds that S-effE (M1, LE) = S-effE (M2, LE). The multipoles M1 and 
M2 are S-equivalent iff they are S-equivalent under LE .
It is easy to see that if two multipoles w.r.t. E are S-equivalent then they are S-equivalent under any set L′ ⊆ LE .
In Example 10, Example 11 and Example 14 M1 and M2 are GR-equivalent and PR-equivalent, while in Example 12 and 
Example 13 M1 and M2 are PR-equivalent but not GR-equivalent.
6.3. Replacements and transparent argumentation semantics
As anticipated by previous examples, an argumentation multipole can be viewed as a component of an argumentation 
framework that can be replaced with another multipole giving rise to a (possibly) different argumentation framework. In 
particular, given an argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att), one may partition the set of arguments Args into two sets, 
i.e. a set E which is not involved in the replacement and the set D1 = Ar \ E which is replaced along with the relevant 
attacks: the set D1 identiﬁes the multipole M1 = (AF↓D1 , att∩ (E × D1), att∩ (D1 × E)) w.r.t. E , which can be replaced with 
another multipole M2 w.r.t. the same set E . For later use in the paper, it is worth identifying those replacements such that 
a partition belonging to the set returned by a selector F is enforced both before and after the replacement.
Deﬁnition 31. Let AF = (Ar, att) be an argumentation framework, and E ⊆ Ar be a subset of its arguments. Let D1 = Ar \ E , 
R1INP = att∩ (E × D1) and R1OUTP = att∩ (D1 × E). A replacement R is a tuple (AF, M1, M2) where M1 = (AF↓D1 , R1INP, R1OUTP)
and M2 is an argumentation multipole w.r.t. E . The set E is called the invariant set of the replacement R . Assuming 
M2 = ((D2, RD2 ), R2INP, R2OUTP), the result of the replacement R , denoted as T (R), is the argumentation framework AF2 =
(E ∪ D2, (att ∩ E × E) ∪ R2INP ∪ RD2 ∪ R2OUTP). Given a partition selector F , a replacement (AF, M1, M2) is F -preserving if 
both ({E, D1} \ ∅) ∈F (AF) and ({E, D2} \ ∅) ∈F (T (AF, M1, M2)).
It is easy to see that T (AF, M1, M1) = AF . Moreover, letting AF2 = T (AF, M1, M2) it holds that T (AF2, M2, M1) = AF . 
Note that, in the deﬁnition of F -preserving replacement, the empty set is excluded from the requirement of belonging to 
F (AF). The reason is that by deﬁnition the empty set does not belong to any partition, however in case one of the sets in 
{E, D1} or {E, D2} is empty then it is sensible to require only the nonempty set to belong to F (AF).
In Examples 10–14, the result of the replacement (AF1, M1, M2) is the argumentation framework AF2.
While Deﬁnition 31 leaves room for any possible replacement, not all of them can be considered legitimate. In partic-
ular, we seek for replacements involving multipoles having the same Input/Output behavior, otherwise in most cases the 
labellings of the resulting frameworks would be different in the invariant set E , leading to changes in the status assignment 
of the relevant arguments. For instance, in Example 10 replacing M1 in AF1 with a multipole including a single argument 
(or an odd-length chain of arguments) would change the label assigned to E2 from out to in. In order to explore the 
notion of legitimate replacements, let us consider an issue arising e.g. in the following example.
Example 15. Consider the application of preferred semantics on the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in 
Fig. 13, where M1 = (AF1↓{A1,A2,A3}, {(E1, A1), (E2, A1)}, {(A3, E1)}) and M2 = (AF2↓{C}, {(E1, C), (E2, C)}, {(C, E1)}) are 
two argumentation multipoles w.r.t. {E1, E2}, AF2 = T (R) with R = (AF1, M1, M2), and the invariant set of the replace-
ment R is E = {E1, E2}. The multipole M1 is not PR-equivalent to M2: considering the labelling {(E1, out), (E2, out)}
FPR prescribes for M1 the unique labelling {(A1, undec), (A2, undec), (A3, undec)}, whose effect on {E1, E2} is 
{(E1, undec), (E2, in)}, while FPR prescribes for M2 the unique labelling {(C, in)}, whose effect on {E1, E2} is 
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{(E1, out), (E2, out)} is impossible both in AF1 and in AF2. As to AF1, if A3 is in then FPR prescribes for {E1, E2} the 
labelling {(E1, out), (E2, in)}, if A3 is out then it prescribes the labellings {(E1, out), (E2, in)} and {(E1, in), (E2, out)}, 
if A3 is undec then it prescribes the labelling {(E1, out), (E2, in)}. As to AF2, the situation is the same. Summing up, 
the set of labellings that can be “seen” by M1 and M2 is LPRR = {{(E1, out), (E2, in)}, {(E1, in), (E2, out)}}, under which 
M1 and M2 turn out to be PR-equivalent. In fact, for each of the labellings in LPRR , FPR prescribes for M1 the unique 
labelling {(A1, out), (A2, in), (A3, out)}, whose effect on {E1, E2} is {(E1, in), (E2, in)}, and FPR prescribes for M2 the 
unique labelling {(C, out)}, whose effect on {E1, E2} is again {(E1, in), (E2, in)}.
Thus, a replacement may be considered as legitimate even if the involved multipoles are not equivalent under all la-
bellings, provided that they are equivalent under the possible ones (in a sense, input labellings that never occur are neglected 
as the “don’t care terms” in digital logic). Of course, one may accept to replace a multipole only with an equivalent one, 
since in this case equivalence holds independently of the context (in particular, the multipoles would remain equivalent 
even modifying the attack relations between arguments of the invariant set E). In order to distinguish between the two 
cases, a replacement is called contextually legitimate in the ﬁrst case, and simply legitimate in the latter. Independently of its 
legitimacy properties, we call safe a replacement that does not yield modiﬁcations of the labellings in E .
Deﬁnition 32. Let S be an argumentation semantics and AF = (Ar, att) be an argumentation framework. A replacement R =
(AF, M1, M2) with invariant set E is S-legitimate if M1 and M2 are S-equivalent, it is contextually S-legitimate if M1 and 
M2 are S-equivalent under LSR , where L
S
R  {FS(AF↓E , M1outp, L1, R1OUTP) | L1 ∈ LM1outp} ∪ {FS(AF↓E , M2outp, L2, R2OUTP) |
L2 ∈ LM2outp }. Moreover, R is S-safe if {L↓E | L ∈ LS(AF)} = {L↓E | L ∈ LS(T (AF, M1, M2))}.
It is easy to see that every legitimate replacement is also contextually legitimate. For instance, in Example 12 the re-
placement (AF1, M1, M2) is PR-legitimate and PR-safe, it is not contextually GR-legitimate nor GR-safe. In Example 15 the 
replacement (AF1, M1, M2) is contextually PR-legitimate (but not PR-legitimate) and PR-safe, and the same holds according 
to grounded semantics.
The examples presented so far may give the impression that for any semantics S a (possibly contextually) S-legitimate 
replacement is always S-safe, i.e. replacing a multipole with an equivalent multipole preserves the labellings in the invariant 
set of the replacement. This property may seem natural and easy to prove, however it is shown in Section 8 that it does not 
hold for all semantics: we denote as transparent the semantics such that legitimate replacements are always safe, strongly 
transparent the semantics such that contextually legitimate replacements are always safe. Similarly to decomposability, also 
transparency may hold under a restriction on the partition identiﬁed by the multipoles that are replaced: accordingly, we 
introduce the concept of transparency w.r.t. a partition selector F .
Deﬁnition 33. A semantics S is transparent if any S-legitimate replacement is S-safe, it is strongly transparent if any con-
textually S-legitimate replacement is S-safe. Given a partition selector F , a semantics S is transparent w.r.t. F if any 
F -preserving and S-legitimate replacement is S-safe, it is strongly transparent w.r.t. F if any F -preserving and contextu-
ally S-legitimate replacement is S-safe.
Since any (F -preserving) legitimate replacement is also contextually legitimate, any strongly transparent semantics 
(w.r.t. F ) is also transparent (w.r.t. F ).
A limit case which is theoretically interesting to consider is a replacement (AF, M1, M2) with the invariant set E equal 
to the empty set, i.e. when an entire argumentation framework is replaced by another one.
Proposition 12. Consider a semantics S such that LS(AF∅) = {∅} and a replacement R = (AF, M1, M2) with invariant set E = ∅. 
Letting AF2 = T (R), the following conditions are equivalent:
• R is S-legitimate
• R is contextually S-legitimate
• |LS(AF)| > 0 ∧ |LS(AF2)| > 0, or LS(AF) = LS(AF2) = ∅
• R is S-safe.
Intuitively, there are no preserved arguments, thus the effect of any labelling of AF on the outside empty set is the same 
as the effect of any labelling of AF2. The only difference arises in the case that AF “crashes” (i.e. admits no labellings) while 
AF2 does not exhibit such pathological behavior, or vice versa.
Note that the notions of replacement and transparent semantics refer to partitions of argumentation frameworks into 
just two subframeworks, i.e. one corresponding to the replaced multipole M1 (or the replacing one M2) and the other 
identiﬁed by the invariant set E . This is not restrictive, since one can treat a multiple replacement of several multipoles as 
a sequence of replacements each involving just one multipole. The following proposition shows that safeness is preserved 
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Transparency properties of argumentation semantics.
AD CO ST GR PR ID SST
(Strong) transparency Yes Yes Yes Yes Noa No No
(Strong) transparency w.r.t. F∪SCC and FSCC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
(Strong) transparency in case of acyclic multipoles Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
a holds under additional conditions (see Deﬁnitions 34 and 35).
by a sequence of safe replacements, and the same holds for skeptical and credulous justiﬁcation of those arguments that 
are not replaced.
Proposition 13. Let AF = (Ar, att) be an argumentation framework. Consider a sequence of replacements (R1, R2, . . . , Rn) where 
Ri = (AFi, Mi,1, Mi,2), Ei is the invariant set of Ri, AF1 = AF and, for any 1 < i ≤ n, AFi = T (AFi−1, Mi−1,1, Mi−1,2). Let AF∗ be the 
result of the sequence of replacements, i.e. AF∗ = T (AFn, Mn,1, Mn,2). If all replacements Ri are S-safe, then letting E = E1 ∩ . . .∩ En
it holds that {L↓E | L ∈ LS(AF)} = {L↓E | L ∈ LS(AF∗)}. Moreover, any argument A ∈ E is skeptically/credulously justiﬁed according to 
S in AF if and only if it is skeptically/credulously justiﬁed according to S in AF∗ .
7. The relationship between decomposability and transparency
Intuitively, there is a close relationship between decomposability and transparency: if a semantics is decomposable, 
i.e. the labellings prescribed for an argumentation framework are completely determined by applying the canonical local 
function to the elements of a partition, then one may expect that replacing a multipole with another one having the same 
Input/Output behavior has no impact on the invariant set of the replacement. This intuition is conﬁrmed by Theorem 8, 
showing that decomposability of a semantics S is a suﬃcient condition for strong transparency.
Theorem 8. Consider an effect-dictated semantics S such that LS(AF∅) = {∅}. If S is decomposable w.r.t. a partition selector F then S
is strongly transparent w.r.t. F .
While full decomposability is a suﬃcient condition for strong transparency, it is not necessary. In particular, for a single-
status semantics which is top-down decomposable a relaxed form of bottom-up decomposability is suﬃcient to ensure 
strong transparency. More speciﬁcally, in this case bottom-up decomposability requires the union of local labellings to coin-
cide with the (unique) global labelling. However, just requiring the union of local labellings to be more or equally committed 
than the global labelling is enough to achieve strong transparency, as shown by Theorem 9.
Theorem 9. Let S be an effect-dictated single-status semantics such that LS(AF∅) = {∅}. Suppose that S is top-down decomposable w.r.t. 
a partition selector F and satisﬁes the following property: for any argumentation framework AF and any partition {E, D} ∈F (AF), 
letting L be the labelling prescribed by S for AF, if LE ∈ LE and LD ∈ LD are two labellings such that LE ∈ FS(AF↓E , E inp, LD↓E inp , ER)
and LD ∈ FS(AF↓D , D inp, LE↓D inp , DR), then L 	 LE ∪ LD . Then S is strongly transparent w.r.t. F .
8. Analyzing transparency of argumentation semantics
In this section we discuss the transparency properties of the semantics reviewed in Section 2. A synthetic view of 
the results is given in Table 2 (for all semantics strong transparency turns out to be equivalent to transparency, and any 
transparency property w.r.t. F∪SCC holds if and only if the same property holds w.r.t. FSCC).
8.1. Admissible, complete and stable semantics
As shown in Section 4, admissible, complete and stable semantics satisfy full decomposability: this easily yields strong 
transparency for such semantics.
Theorem 10. Admissible semantics AD, complete semantics CO and stable semantics ST are strongly transparent.
For instance, in Examples 10 and 11 the replacement R = (AF1, M1, M2) is S-legitimate, where S ∈ {AD, CO, ST}, 
therefore it is also S-safe, i.e. {L↓E | L ∈ LS(AF1)} = {L↓E | L ∈ LS(AF2)}. In Examples 12, 13 and 14 R is ST-legitimate, 
in Example 15 it is contextually ST-legitimate, therefore in all cases R is ST-safe. In particular, in Example 15
LST(AF1) = {{(E1, in), (E2, out), (A1, out), (A2, in), (A3, out)}, {(E1, out), (E2, in), (A1, out), (A2, in), (A3, out)}} and 
LST(AF2) = {{(E1, in), (E2, out), (C, out)}, {(E1, out), (E2, in), (C, out)}}, thus the stable labellings restricted to {E1, E2}
are {(E1, out), (E2, in)} and {(E1, in), (E2, out)} both in AF1 and in AF2.
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8.2. Grounded semantics
As shown in Section 4.3, grounded semantics is not fully decomposable but only top-down decomposable.
Theorem 11 shows however that grounded semantics is strongly transparent, building on the result proved in Theorem 9.
Theorem 11. Grounded semantics GR is strongly transparent.
For instance, in Examples 10, 11 and 14 the replacement (AF1, M1, M2) is GR-legitimate, therefore it is also GR-safe. In 
Example 15 the replacement R = (AF1, M1, M2) is contextually GR-legitimate, since LGRR = {{(E1, undec), (E2, undec)},
{(E1, out), (E2, in)}} and M1 and M2 are GR-equivalent under LGRR : as a consequence, R is GR-safe, as it can be seen 
by considering that both the grounded labelling of AF1 and the grounded labelling of AF2 assign to all arguments the label 
undec.
8.3. Preferred semantics
Like grounded semantics, preferred semantics is top-down decomposable but not fully decomposable. However, differ-
ently from grounded semantics, preferred semantics is not transparent, as shown by the following counterexample.
Example 16. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Fig. 14, where AF2 = T (R) with R =
(AF1, M1, M2), and the invariant set of the replacement R is E = {E1, E2}. It turns out that M1 and M2 are PR-equivalent, 
thus R is PR-legitimate. In fact, for any label Lin ∈ LE such that E1 is labelled in the local function FPR prescribes for M1
the unique labelling {(A1, out), (A2, in), (O , undec)}, therefore PR-effE (M1, Lin) = {{(E2, undec), (E1, in)}}, and it pre-
scribes for M2 the unique labelling {(B, out), (C, in), (A1, out), (A2, out), (O , undec)}, therefore also PR-effE (M2, Lin)
= {{(E2, undec), (E1, in)}}. For any label Lout ∈ LE such that E1 is labelled out FPR prescribes for M1 the la-
bellings {(A1, in), (A2, out), (O , out)} and {(A1, out), (A2, in), (O , undec)}, for M2 the labellings {(B, in), (C, out),
(A1, in), (A2, out), (O , out)} and {(B, in), (C, out), (A1, out), (A2, in), (O , undec)}, thus PR-effE (M1, Lout) =
PR-effE (M2, Lout) = {{(E2, in), (E1, in)}, {(E2, undec), (E1, in)}}. For any label Lundec ∈ LE such that E1 is labelled 
undec, FPR prescribes for M1 the unique labelling {(A1, out), (A2, in), (O , undec)}, and it prescribes for M2 the 
unique labelling {(B, undec), (C, undec), (A1, undec), (A2, undec), (O , undec)}, therefore PR-effE(M1, Lundec) =
PR-effE (M2, Lundec) = {{(E2, undec), (E1, in)}}. However, the replacement (AF1, M1, M2) is not PR-safe. In fact, the 
preferred labellings of AF1 are {(A1, in), (A2, out), (O , out), (E2, in), (E1, out)} and {(A1, out), (A2, in), (O , undec),
(E2, undec), (E1, undec)}, while {(B, in), (C, out), (A1, in), (A2, out), (O , out), (E2, in), (E1, out)} is the only pre-
ferred labelling of AF2. Note in particular that E2 is skeptically justiﬁed in AF2 but not in AF1. Interestingly enough, 
considering the application of stable semantics it can be checked that the replacement (AF1, M1, M2) is ST-legitimate, 
therefore according to Theorem 10 it is also ST-safe. In fact, LST(AF1) = {{(A1, in), (A2, out), (O , out), (E2, in), (E1, out)}}
and LST(AF2) = {{(B, in), (C, out), (A1, in), (A2, out), (O , out), (E2, in), (E1, out)}}, therefore both in AF1 and in AF2 the 
argument E1 is labelled out and E2 is labelled in by all stable labellings.
In the previous example a PR-legitimate replacement yields a change in the status assignment of arguments belonging 
to the invariant set E , however it can be noted that their credulous justiﬁcation is preserved, i.e. E2 is credulously justiﬁed 
both in AF1 and AF2, E1 is not credulously justiﬁed either in AF1 or in AF2. Theorem 12 proves that this result holds in 
general.
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ulously justiﬁed according to PR in AF if and only if it is credulously justiﬁed according to PR in T (AF, M1, M2).
While the obtained result is somewhat weak, as it concerns credulous justiﬁcation only, it has to be acknowl-
edged that the counterexample against transparency of PR (Example 16) is rather tricky. In particular, M1 and M2
are PR-equivalent, but they differ in the following aspect. On the one hand, in M1, the local function FPR pre-
scribes for any input labelling Lundec the unique labelling {(A1, out), (A2, in), (O , undec)}, and with the “more com-
mitted” input labelling Lout ∈ LE it returns (among others) the labelling {(A1, in), (A2, out), (O , out)} which is not 
“more committed” than {(A1, out), (A2, in), (O , undec)}, i.e. it is not the case that {(A1, out), (A2, in), (O , undec)} 	
{(A1, in), (A2, out), (O , out)}. On the other hand, in M2 both the labellings returned by the local function FPR with the 
input labelling Lout are “more committed” than the labelling returned by FPR with the input labelling Lundec , i.e. it holds 
that {(B, undec), (C, undec), (A1, undec), (A2, undec), (O , undec)} 	 {(B, in), (C, out), (A1, in), (A2, out), (O , out)}, 
{(B, undec), (C, undec), (A1, undec), (A2, undec), (O , undec)} 	 {(B, in), (C, out), (A1, out), (A2, in), (O , undec)}.
More generally, we deﬁne the notion of homogeneously equivalent argumentation multipoles, corresponding to equivalent 
multipoles that exhibit a sort of mutually regular behavior.
Deﬁnition 34. Two multipoles M1 = (AF1, R1INP, R1OUTP) and M2 = (AF2, R2INP, R2OUTP) w.r.t. a set E are homogeneously 
S-equivalent under a set of labellings L′ ⊆ LE iff they are S-equivalent under L′ and the following two symmetric con-
ditions hold:
1. Given L1E , L
2
E ∈ L′ such that L1E 	 L2E ,
if there are two labellings LD11 ∈ FS(AF1, M1inp, L1E↓M1inp , R1INP) and L
D1
2 ∈ FS(AF1, M1inp, L2E↓M1inp , R1INP) such that 
LD11 	 LD12 , then ∀LD21 ∈ FS(AF2, M2inp, L1E↓M2inp , R2INP) such that effE (M2outp, L
D2
1 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP) = effE (M1outp,
LD11 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP), there is a labelling L
D2
2 ∈ FS(AF2, M2inp, L2E↓M2inp , R2INP) such that effE (M2outp, L
D2
2 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP)
= effE (M1outp, LD12 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP) and L
D2
1 	 LD22 .
2. Given L1E , L
2
E ∈ L′ such that L1E 	 L2E , if there are two labellings LD21 ∈ FS(AF2, M2inp, L1E↓M2inp , R2INP) and L
D2
2 ∈
FS(AF2, M2
inp, L2E↓M2inp , R2INP) such that L
D2
1 	 LD22 , then ∀LD11 ∈ FS(AF1, M1inp, L1E↓M1inp , R1INP) such that effE (M1outp,
LD11 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP) = effE (M2outp, L
D2
1 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP), there is a labelling L
D1
2 ∈ FS(AF1, M1inp, L2E↓M1inp , R1INP) such 
that effE (M1outp, L
D1
2 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP) = effE (M2outp, L
D2
2 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP) and L
D1
1 	 LD12 .
In Example 16, it can be seen that the argumentation multipoles M1 and M2, while being PR-equivalent, are not 
homogeneously PR-equivalent.
It turns out that strong transparency of preferred semantics is recovered in case of replacements involving homoge-
neously PR-equivalent multipoles.
Theorem 13. Any replacement R = (AF1, M1, M2) with invariant set E, such that M1 and M2 are homogeneously PR-equivalent 
under LPRR , is PR-safe.
Given two equivalent multipoles, a suﬃcient condition for their homogeneous equivalence is that each multipole is 
“internally homogeneous”, i.e. the labellings prescribed by the local function are related by set-inclusion in a regular way 
w.r.t. the commitment relation between the input labellings. Deﬁnition 35 formalizes this intuition, while the suﬃciency 
result is proved by Lemma 5 and Corollary 1.
Deﬁnition 35. Consider an argumentation semantics S. An argumentation multipole M = (AF, RINP, ROUTP) w.r.t. a set 
E is internally S-homogeneous under a set of labellings L′ ⊆ LE iff for all labellings L1E , L2E ∈ L′ such that L1E 	 L2E , it 
holds that ∀L1 ∈ FS(AF, M inp, L1E↓M inp , RINP), ∀L2 ∈ FS(AF, M inp, L2E↓M inp , RINP) such that effE (M outp, L1↓M outp , ROUTP) 	
effE (M outp, L2↓M outp , ROUTP), there is a labelling L′2 ∈ FS(AF, M inp, L2E↓M inp , RINP) such that effE (M outp, L2↓M outp ,
ROUTP) = effE (M outp, L′2↓M outp , ROUTP) and L1 	 L′2.
Lemma 5. Consider two multipoles M1 = (AF1, R1INP, R1OUTP) and M2 = (AF2, R2INP, R2OUTP) w.r.t. a set E which are internally 
S-homogeneous under a set of labellings L′ ⊆ LE . If M1 and M2 are S-equivalent under L′ , then they are homogeneously S-equivalent 
under L′ .
Corollary 1. Any replacement R = (AF1, M1, M2) with invariant set E, such that M1 and M2 are PR-equivalent under LPRR and 
both M1 and M2 are internally PR-homogeneous under LPRR , is PR-safe.
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Example 17. Consider again the replacement R = (AF1, M1, M2) depicted in Fig. 13. As shown in Example 15, LPRR =
{{(E1, out), (E2, in)}, {(E1, in), (E2, out)}} and M1, M2 are PR-equivalent under LPRR . Since there are no distinct la-
bellings L1E , L
2
E ∈ LPRR such that L1E 	 L2E , M1 and M2 are trivially internally PR-homogeneous under LPRR . As a con-
sequence, by Corollary 1 the replacement R is PR-safe. In fact, there are two preferred labellings in AF1, namely 
{(E1, in), (E2, out), (A1, out), (A2, in), (A3, out)} and {(E1, out), (E2, in), (A1, out), (A2, in), (A3, out)}, while in AF2
the preferred labellings are {(E1, in), (E2, out), (C, out)} and {(E1, out), (E2, in), (C, out)}. Thus, the restriction of the 
preferred labellings to {E1, E2} are {(E1, out), (E2, in)} and {(E1, in), (E2, out)} both in AF1 and in AF2.
Turning to non-arbitrary partitionings, strong transparency of preferred semantics is recovered without additional condi-
tions for replacements involving the union of strongly connected components.
Theorem 14. Preferred semantics PR is strongly transparent w.r.t. F∪SCC.
Example 18. The multipoles M1 and M2 shown in Fig. 14 can be safely interchanged if they correspond to the union of 
strongly connected components. For instance, removing the attack from E2 to E1 makes the replacement (AF1, M1, M2)
F∪SCC-preserving, thus such replacement is safe. In fact, in this case there is a unique preferred labelling in AF1 and a 
unique preferred labelling in AF2, and in both cases E1 is labelled in and E2 is labelled undec.
It is easy to see that in Examples 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 the replacement R = (AF1, M1, M2) is F∪SCC-preserving and 
PR-legitimate. As a consequence, in all cases the replacement R is safe, i.e. {L↓E | L ∈ LPR(AF1)} = {L↓E | L ∈ LPR(AF2)}. 
Moreover, it can be seen that in all cases the multipoles are internally PR-homogeneous, therefore they could be safely 
interchanged also in the context of non-F∪SCC-preserving replacements.
8.4. Ideal semantics
The transparency properties of ideal semantics mirror the discouraging decomposability properties analyzed in Sec-
tion 4.4: the following example, inspired by Example 7, shows that ideal semantics is not transparent even w.r.t. FSCC .
Example 19. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Fig. 15, where AF2 = T (R) with R =
(AF1, M1, M2), and the invariant set of the replacement R is E = {E1, E2}. It is easy to see that M1 and M2
are ID-equivalent, since F ID prescribes for M1 the labelling {(A1, undec), (A2, undec)} and for M2 the labelling 
{(B1, undec), (B2, undec), (B3, undec)}. As a consequence, the replacement R is ID-legitimate, and it is also easy to 
see that it is FSCC-preserving. However, R is not ID-safe, since the ideal labelling of AF1 leaves all the arguments undec, 
while the ideal labelling of AF2 is {(B1, undec), (B2, undec), (B3, undec), (E1, out), (E2, in)}.
Transparency is recovered in the (somewhat speciﬁc) case of replacements involving multipoles for which FCO always 
prescribes a unique labelling.
Deﬁnition 36. Consider an argumentation semantics S. An argumentation multipole M = (AF, RINP, ROUTP) w.r.t. a set E is 
S-univocal under a set of labellings L′ ⊆ LE iff ∀LE ∈ L′ |FS(AF, M inp, LE↓M inp , RINP)| = 1.
The following lemmas prove some speciﬁc results holding in the case of CO-univocal argumentation multipoles.
Lemma 6. Let M be an argumentation multipole (AF, RINP, ROUTP) w.r.t. a set E which is CO-univocal under a set of labellings 
L′ ⊆ LE . Then ∀LE ∈ L′ , FCO(AF, M inp, LE↓M inp , RINP) = FS(AF, M inp, LE↓M inp , RINP) for any S ∈ {GR, PR, ID, SST}.
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Lemma 7. Let M be an argumentation multipole (AF, RINP, ROUTP) w.r.t. a set E which is CO-univocal under a set of la-
bellings L′ ⊆ LE , and let L1E , L2E be two labellings of L′ such that L1E 	 L2E . Then, for any two labellings L1 , L2 such that L1 ∈
FPR(AF, M inp, L1E↓M inp , RINP) and L2 ∈ FPR(AF, M inp, L2E↓M inp , RINP), it holds that L1 	 L2 .
Lemma 8. Let M be an argumentation multipole (AF, RINP, ROUTP) w.r.t. a set E which is CO-univocal under a set of labellings 
L′ ⊆ LE . Then M is internally PR-homogeneous under L′.
On this basis, Theorem 15 shows that contextually CO-legitimate replacements are ID-safe if they involve CO-univocal 
multipoles. Note that the theorem requires the involved multipoles to be CO-equivalent under LCOR . In the light of Lemma 6, 
this is tantamount to requiring them to be S-equivalent for any S ∈ {GR, PR, ID, SST}. We cannot, however, replace LCOR with 
e.g. LPRR , since L
CO
R may be a strict superset of L
PR
R .
Theorem 15. Any contextually CO-legitimate replacement R = (AF1, M1, M2) with invariant set E, such that M1 and M2 are 
CO-univocal under LCOR , is ID-safe.
As shown in Section 8.6, the previous theorem applies in particular to acyclic argumentation multipoles, while the next 
example shows that there are cases of equivalent multipoles containing cycles that can be safely interchanged under ideal 
semantics.
Example 20. It is easy to see that the multipoles M1 and M2 shown in Fig. 16 are CO-equivalent and both of them are 
CO-univocal under any set. Thus, by Theorem 15 they can be safely replaced each other under the ideal semantics, i.e. the 
replacement maintains the labels assigned by the ideal labelling to the arguments of the invariant set. It is also easy to see 
that the same holds by replacing the three-length cycles in M1 with any odd-length cycle.
8.5. Semi-stable semantics
As in the case of ideal semantics, semi-stable semantics inherits from its lack of decomposability properties the inability 
of guaranteeing safeness of legitimate replacements: the following example, inspired by Examples 8 and 9, shows that 
semi-stable semantics is not transparent even w.r.t. FSCC .
Example 21. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Fig. 17, where AF2 = T (R) with R =
(AF1, M1, M2), and the invariant set of the replacement R is {E1}. It is easy to see that M1 and M2 are SST-equivalent, 
since FSST prescribes for M1 the unique labelling {(A1, out), (A2, in)} and for M2 the unique labelling {(B1, out), (B2, in),
(B3, out)}, thus the effect on {E1} is {{(E1, in)}} in both cases. As a consequence, the replacement R is SST-legitimate, 
and it is also easy to see that it is FSCC-preserving. However, R is not SST-safe, since in AF1 there is only one semi-stable 
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labelling, namely {(A1, out), (A2, in), (E1, undec)}, which assigns to E1 the label undec, while there are two semi-stable 
labellings in AF2, namely {(B1, in), (B2, out), (B3, undec), (E1, out)} and {(B1, out), (B2, in), (B3, out), (E1, undec)}, 
which assign to E1 the label out and undec, respectively.
8.6. The case of acyclic multipoles
It is well-known that an argumentation framework with an acyclic attack relation admits a unique complete labelling 
which is thus also grounded, preferred, ideal, stable and semi-stable. It is then interesting to speciﬁcally consider acyclic 
multipoles, and to investigate whether they beneﬁt of speciﬁc properties as far as replaceability is concerned.
Deﬁnition 37. A multipole M = (AF, RINP, ROUTP), where AF = (Ar, att), is acyclic if there is no sequence A1, . . . , An of 
distinct arguments with Ai ∈ Ar such that n > 1, (Ai, Ai+1) ∈ att for 1 ≤ i < n, and (An, A1) ∈ att.
Note that this deﬁnition does not prevent an acyclic multipole to contain self-attacking arguments, i.e. arguments attacking 
themselves.
The following proposition shows that the property of acyclic frameworks mentioned above can be extended to acyclic 
multipoles.
Proposition 14. An acyclic argumentation multipole M = (AF, RINP, ROUTP) w.r.t. a set E is CO-univocal under any set of labellings 
L′ ⊆ LE .
The above result entails that all semantics considered in this paper, with the exception of semi-stable semantics, be-
come strongly transparent in case replacements involve acyclic multipoles. Since admissible, complete, stable and grounded 
semantics are strongly transparent, it suﬃces to consider preferred and ideal semantics.
Proposition 15. Any contextually PR-legitimate (ID-legitimate) replacement R = (AF1, M1, M2)with invariant set E, such that M1
and M2 are acyclic, is PR-safe (ID-safe).
The following example shows that this result cannot be extended to semi-stable semantics, i.e. there are acyclic 
SST-equivalent multipoles that cannot be safely interchanged.
Example 22. Consider the argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 shown in Fig. 18, where AF2 = T (R) with R =
(AF1, M1, M2), and the invariant set of R is {E1, E2, E3, E4}. The acyclic multipoles M1 and M2 are trivially SST-equivalent, 
since they do not attack E (for both of them, the effect on E includes a unique labelling which assigns to all arguments 
the label in). However, the replacement R is not SST-safe, since there is a unique semi-stable labelling in AF1, namely 
{(E1, undec), (E2, out), (E3, in), (E4, out), (A1, undec), (A2, in)}, while AF2 admits {(E1, undec), (E2, out), (E3, in),
(E4, out), (B1, undec), (B2, undec), (B3, in), (B4, out), (B5, undec)} and {(E1, undec), (E2, undec), (E3, out), (E4, in),
(B1, undec), (B2, undec), (B3, out), (B4, in), (B5, out)} as the two semi-stable labellings. For instance, argument E4 is 
assigned the unique label out in AF1 and the labels in and out in AF2.
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9. Putting modularity at work
As modularity is a very useful and pervasive property, the notions and results introduced in this paper have an 
open-ended range of applications. In fact, they can be exploited in all contexts, either theoretical or practical, where a 
non-monolithic approach is appropriate, ranging from the management of dynamics in argumentation to the study of ef-
ﬁcient divide-and-conquer algorithms. While an extensive discussion of related works with pointers to future research 
directions is given in Section 10, in this section we use, as sample case-studies, the tasks of summarization and translation 
of argumentation frameworks and develop in detail some relevant application examples.
9.1. Summarizing argumentation frameworks
In this subsection we illustrate an example of application of the notion of equivalence between argumentation multipoles 
for the purpose of summarization of argumentation frameworks. In particular we take from the literature two argument-
based recontructions of the court’s decision of the Popov v. Hayashi case and show that, in spite of many differences in the 
details, they can be reduced to a comparable basic structure through considerations based on multipole equivalence.
We borrow a synthetic description of the facts originating the case from [44]. “The case concerned the possession of 
the baseball which Barry Bonds hit for his record breaking 73rd home run in the 2001 season. Such a ball is very valuable 
(Mark McGwire’s 1998 70th home run ball sold at auction for $3,000,000). When the ball was struck into the crowd, Popov 
caught it in the upper part of the webbing of his baseball glove. Such a catch, a snowcone catch because the ball is not fully 
in the mitt, does not give certainty of retaining control of the ball, particularly since Popov was stretching and may have 
fallen. However, Popov was not given the chance to complete his catch since, as it entered his glove, he was tackled and 
thrown to the ground by others trying to secure the ball, which became dislodged from his glove. Hayashi (himself innocent 
of the attack on Popov), then picked up the ball and put it in his pocket, so securing possession.”
Popov then claimed possession of the ball and sued Hayashi. The court ﬁnally decided that the ball should be sold and 
the proceeds divided between the two.
The rather articulated motivations underlying the decision have attracted the attention of researchers and have been 
the subject of several papers, culminating in a special issue of the Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Law journal devoted to the 
modelling of this case [1]. In the following subsections we present the argument-based formalizations provided by Wyner 
and Bench-Capon [44] and by Prakken [39] respectively. Then we show how the notions and results presented in previous 
sections can be used to summarize the two formalizations and simplify their comparison.
For the sake of uniformity with the original formalizations, in the following we will sometimes refer to the extension-
based rather than the labelling-based approach. In particular, an S extension (e.g. the grounded extension) is the set of 
arguments labelled in by an S labelling (e.g. the grounded labelling).
9.1.1. The formalization by Wyner and Bench-Capon
In [44] the legal analysis of the case is synthesized by the argumentation framework presented in Fig. 19 (the paper also 
presents an analysis of the values underlying the ﬁnal decision using the formalism of value-based argumentation frame-
works, which is beyond the scope of the present paper). In the original ﬁgure of [44] the boxes representing arguments 
are labeled with an identiﬁer Ax, where x is a number, while a few other boxes have no label and contain a statement 
corresponding to the conclusion of the argument. In Fig. 19 all arguments have both a label (on top of the box and corre-
sponding to the original one where present) and a text synthesizing their conclusion. Each argument labeled as Ax derives 
from the application of a rule with some premises and a conclusion, while the other four arguments are intended to repre-
sent default answers to some questions: quoting [44], “if the argument is not defeated, the contrary has not been shown”. 
The conclusion of an argument may correspond to the undercut of some rule. An argument attacks another argument if the 
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conclusion of the former contradicts the conclusion or some premise of the latter or undercuts the rule used for its con-
struction. Default arguments can only attack another argument on its premises. Turning to a quick explanation of Fig. 19, we 
can proceed backwards starting from the mutually attacking arguments A1 and A2, concerning who has possession of the 
ball. A2 is undercut by A13: the rule that Hayashi has possession of the ball because he retrieved it is not applicable given 
that Popov was active in catching the ball before Hayashi retrieved it. A13 is attacked by the default argument P-na, which 
is in turn attacked by A11 based on factual evidence of the snowcone catch. A2 is also undercut by A3, whose premise (by 
the way, the same as of A1) is that Popov caught the ball before Hayashi. However both A1 and A3 are attacked by the 
default argument that the ball was not caught by Popov. This is in turn attacked by A4, based on the fact that the ball was 
in Popov’s glove. A4 is undercut by A5 and A6, the former based on the fact that the ball was still in motion, the latter on 
the fact that Popov was not in control of the ball. Both A5 and A6 are undercut by A10 based on the fact that Popov was 
active. A10 is hence attacked by the default argument P-na and is also undercut by A12, based on the custom and practice 
of the stands in baseball. Moreover A5 is attacked by the default argument P-ic, which is attacked by A7 based on the fact 
that Popov did not retain the ball in the glove. A7 is undercut by A8, based on the fact that Popov lost the ball due to an 
intentional contact of other people. Finally, A8 is attacked by the default argument CI which is in turn attacked by A9 based 
on factual evidence that Popov was assaulted.
It can be seen that for the argumentation framework represented in Fig. 19 the grounded extension is also the only 
complete, stable, semi-stable, ideal and preferred extension. It consists of the arguments A9, A11, A12, A13, A6, A8, P-ic, 
P-nc, which are evidenced in grey in Fig. 20. We note that both A1 and A2 are rejected according to any semantics, leaving 
the issue of the possession of the ball unresolved.
9.1.2. The formalization by Prakken
The reconstruction of the case given in [39] adopts ASPIC+, which is essentially a rule-based formalism for the construc-
tion of arguments and the identiﬁcation of their subargument and attack relations. It is worth remarking that the latter 
takes into account the former: if an argument attacks another argument then it attacks also all its superarguments. In AS-
PIC+ argument status evaluation follows Dung’s approach: an argumentation framework consisting only of the arguments 
and their attack relations can be derived and then the semantics deemed most appropriate can be applied.
Coming back to Popov and Hayashi, the reconstruction of [39] covers a lot of details concerning argument construction 
and, as such, is much more articulated than the one of [44] as shown by Figs. 21 and 22 which correspond to the aggre-
gation of ﬁve distinct but linked ﬁgures included in [39]. Direct subargument relationships are represented by dashed lines 
ending with a solid dot on the superargument, attack relationships are represented by solid arrows ending on the attacked 
argument. The text in an argument box essentially gives an idea on its conclusion. Fig. 21 is referred to as the upper part, 
while Fig. 22 is referred to as the lower part, they are linked only by two subargument relations: VR-MC8 and VR-r1 in 
Fig. 22 are direct subarguments respectively of EQ and H-hr in Fig. 21.
For a detailed description of the whole reconstruction, which is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper, the reader 
is referred to [39]. At a general level we can observe that:
• a lot of attention is reserved to issues concerning the validity of rules (sometimes based in turn on the validity of other 
rules), their adoption and their applicability to the case into question;
• the lower part (Fig. 22) essentially concerns the question whether Popov gained possession of the ball. There are two 
alternative reasoning lines leading to this conclusion, composed respectively by arguments VR-cs4, P-cc(1), P-ca(1), 
P-ph(1), P-hp(1), and P-wit, P-cb, VR-cs2, P-cc(2), P-ca(2), P-ph(2), P-hp(2). Both lines are defeated, the former by argu-
ment NV-cs4 stating the invalidity of the rule cs4 which is the starting point of the whole line, the latter by argument 
P-inc stating that Popov’s testimony, on which the whole line is based, is not credible.
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174 P. Baroni et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 217 (2014) 144–197• the upper part (Fig. 21) essentially concerns the action to be taken: three mutually exclusive alternatives (corresponding 
to the three mutually attacking arguments H-hr, H-nr, and EQ) are considered: Hayashi has to return the ball, Hayashi 
has not to return the ball, the ball is equally shared. Each of the three arguments is derived through a quite articulated 
reasoning line. Both H-hr and H-nr are defeated, the former by argument NV-rp, stating that the rule rp is not valid, 
the latter by argument NA-r4, stating that the rule r4 is not applicable.
If one considers the attack relations only (i.e. focuses on the argumentation framework to be used for argument status 
evaluation) the picture is simpliﬁed, as shown in Fig. 23, since a large number of arguments are neither attacking nor 
attacked by others. It can be seen that for the argumentation framework represented in Fig. 23 the grounded extension is 
also the only complete, stable, semi-stable, ideal and preferred extension and consists of the arguments evidenced in grey. 
We note that of the three arguments corresponding to the possible ﬁnal decisions both H-hr and H-nr are rejected, while 
EQ is accepted.
9.1.3. Summarizing and comparing the two formalizations
We can now use considerations based on the equivalence properties examined in the previous sections to identify some 
fundamental similarities between the two reconstructions of the case.
As to the argumentation framework AF J = (Ar, att) of Fig. 19, let us start by considering the argumentation multipole 
M1 = (AF J↓{A11, P-na}, ∅, {(P-na, A10), (P-na, A13)}) with respect to E1 = Ar \ {A11, P-na}. It is rather easy to see that for 
any labeling LE1 of E1 (actually irrelevant since the multipole does not receive attacks) and for any semantics S (all behave 
the same on such a simple subframework) it holds that S-effE1 (M1, LE1 ) = {(A, in) | A ∈ E1} = S-effE1 (M∅, LE1 ).
In other words, the multipole M1 is S-equivalent to the empty multipole for any semantics S. It follows that the re-
placement R = (AF J , M1, M∅) is S-legitimate. Intuitively this means that the arguments A11 and P − na can be canceled 
from AF J without any consequence on the evaluation of other arguments, provided that a suitable transparency property 
holds for S. Since both multipoles M1 and M∅ are acyclic, the results summarized in Table 2 ensure that the replacement 
is safe for any semantics considered in this paper except semi-stable semantics (by the way, the replacement is safe also for 
semi-stable semantics, given that in this case its labellings coincide with stable labellings).
Iterating the same kind of reasoning, it can be seen that the following pairs of arguments can progressively (and safely) 
be cancelled: {A12, A10}, {A9, CI}, {A8, A7}, {P-ic, A5}, {A6, A4}. In virtue of Proposition 13 we have that we can safely 
restrict AF J to the set of arguments E∗ = {A1, A2, A3, A13, P-nc} without affecting the labellings of the arguments in E∗ . 
This could have been done (in a single, more laborious, step) also showing that the big multipole consisting of the set of 
arguments {A11, P-na, A12, A10, A9, CI, A8, A7, P-ic, A5, A6, A4} is S-equivalent to the empty multipole.
Assuming that the main focus concerns the evaluation of arguments A1 and A2, we can also see that A3 can be 
suppressed in AF∗J = AF J↓E∗ : given the multipole M2 = (AF∗J↓{A3, P-nc}, ∅, {(P-nc, A1), (A3, A2)}) with respect to E2 ={A1, A2, A13}, it is again easy to see that for any (actually irrelevant) labelling LE2 of E2 and for any semantics S it holds 
that S-effE2 (M2, LE2) = {(A1, out), (A2, in), (A13, in)} = S-effE2 (M3, LE2 ) where M3  (({P-nc}, ∅), ∅, {(P-nc, A1)}). Us-
ing again the fact that both M2 and M3 are acyclic we get that the replacement is safe, i.e. that A3 can be cancelled.
Summing up, we get the simpliﬁed argumentation framework AF−J shown in Fig. 24 which, for any semantics considered 
in this paper, is equivalent to the original one as far as the evaluation of the remaining arguments is concerned.
Turning now to the argumentation framework AFK of Fig. 23, we ﬁrst note that all the isolated (i.e. both unattacking and 
unattacked) arguments can be suppressed. This follows from the fact that, for any semantics S and for any argumentation 
framework AFU such that LS(AFU ) = ∅, given the multipole MU = (AFU , ∅, ∅) with respect to any (actually irrelevant) set E , 
for any labeling LE of E it holds that S-effE (MU , LE) = {(A, in)|A ∈ E} = S-effE1 (M∅, LE ).
Supposing that the main interest concerns the ﬁnal decision, i.e. the evaluation of the arguments H-hr, H-nr and EQ, and 
using the same reasoning as above we can also see that all the arguments concerning the issue of Popov’s possession, not 
attacking nor being attacked by arguments outside the set, can be suppressed.
Then, using a reasoning which is completely analogous to the one applied to the multipole M2 above, we can also 
suppress the arguments H-hp, P-nhp, and Vr-rp, getting ﬁnally the argumentation framework AF−K represented in Fig. 25.
Comparing now Figs. 24 and 25 we observe that:
• arguments A1 and A2 in AF−J correspond respectively to arguments H-hr and H-nr in AF−K and have the same status of 
rejected;
• similarly, we can also say that arguments P-nc and A13 in AF−J correspond respectively to arguments NV-rp and NA-r4 
in AF−K ;
• the argument EQ of AF−K has no counterpart in AF−J due to the fact that in [44] the ﬁnal decision is represented only in 
the context of the value-based formalization.
Leaving apart EQ, we note therefore a basic structural similarity between the two simpliﬁed frameworks: in both recon-
structions the arguments corresponding to giving the ball to one of the contendants are rejected due to one main reason. 
One may then wonder whether the reasons for these rejections are actually the same in the two reconstructions.
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Fig. 25. The argumentation framework AF−K summarizing the reconstruction from [39].
As to the rejection of the decision in favor of Hayashi, in AF−J it is due to the undercut of A2 by A13, which is based 
on the fact that Popov was “ably and actively engaged in establishing control” of the ball. Similarly, in AF−K the rejection 
of H-nr is due to the fact that a rule used to derive that Hayashi has possession of the ball, is shown not to be applicable 
in this case through argument NA-r4, based on the fact that the ball was not loose (due to the previous attempt of Popov) 
when Hayashi retrieved it.
While basically similar as far as the previous point is concerned, the two reconstructions turn out to be different as to 
the rejection of the decision in favor of Popov: in AF−J A1 is attacked by P-nc which corresponds to the conclusion that 
Popov did not catch the ball, thus denying the premise of A1, while in AF−K H-hr is attacked by NV-rp, which concerns the 
validity of the rule rp. It is interesting to note that in [39] the argument NV-rp is essentially based on the fact that “rule rp 
does not promote fundamental fairness as regards Popov’s claim” and that, indeed, fairness is the primary value considered 
in the value-based part of [44] as a justiﬁcation of the ﬁnal decision.
Thus the difference arises from the fact that in the formalism adopted in [39] reasoning about values is embedded into 
arguments that are at the same level as other arguments, while in [44] reasoning about values is carried out in a separate 
layer. A discussion about the pros and cons of either approach to deal with values is clearly out of the scope of this paper.
To conclude this section we remark that the identiﬁcation of some basic commonalities and differences between two 
argument-based reconstructions of a real law case has been greatly simpliﬁed by the possibility to summarize frameworks in 
a general and technically sound way. In this perspective the notion of argumentation multipole and the decomposability and 
equivalence properties investigated in this paper can be regarded as enabling techniques for the investigation of methods 
for (possibly automated) analysis, synthesis and comparison of argumentation frameworks.
9.2. Translations of argumentation frameworks
Translating an argumentation framework AF1 into another framework AF2 such that AF2 has some desirable features and, 
at the same time, preserves some speciﬁc properties of AF1 is a generic problem with signiﬁcant theoretical and practical 
implications. In particular in [27] the problem of intertraslatability is considered, which is deﬁned as follows: “Given an 
argumentation framework F and argumentation semantics σ and σ ′ , ﬁnd a function Tr such that the σ -extensions of F
are in certain correspondence to the σ ′-extensions of Tr(F ).” As a matter of fact, in [27] modularity is one of the general 
requirements of a translation procedure, informally stated as “the translation can be done independently for certain parts of 
the framework”. While this generic notion may have different technical counterparts depending on the kind of translation 
addressed, our results provide a systematic and sound basis for ensuring modularity in any context where there is an interest 
in replacing a subframework with a translated counterpart. A broad investigation of this issue is clearly a matter for future 
work, here we provide two speciﬁc examples taken from the literature: the former concerns a subframework replacement 
considered in the context of the analysis of the properties of weighted argument systems, while the latter concerns the 
translation (also called ﬂattening) of argumentation frameworks with attacks to attacks into “traditional” Dung’s frameworks.
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9.2.1. Reducing the attacks involving single arguments under grounded semantics
A weighted argument system (WAS in the following), as deﬁned in [26], is basically an argumentation framework with 
a numerical weight (actually a non-negative real number) attached to each attack. In the analysis of the computational 
properties of WASs, it turns out to be convenient to consider a translation from a WAS into another one such that no 
argument attacks or is attacked by more than 2 arguments and some conditions are satisﬁed. Leaving apart the aspects of 
the translation and the conditions involving weights, which are not relevant to the present paper, basically the translation 
described in [26] involves replacing the subframework consisting of an argument z receiving more than two attacks (from 
arguments y1, . . . , yk) with a subframework with additional arguments p1 and q1 where z receives only two attacks (from 
p1 and y1), while p1 is attacked by q1 and q1 is attacked by the arguments y2, . . . , yk (see Fig. 26). The replacement can 
then be iterated focusing on q1 and adding p2 and q2 until qk−2 is only attacked by yk−1 and yk . The claim (proved in [26]
as part of Lemma 1) is that the grounded extension of the original framework is the same as the grounded extension of 
the framework resulting from the replacements mentioned above. Note that Lemma 1 of [26] concerns an arbitrary WAS, 
i.e. its hypotheses do not put any restriction on other attacks present in the original framework. In particular, as explicitly 
remarked in [26], there can be attacks between some of the attackers of z, but also (not explicitly remarked in [26]) 
z might counterattack some of its attackers or there could be longer loops involving z, some of its attackers and possibly 
other arguments in the framework.
Given these remarks, the proof of Lemma 1 provided in [26] is not completely satisfactory: it consists in local consider-
ations on the arguments involved in the replacement described above without dealing with possible effects involving other 
arguments in the framework. The absence of these effects, however, cannot be taken for granted. To give an example, when 
considering (to contradiction) a generic argument x included in the grounded extension of the original framework but not 
in the grounded extension of the translated framework it is stated that this implies that there is an attacker u of x in the 
translated framework such that (u, x) was not an attack in the original framework. This immediately leads to identify x as z
and u as p1 and to apply only local considerations. However, in general, an argument might be excluded from the grounded 
extension not just because it has an additional attacker but also because one of its attackers has a different justiﬁcation state 
in the new framework. In a sense, the proof of Lemma 1 of [26] seems to implicitly assume the property of transparency of 
grounded semantics (which, of course is not obvious per se) and (partially) shows a sort of local equivalence of the original 
fragment and of its translated counterpart.
Actually, the result of Lemma 1 of [26] is valid and this can be shown in a relatively straightforward way using the 
results of the present paper. First, given that grounded semantics is strongly transparent, to obtain the result it is suﬃcient 
to show that the translation step depicted in Fig. 26 involves the replacement of an argumentation multipole with another 
one which is Input/Output GR-equivalent. The fact that the translation may involve several such steps is then covered by 
the result of Proposition 13.
As to the identiﬁcation of the equivalent multipoles M1 = (AF1, R1INP, R1OUTP) and M2 = (AF2, R2INP, R2OUTP), ob-
serve that the basic idea consists in replacing the argument z with the attack chain composed by the three argu-
ments p1, q1, and z itself within an arbitrary argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att) where {y1, . . . , yk} is the set 
of attackers of z with k > 2. Then M1 and M2 are deﬁned with respect to the same invariant set E = Ar \ {z}, 
and the relevant frameworks are AF1 = ({z}, ∅) and AF2 = ({p1, q1, z}, {(q1, p1), (p1, z)}). Moreover M1 and M2 have 
the same output relation: R1OUTP = R2OUTP = att ∩ ({z} × Ar), while they differ in the input relation: R1INP = {(yi, z) |
1 ≤ i ≤ k}; R2INP = {(y1, z)} ∪ {(yi, q1) | 2 ≤ i ≤ k}. We have now to show that M1 and M2 are GR-equivalent, 
i.e. that for any labelling LE ∈ LE , GR-effE (M1, LE) = GR-effE(M2, LE ), which, recalling Deﬁnition 29, amounts to 
show that {effE (M1outp, L↓M1outp , R1OUTP) | L ∈ FGR(AF1, M1inp, LE↓M1inp , R1INP)} = {effE (M2outp, L↓M2outp , R2OUTP) | L ∈
FGR(AF2, M2
inp, LE↓ inp , R2 )}.M2 INP
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First note that, since M1
outp =M2outp = {z} and R1OUTP = R2OUTP , both effE(M1outp, L↓M1outp , R1OUTP) and effE (M2outp,
L↓M2outp , R2OUTP) are totally determined by the label assigned to z by FGR given the labelling of the arguments in the input 
set {y1, . . . , yk} (which is the same for both multipoles).
Now it is easy to see that the label assigned to z is the same for any labelling of the arguments {y1, . . . , yk} considering 
three basic cases: i) ∃yi ∈ {y1, . . . , yk} : Lab(yi) = in; ii) ∀yi ∈ {y1, . . . , yk} : Lab(yi) = out; iii) yi ∈ {y1, . . . , yk} : Lab(yi) =
in∧ ∃yi ∈ {y1, . . . , yk} : Lab(yi) = undec.
In the case i), clearly z is assigned the label out by FGR in M1 and this also holds in M2 since either z is attacked 
directly by an argument labelled in (if Lab(y1) = in) or, if this is not the case, necessarily ∃yi ∈ {y2, . . . , yk} : Lab(yi) = in
and then Lab(q1) = out, Lab(p1) = in, Lab(z) = out.
In the case ii), clearly z is assigned the label in by FGR in M1 and this also holds in M2: given ∀yi ∈ {y1, . . . , yk} :
Lab(yi) = out it follows Lab(q1) = in, Lab(p1) = out and then both attackers (y1 and p1) of z are labelled out and z is 
labelled in.
In the case iii), clearly z is assigned the label undec by FGR in M1. As to M2, ﬁrst note that y1 is either labelled undec
or out (in the latter case necessarily ∃yi ∈ {y2, . . . , yk} : Lab(yi) = undec). Moreover, q1 is either labelled in or undec
and consequently p1 is labelled out or undec (both are necessarily undec if Lab(y1) = out). Summing up, z is either 
attacked by two arguments labelled undec or by one labelled undec and one labelled out and hence is labelled undec
by FGR , as required.
A similar reasoning applies to the case where an argument attacks more than two other arguments, using the replace-
ment sketched in Fig. 27.
9.2.2. Flattening attacks to attacks
In recent years several extensions of Dung’s framework encompassing attacks to attacks have been considered, like the 
EAF (Extended Argumentation Framework) formalism [35], mainly designed for the purpose of preference modelling, and the 
more general (as, differently from EAF, they allow unlimited recursion of attacks on attacks) AFRA (Argumentation Framework 
with Recursive Attacks) [4,5] and HLAF (Higher Level Argumentation Framework) [29].
For the sake of keeping the example compact, we focus here on the EAF formalism whose deﬁnition (taken from [35]) is 
given below.
Deﬁnition 38. An Extended Argumentation Framework (EAF) is a tuple (Args, R, D) such that Args is a set of arguments 
and:
• R ⊆ Args× Args
• D ⊆ Args×R
• if (X, (Y , Z)), (X ′, (Z , Y )) ∈D then (X, X ′), (X ′, X) ∈R .
As typical in any kind of extension of Dung’s framework, there is an interest in deﬁning a translation procedure from the 
extended formalism to the basic one. This is useful for several purposes, including the opportunity to reuse or adapt, in the 
extended context, the large corpus of theoretical results available in Dung’s framework, in particular as far as computational 
complexity is concerned.
In the case of attacks to attacks, as to our knowledge, two main translation procedures have been proposed in the 
literature. The ﬁrst procedure (considered with some slight variants in [36,29,18]) involves replacing an attacked attack with 
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an attack chain consisting in two additional arguments, then every attack towards the replaced attack becomes an attack 
towards the second additional argument. The second procedure (considered in [4,5]) involves replacing an attack with a 
single new argument, with a proper rearrangement of the incoming and outcoming attacks involving it. We present in the 
following the formal deﬁnition of these procedures tailored to the case of EAF.
Deﬁnition 39. Let Γ = (Args, R, D) be an EAF and let us deﬁne D→(Γ ) = {(A, B)|D ∩ (Args× {(A, B)}) = ∅} i.e. the set of 
attacks receiving at least an attack according to the relation D .
• The chain-style ﬂattening of Γ is the argumentation framework AFΓc = (Argsc, attc) where Argsc = Args ∪ {XA,B , Y A,B |
(A, B) ∈D→(Γ )} and attc =R ∪ {(A, XA,B), (XA,B , Y A,B), (Y A,B , B)|(A, B) ∈D→(Γ )} ∪ {(C, Y A,B)|(C, (A, B)) ∈D}
• The single-argument ﬂattening of Γ is the argumentation framework AFΓsa = (Argssa, attsa) where Argssa = Args ∪
{AB|(A, B) ∈ D→(Γ )} and attsa = (R \ {(A, B)|(A, B) ∈ D→(Γ )}) ∪ {(AB, B)|(A, B) ∈ D→(Γ )} ∪ {(D, AB)|(A, B) ∈
D→(Γ ) ∧ (D, A) ∈R} ∪ {(C, AB)|(C, (A, B)) ∈D}.
In words, in chain-style ﬂattening two arguments XA,B and Y A,B are added in replacement of every attacked attack 
(A, B) (with A, XA,B , Y A,B , B forming an attack chain) and the arguments attacking (A, B) according to the relation D of 
Γ attack Y A,B in AFc (while the attacks between arguments in R remain the same). In single-argument ﬂattening every 
attacked attack (A, B) is replaced by a single argument AB which attacks B (instead of A) and is attacked by all attackers 
of A in R and by all attackers of (A, B) in D .
The two translation procedures are illustrated in Fig. 28.
Of course one may wonder whether the operational differences in the two ﬂattening procedures give rise to any actual 
difference in the ﬁnal outcome (i.e. in the justiﬁcation status of the arguments originally included in Γ ) or, indeed, the 
two ﬂattened frameworks treat the arguments originally included in Γ in the same way, showing that the two procedures, 
different as they are, basically capture the same intuition.
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Contextually CO-legitimate replacement of Mc with Msa .
{D1, . . . , Dm} {C1, . . . ,Cn} Lab(A) Lab(XA,B ) Lab(Y A,B ) LabAB
∃in ∃in out in out out
∃in ∀out out in out out
∃in in∧ ∃undec out in out out
∀out ∃in in out out out
∀out ∀out in out in in
∀out in∧ ∃undec in out undec undec
in∧ ∃undec ∃in undec undec out out
in∧ ∃undec ∀out undec undec undec undec
in∧ ∃undec in∧ ∃undec undec undec undec undec
To answer this question ﬁrst observe that, given an EAF Γ = (Args, R, D), both the argumentation frameworks AFΓc and 
AFΓsa include all the original arguments Args and that they locally differ in correspondence of the additional arguments used 
to represent the elements of D→(Γ ). So AFΓsa can be obtained from AFΓc (and vice versa) through the replacements of a 
(possibly quite articulated) multipole Mc with another multipole Msa , both referring to the same set of invariant arguments 
Args. Thus, answering the question amounts to analyzing the safeness of this replacement, based in turn on the equivalence 
between these multipoles.
First, observe that the multipoles Mc and Msa consist of the union of |D→(Γ )| disjoint and non-interacting “submulti-
poles” each having the form illustrated in Fig. 28. In virtue of Proposition 13, we can then consider a sequence of (similar) 
replacements leading from AFΓsa to AF
Γ
c and, to ensure that the whole sequence of replacements is safe (as far as the argu-
ments Args are concerned), it is suﬃcient to show that each single step is safe, i.e. to analyze equivalence between the two 
multipoles representing the translation of a single attack to attack.
To this purpose, referring again to Fig. 28, we can identify the multipoles Mc = (AFc, RcINP, RcOUTP) with AFc = ({XA,B ,
Y A,B}, (XA,B , Y A,B)), RcINP = {(A, XA,B)} ∪{(C1, Y A,B), . . . , (Cn, Y A,B)}, RcOUTP = {(Y A,B , B)}, and Msa = (AFsa, RsaINP, RsaOUTP) with 
AFsa = ({AB}, ∅), RsaINP = {(D1, AB), . . . , (Dm, AB)} ∪ {(C1, AB), . . . , (Cn, AB)}, and RsaOUTP = {(AB, B)}.
It is immediate to observe that the replacement of Mc with Msa (or vice versa) is in general not legitimate: for 
instance, Mc and Msa are in general not equivalent if one considers a labelling Lab such that Lab(D1) = in and 
Lab(A) = in. However, this labelling is clearly illegal in a context where D1 attacks A. More generally, the labels of 
arguments D1, . . . , Dm completely determine the label of A, thus one may check whether the replacement is contextu-
ally legitimate. So, for any semantics S, we are interested in showing that Mc and Msa are S-equivalent with respect to 
LSR  {FS(AF↓Args, Mcoutp, Lc, RcOUTP) | Lc ∈ LMcoutp } ∪ {FS(AF↓Args, Msaoutp, Lsa, RsaOUTP) | Lsa ∈ LMsaoutp }.
Observe that since the output relation of both Mc and Msa consists of a single attack (arising from Y A,B and AB
respectively) the two multipoles are equivalent if and only if the labels assigned to Y A,B and AB are the same for any 
labelling in LSR . Moreover, we focus on CO-equivalence of multipoles without loss of generality: in fact, it turns out (and 
it is easy to see) that, in any case, for both AFc and AFsa , the local function of complete semantics prescribes exactly 
one complete labelling, which implies that this is the only labelling also for all the other complete-compatible semantics 
considered in this paper.
A remark is now in order concerning the labellings of the arguments outside the multipoles, i.e. LCOR (note that L
CO
R ⊇ LSR
for any complete-compatible semantics S considered in this paper). As we are interested in proving an equivalence result 
whatever the remaining part of the framework is (in addition to the arguments depicted in Fig. 28), the set of labellings LCOR
cannot be precisely characterized as it also depends on the (unspeciﬁed) remaining part of the framework. As a consequence, 
we prove a slightly stronger result, considering any labelling in the set LCOR consisting of the labellings compatible with the 
attacks from the arguments Di to the argument A. Since LCOR ⊇ LCOR this implies the desired equivalence result.
Now, the examination of labellings in LCOR can be carried out considering nine cases, i.e., all possible combination, for 
the sets {D1, . . . , Dm} and {C1, . . . , Cn}, of three basic cases: i) there is an argument labelled in; ii) all arguments are 
labelled out; iii) otherwise (note in particular that Lab(A) is determined by the labelling of the set {D1, . . . , Dm} in both 
multipoles). As all cases are rather simple, for the sake of compactness we synthesize the analysis in Table 3 rather than 
providing trivial and verbose explanations: by inspection of the last two columns it appears that Lab(Y A,B) = Lab(AB) in all 
cases, as desired.
We have thus proved that the replacement of the considered multipoles is contextually S-legitimate for any complete-
compatible semantics S considered in this paper. Then, the replacement is safe for any such semantics S which is strongly 
transparent with respect to these multipoles. Given that the multipoles are acyclic, from the results recalled in Table 2 it 
follows that the replacement is guaranteed to be safe for all semantics considered in this paper, but SST, for which the 
answer is negative in general and the question is open for this speciﬁc case.
The lesson learned is twofold: ﬁrst, we have given a substantial formal conﬁrmation of the intuition that the two trans-
lation procedures are equivalent as far as the “external effects” are concerned for a comprehensive set of semantics, second 
we have seen however that even “simple” and basically correct intuitions require a careful semantics-speciﬁc scrutiny which 
may point out speciﬁc exceptions or critical issues (like for semi-stable semantics in our case).
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As mentioned in Section 1, the work presented in this paper has connections with three main (and non-disjoint) topics 
in the area of computational argumentation namely:
• local evaluation in argumentation semantics;
• argumentation dynamics;
• equivalence and interchangeability between argumentation frameworks.
We discuss the relationships with the relevant literature orderly in the following subsections.
10.1. Local evaluation in argumentation semantics
As to our knowledge the ﬁrst analyses of semantics’ properties exploitable for the purpose of local evaluation in the 
literature are provided by the work on SCC-recursiveness [10] and the notion of directionality introduced in [8].
Starting from the latter, in a nutshell a semantics is directional when it is guaranteed that, as far as extensions are 
concerned, a part of the framework which does not receive attacks from the rest of the framework is unaffected by the rest 
of the framework itself. Letting U be a set of arguments not receiving attacks from arguments not in U , this means that 
the same results (i.e. the same set of local extensions) are obtained either by computing the global extensions and then 
intersecting them with U , or by directly computing the extensions of the restricted framework consisting of the arguments 
in U and of the attacks among them.
Directionality allows for local computation when the results one is interested in can be obtained by focusing on an 
unattacked set, but has no embedded notion of progressive construction: it simply prescribes a relation of inclusion between 
the local extensions and the global ones. As such it is poorly related with the properties of semantics decomposability and 
transparency. To give some examples, stable semantics, which is not directional, is fully decomposable (and hence strongly 
transparent) while semi-stable semantics (which is non directional too) lacks any form of decomposability and transparency. 
Admissible and complete semantics are directional, fully decomposable and strongly transparent, while ideal semantics 
(which is directional too) lacks any form of decomposability and satisﬁes only a very weak form of transparency. To complete 
the picture, recall that grounded and preferred semantics (which feature intermediate properties) are directional too.
The notion of SCC-recursiveness has closer relationships with the present work, as already evidenced by the fact that we 
considered partition selectors based on the notion of SCC. Basically, the SCC-recursive scheme provides a general method 
to build the global extensions prescribed by a semantics by proceeding progressively following the (partial) order among 
SCCs induced by the attack relation (recall that the graph obtained by considering each SCC as a single node is acyclic). 
The SCC-recursive scheme applies to each SCC a semantics-speciﬁc base function and then prescribes how to “propagate the 
effects” of the choices made in the previous SCCs to the subsequent ones before applying in turn the base function to them. 
As such, SCC-recursiveness directly implies the property of semantics decomposability with respect to the selector FSCC .
Five of the semantics we have considered in this paper are SCC-recursive (namely admissible, complete, stable, grounded, 
and preferred semantics), and indeed we have proved that all of them feature stronger decomposability properties than 
the one implied by SCC-recursiveness. Moreover, the notion of local function introduced in this paper can be seen as a 
generalization of the notion of base function in the SCC-recursive scheme.
Drawing a more detailed analysis of the relationships of SCC-recursiveness with decomposability and transparency prop-
erties is an interesting line of future work. As a ﬁrst note in this direction, we can observe that the two semantics lacking 
SCC-recursiveness considered in this paper (namely semi-stable and ideal semantics) lack also any decomposability property.
In [40] the problem of combining local evaluations is addressed in a multi-agent scenario context where each agent 
owns a part of the framework and may locally adopt a different semantics. This gives rise to the notion of multi-sorted 
argumentation framework where a global argumentation framework is regarded as composed of a set of interacting cells, 
each associated with a (possibly) different semantics. In this context, the investigation in [40] follows a sort of top-down 
approach: given a (global) set of arguments S , it addresses the problem of checking whether S is an extension of the 
multi-sorted framework, according to local evaluations carried out for each cell. Basically, the deﬁnition of local evaluation 
at the cell level, directly reuses notions taken from the SCC-recursive scheme, as explicitly stated in [40]: the acceptance 
functions used at the cell level (Deﬁnition 5 in [40]) correspond to the base functions of the SCC-recursive scheme, while 
the notions of subframework and qualiﬁed arguments of a subframework (Deﬁnitions 7 and 8 in [40]) also have a direct 
correspondence with key technical elements of the SCC-recursive scheme (respectively with AF↓UPAF (S,E) and UAF(S, E) in 
Deﬁnition 20 of [10]). Thus, in a sense, the work of [40] reuses some of the main notions of the SCC-recursive scheme 
by applying them into two important directions of generalization: considering arbitrary (rather than SCC-based) partitions 
of the framework and allowing heterogeneous local evaluations. However, the direct reuse of notions speciﬁcally conceived 
in the context of the SCC-recursive scheme limits the possibility to fully encompass situations of mutual interaction and 
cyclic dependence between cells, which are impossible in the case of SCCs but are possible with arbitrary partitions. The 
present work addresses the study of homogeneous local evaluations for arbitrary partitions of an argumentation framework 
by introducing novel notions to capture the more complex interactions between subframeworks arising in this context. 
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future work.
It has also to be mentioned that some results concerning the use of the same semantics (or of semantics with common 
properties) in all cells are provided in [40] (in particular the notion of Uniform Case Extension Equivalence in Deﬁnition 10 of 
[40] roughly corresponds to our notion of semantics decomposability). These results are not directly comparable with ours, 
due to the different modeling of the interactions between subframeworks mentioned previously. For instance, in Example 5 
of [40] a counterexample is given disproving (a sort of) top-down decomposability of grounded semantics in multi-sorted 
frameworks, while in our context grounded semantics is actually top-down decomposable.
In the notion of conditional acceptance function introduced in [19], basically the acceptance function, corresponding to a 
given semantics, accepts as input not only an argumentation framework but also an (externally imposed) condition, which 
corresponds to the set of possible labellings of the framework. In other words, the acceptance function is constrained to 
produce a set of labellings which is a subset of the given condition. This expresses some form of external inﬂuence on 
argument evaluation, and in this sense could be related to our notion of argumentation framework with input. However, it 
is based on a rather different intuition, since it expresses a constraint on the labels of all arguments, independently of any 
attack relation coming from outside, while in our approach external inﬂuences manifest themselves through attack relations 
involving a well-identiﬁed set of arguments in the conditioned framework. In [19] the generic notion of conditional accep-
tance function is instantiated only for complete semantics, while its application to other semantics is, as to our knowledge, 
still to be developed.
Abstract dialectical frameworks (ADFs) [20] generalize Dung’s framework by detaching the meaning of attack from the 
binary relation between arguments, so that each element of this relation is just a link representing a dependency. The 
meaning of the dependencies for each argument s is then expressed by an acceptance condition Cs which associates each 
subset of the set of parents of s with either in or out, namely gives a binary decision on the acceptance of s given the set 
of its parents which are accepted. Hence, in ADFs argument evaluation is, by deﬁnition, based on a strictly local criterion 
and any global evaluation arises bottom-up from the combination of the local ones.
While the present work is strictly focused on Dung’s framework and the relevant semantics based on the attack relation, 
it appears that the basic ideas underlying our analysis have signiﬁcant commonalities with the process of bottom-up eval-
uation in ADFs. Generalizing the results we have obtained to the context of ADFs is therefore a very important direction of 
future work.
10.2. Argumentation dynamics
Broadly speaking, in the context of abstract argumentation, dynamics concerns the evolution of a given framework to 
which one or more modiﬁcations (i.e. additions and/or deletions of arguments and/or attacks) are applied. These modiﬁca-
tions can be exogenous and neutral, namely determined by some external event, or endogenous and goal-oriented, namely 
deliberately induced by an agent to reach some goal, like the acceptance of a desired argument. In the former case, the 
main interest is in determining the effect of the external modiﬁcations, in the latter, in identifying the minimal set of mod-
iﬁcations suﬃcient to reach the goal. In both cases, one is typically interested in reusing as far as possible the results of 
previous computations carried out in the original framework so as to limit the amount of new computation required by 
the modiﬁcation. Hence some of the pre-existing computation results have to be combined with the results of some partial 
computations in the new framework. Clearly the results presented in this paper are speciﬁcally related to this facet of argu-
mentation dynamics and we focus on the relevant literature. A detailed analysis of the broader implications of our work on 
argumentation dynamics is beyond the scope of the present paper.
In [33] to save computation in a dynamic context the division-based method is proposed. Essentially, after a modiﬁca-
tion, the considered framework is divided into two parts, one unaffected and one affected. Brieﬂy, the affected part consists 
of those arguments which are reachable (through a directed path of attacks) starting from any argument or attack in-
volved in the modiﬁcation. The identiﬁcation of the unaffected part relies on the directionality property, which is required 
for the application of the method. To formalize the inﬂuence of the unaffected part over the affected part, the notion 
of conditioned argumentation framework is introduced, namely an argumentation framework receiving some attacks from 
arguments included in another argumentation framework. The paper then deals with incremental computation for some 
semantics satisfying the directionality property, namely complete, grounded, preferred and ideal14 semantics. After the 
modiﬁcation, one needs to recompute the extensions only for the affected part (modeled as a conditioned argumentation 
framework w.r.t. the unaffected part).
Some basic notions underlying the division-based method are related to our work. In particular, the notion of conditioned 
argumentation framework in [33] is similar to the notions of conditioning relation and of argumentation framework with 
input in our Deﬁnitions 10 and 11. Moreover, the incremental computation in a conditioned framework is analogous to the 
application of the local function introduced in Deﬁnition 11.
There is however an important difference due to the fact that the division-based method is essentially based on the 
directionality principle and, in particular, requires that there are no paths from the affected part to the unaffected part. As 
14 Actually the claim concerning ideal semantics turns out to be ﬂawed, as recently pointed out in [11].
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that one has an output, without having an input, and the other has an input (from the former) without having an output. 
The results concerning incremental computation of the four semantics considered in [33] correspond to a restricted form 
of semantics decomposability under these restrictive assumptions: both the unaffected and the affected part consist of a 
set of SCCs such that the SCCs included in the unaffected part precede those included in the affected part according to the 
partial order induced by the attack relation. Given this observation, the notion of decomposability in this context basically 
corresponds to a mild generalization of decomposability w.r.t. FSCC(AF), i.e. of the weakest notion of decomposability con-
sidered in this paper, and is deﬁnitely weaker than decomposability w.r.t. F∪SCC(AF). Our work is deﬁnitely more general as 
it concerns arbitrary partitions and does not rely on the directionality property. In particular, we prove full decomposability 
of stable semantics, which is not directional.
The work on splitting argumentation frameworks [17] focuses on modiﬁcations involving only additions of arguments 
or attacks (called expansions) and, apart of this restriction, shares the main basic assumptions with [33]. Considering a 
subclass of expansions called weak expansions, a splitting divides an argumentation framework into two subframeworks, 
such that only one of them receives attacks from the other: the two subframeworks correspond to the unaffected and 
affected parts of [33]. To model the effect of the unaffected subframework on the affected one, in [17] a modiﬁcation of 
the affected subframework is introduced, which involves the addition of self-attacks and bears some similarity with our 
notion of standard argumentation framework for an argumentation framework with input. Then, the splitting theorem of [17]
provides a decomposability result for stable, admissible, preferred, complete and grounded semantics, which, due to the 
restriction on the partitions considered, as in the case of [33], are weaker than the ones considered in this paper.
The restrictions that one of the two parts cannot receive attacks from the other one is lifted in [15] where an arbitrary 
partition of a framework into two parts is called quasi splitting and, using a technical arsenal rather different than ours, the 
decomposability property of stable semantics is proved. We achieved the same result for stable semantics in the context of 
a more general analysis, covering six additional literature semantics.
On the performance side, there are some empirical evidences that both the division-based method [32] and the splitting 
approach [16] may signiﬁcantly reduce the computation time required for some standard problems in abstract argumen-
tation w.r.t. to algorithms adopting a “monolithic” approach. Investigating the advantages provided by our more general 
approach in this respect is an important direction of future work.
10.3. Equivalence and interchangeability between argumentation frameworks
Various notions of equivalence for argumentation frameworks have been considered in the literature. The most basic 
ones focus either on structural correspondences (like the notion of syntactical equivalence, i.e. equality of arguments and 
attacks, used in [38] or the notion of isomorphism used in [8]) or on equality of extensions (w.r.t. a given semantics), which 
is called equivalence tout court in [38] and is analogous to the notion of equivalence between logic programs [34]. These 
notions are poorly or not at all related with modularity and interchangeability issues, that may arise in various contexts and 
in particular in presence of some form of argumentation dynamics.
To address this limitation, the notion of strong equivalence between argumentation framework (again, analogous to the 
one of strong equivalence between logic programs [34]) is introduced and investigated in [38]: two frameworks F and G are 
strongly equivalent w.r.t. a given semantics if for any argumentation framework H , the frameworks F ∪ H and G ∪ H have 
the same extensions. Basically, F and G must preserve the same outcomes in front of any operation of expansion. Since 
this requirement is, in fact, very strong, weaker notions of equivalence have subsequently been considered in the literature 
by restricting the set of expansions of the original frameworks encompassed. In particular four subclasses of expansions 
(called normal, weak, strong, and local15) are considered in [12] giving rise to four correspondent deﬁnitions of expansion 
equivalence all weaker than strong equivalence. A different notion of equivalence, introduced in [13], refers to the problem 
of minimal change: given a framework and a set of arguments E whose (credulous) acceptance has to be enforced, one is 
interested in identifying the minimal number of modiﬁcations that ensure the desired enforcement result. Two frameworks 
are minimal change equivalent, if for any set E the minimal number of modiﬁcations required to enforce E is the same in 
both frameworks. The relationships between all the above mentioned notions of equivalence have been analyzed in detail 
in [14].
The approach presented in this paper is complementary to the ones reviewed above: while these refer to several forms of 
invariance over the whole framework w.r.t. an operation of expansion, our work concerns invariance only in the unmodiﬁed 
part of the framework w.r.t. an operation of replacement. This involves a notion of equivalence in terms of Input/Output 
behavior and the study of the property of semantics transparency, which have no counterpart in the works cited above. As 
already mentioned, they can be related with the notion of strong equivalence in logic programming, while our approach is 
closer in spirit to the notion of modular equivalence between logic programs [37] and, more generally, with the study of 
modularity in this context [31]. A detailed analysis of the possible interplay between our results and the area of modular 
logic programming is beyond the scope of the present paper and is left for future work.
15 This terminology, taken out of its context, may be a bit misleading: normal expansions are not the most general case of expansions, and the terms 
weak and strong here refer to the additional arguments, so strong expansions are not a subset of weak expansions.
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indeed covers the more general case of combining together networks of different nature (e.g. embedding a neural network 
or a Bayesian network into an argumentation framework), including the special case of combination of networks of the 
same nature, called self-ﬁbring. Due to the potential heterogeneity of the networks involved, however, ﬁbring concerns the 
substitution of a single node of a network with an entire other network (neither of them having a notion of “interface” 
with the rest of the framework) and hence addresses a different kind of replacement than the one considered in this paper, 
which involves the two argumentation multipoles, i.e. two partial networks with well-deﬁned interface. Moreover, the study 
presented in [28] covers generalized argumentation frameworks, featuring a richer set of relations (e.g. support, attacks 
to attacks, attacks arising from attacks, collective and disjoint attacks) than Dung’s framework, and investigates how this 
conceptual and technical arsenal can be used to properly transform the incoming and outcoming links involving just one 
node into links involving the nodes of the network replacing that node. Thus, the analysis in [28] goes deeply into these 
complex structural manipulations, which are mostly semantics independent, and does not concern the study of speciﬁc 
semantics properties. Our work, as already mentioned, concerns a different kind of replacement and lies in the context 
of traditional Dung frameworks, where we provide a systematic assessment of interchangeability-related properties for a 
comprehensive set of literature semantics. Extending and relating our results to generalized frameworks in the spirit of [28]
is a further interesting direction of future work.
In [43] the notion of argumentation pattern is introduced in order to capture “general reusable solutions to commonly oc-
curring problems in the design of argumentation frameworks”. Hence an argumentation pattern is understood as a reusable 
and modular component, in a spirit which has some analogy with the idea of argumentation multipole introduced in this 
paper. It has however to be observed that the notion of argumentation pattern lies at a higher level of abstraction than 
the one of argumentation multipole: the deﬁnition of argumentation pattern given in [43] involves a set of arguments and, 
basically, a set of possible labellings of these arguments. No notion of attack is explicitly involved, since an argumentation 
pattern captures a set of evaluation outcomes which together represent a “typical situation” seen from outside, indepen-
dently of the (in fact, not necessarily univocal) underlying structure giving rise to this situation. Indeed, in [43] methods to 
translate (or ﬂatten) a pattern into an argumentation framework and vice versa to extract a pattern from an argumentation 
framework (where arguments to be included in the pattern have been preliminarily identiﬁed) are devised. Our work, lying 
at different level, provides suitable technical foundations for further developments of the study of argumentation patterns. 
Indeed, our analysis concerning the equivalence of alternative representations of attacks to attacks in Section 9.2.2 strenght-
ens the analysis of patterns for so called higher-order attacks in Section 3.2 of [43]. Moreover in [43] the issue of pattern 
combination is mentioned as a matter of future research, which may certainly beneﬁt from the systematic set of results 
provided in this paper, applicable to the underlying ﬂattened representation.
11. Conclusions
This paper contributes to the emerging research direction on modularity-based properties and techniques in abstract ar-
gumentation, by introducing a novel comprehensive formal corpus to describe the Input/Output behavior of argumentation 
frameworks along with the relevant semantics properties, and by providing a systematic assessment of seven well-known 
argumentation semantics in this context. Due to their foundational nature, we believe these results may play an enabling 
role in the development of a variety of more speciﬁc investigation lines, ranging from the sound combination of hetero-
geneous semantics to the deﬁnition of reusable argumentation patterns. As to future work, in addition to the many issues 
already included in the discussion of Section 10, we mention three further interesting lines. First, the extension of the 
analysis carried out in the paper to other literature semantics like the ones mainly based on the notion of conﬂict-freeness 
(e.g. stage [41], CF2 [7,10], stage2 [30] semantics) or those featuring a parametric deﬁnition (e.g. resolution-based semantics 
[6]). Second, the study of argumentation synthesis problems, namely, given a desired Input/Output behavior generating an 
argumentation framework which produces it, possibly under some constraints concerning its structure and/or the semantics 
to be adopted. Third, a systematic deﬁnition of modularity-related variations of traditional computational problems in ab-
stract argumentation, e.g. checking whether two multipoles are equivalent according to a given semantics, and the analysis 
of their complexity properties.
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proofs of Section 3
Proposition 1. Given a semantics S and an argumentation framework AF, FS(AF, ∅, ∅, ∅) = LS(AF).
Proof. The result is immediate by considering that the standard argumentation framework w.r.t. (AF, ∅, ∅, ∅) is AF . 
P. Baroni et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 217 (2014) 144–197 185Proposition 2. Let S be a complete-compatible semantics and let AF′ = (Ar ∪I ′, att ∪ R ′I ) be the standard argumentation frame-
work w.r.t. an argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ). Then for any Lab ∈ LS(AF′) it holds that Lab↓I ′ = {(A′, in) |
A ∈ out(LI )} ∪ LI and Lab↓I = LI .
Proof. Since S is complete-compatible, on the basis of Deﬁnition 14 it is immediate to see that for any labelling Lab ∈ LS(AF′)
Lab↓I ′ = {(A′, in) | A ∈ out(LI )} ∪ LI , thus in particular Lab↓I = LI . 
Proposition 3. Given a complete-compatible semantics S, a set of arguments I and a labelling LI ∈ LI , it holds that 
FS(AF∅, I , LI , ∅) = {∅}.
Proof. According to Deﬁnition 12, the standard argumentation framework w.r.t. (AF∅, I , LI , ∅) is AF′ = (I ′, att′), where 
I ′ = I ∪ {A′ | A ∈ out(LI )} and att′ = {(A′, A) | A ∈ out(LI )} ∪ {(A, A) | A ∈ undec(LI )}. According to Deﬁnition 13, 
FS(AF∅, I , LI , ∅) = {Lab↓∅ | Lab ∈ LS(AF′)}. Since S is complete-compatible, |LS(AF′)| = 1, thus FS(AF∅, I , LI , ∅) = {∅}. 
Proposition 4. GR, CO, ST, PR, SST, ID are all complete-compatible semantics.
Proof. First, it is easy too see that the three conditions of the ﬁrst part of Deﬁnition 14 are satisﬁed by any complete 
labelling (see Deﬁnition 6). The desired conclusion then follows from the fact that, according to Deﬁnition 8, all labellings 
prescribed by GR, ST, PR, SST, ID are complete (note in particular that only the ﬁrst two conditions have to be satisﬁed 
by ST, since there are no stable labellings in case a self-attacking argument is attacked by itself only). As to the second part 
of the deﬁnition, it is immediate to see that the labelling {(A′, in) | A ∈ out(LI )} ∪ LI is the unique complete labelling, 
thus it is also grounded, preferred, semi-stable and ideal. Moreover, such labelling is also stable (note that in this case there 
are no self-attacking arguments in the framework). 
Proposition 5. Given a complete-compatible semantics S, if S is fully decomposable then there is a unique local function satisfying the 
conditions of Deﬁnition 15, coinciding with the canonical local function FS.
Proof. For each argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ), consider the standard argumentation framework 
AF′ w.r.t. it, and the partition {Ar, I ′} where I ′ = I ∪ {A′ | A ∈ out(LI )}. Since S is decomposable, according to 
Deﬁnition 15 it must be the case that LS(AF′) = {LAr ∪ LI ′ | LAr ∈ F (AF, I , LI ′↓I , RI ), LI ′ ∈ F (AF′↓I ′ , ∅, ∅, ∅)}. By 
Proposition 2, for any Lab ∈ LS(AF′) it must be the case that Lab↓I = LI , thus from the above condition LS(AF′) =
{LAr ∪ LI ′ | LAr ∈ F (AF, I , LI , RI ), LI ′ ∈ F (AF′↓I ′ , ∅, ∅, ∅)}. Moreover, F (AF′↓I ′ , ∅, ∅, ∅) is nonempty (in particular 
there is a unique labelling LI ′ ∈ F (AF′↓I ′ , ∅, ∅, ∅)), since Deﬁnition 15 applied to the partition {I ′} of AF′↓I ′ yields 
LS(AF′↓I ′ ) = F (AF′↓I ′ , ∅, ∅, ∅) and |LS(AF′↓I ′ )| = 1 since S is complete-compatible. This entails that F (AF, I , LI , RI ) =
{Lab↓Ar | Lab ∈ LS(AF′)}, which according to Deﬁnition 13 coincides with the canonical local function FS . 
A.2. Proofs of Section 4
Theorem 1. Admissible semantics AD is fully decomposable, with FAD satisfying the conditions of Deﬁnition 15.
Proof. We have to prove that, for any argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att) and any partition {P1, . . . , Pn} of Ar, 
LAD(AF) = {LP1 ∪ . . . ∪ LPn | LPi ∈ FAD(AF↓Pi , Pi inp, (
⋃
j=1...n, j =i L P j )↓Pi inp , Pi R)}. As to LAD(AF) ⊆ {LP1 ∪ . . . ∪ LPn | LPi ∈
FAD(AF↓Pi , Pi inp, (
⋃
j=1...n, j =i L P j )↓Pi inp , Pi R)}, given L ∈ LAD(AF), let us consider a generic P = Pi and let LP = L↓Pi and 
LAr\P = L↓(⋃ j=1...n, j =i P j): we have to prove that LP ∈ FAD(AF↓P , P inp, LAr\P↓P inp , P R), i.e. that the conditions of Deﬁnition 23
are satisﬁed for LP . Given a generic argument A ∈ P :
• if LP (A) = in then L(A) = in and since L is an admissible labelling it must be the case that ∀B ∈ Ar : (B, A) ∈
att, L(B) = out. As a consequence, ∀B ∈ P : (B, A) ∈ att, L(B) = out with L(B) = LP (B), and ∀B ∈ P inp : (B, A) ∈ P R , 
since P R ⊆ att and LAr\P↓P inp (B) = L(B) it must be the case that LAr\P↓P inp (B) = out;• if LP (A) = out then L(A) = out and since L is an admissible labelling ∃B ∈ Ar : (B, A) ∈ att∧ L(B) = in. There are two 
cases to consider. If B ∈ P , then LP (B) = L(B) = in and the condition is veriﬁed. If B /∈ P , then since (B, A) ∈ att it 
holds that B ∈ P inp, and LAr\P↓P inp (B) = L(B) = in;
Turning to LAD(AF) ⊇ {LP1 ∪ . . . ∪ LPn | LPi ∈ FAD(AF↓Pi , Pi inp, (
⋃
j=1...n, j =i L P j )↓Pi inp , Pi R)}, let LP1 , . . . , LPn be n labellings 
of P1, . . . , Pn such that ∀i LPi ∈ FAD(AF↓Pi , Pi inp, (
⋃
j=1...n, j =i L P j )↓Pi inp , Pi R). Letting L = LP1 ∪ . . . ∪ LPn , we prove that 
L ∈ LAD(AF). We consider a generic argument A ∈ Ar, denoting as P the set Pi such that A ∈ Pi , as LAr\P the labelling 
(
⋃
j=1...n, j =i L P j ), and we prove that the conditions of Deﬁnition 5 are satisﬁed:
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out, if B /∈ P then B ∈ P inp, thus L(B) = LAr\P↓P inp (B) = out;• if L(A) = out then LP (A) = out. On the basis of Deﬁnition 23, ∃B ∈ P : (B, A) ∈ att ∧ LP (B) = in or
∃B ∈ P inp : (B, A) ∈ P R ∧ LAr\P↓P inp (B) = in. Since P R ⊆ att and L = LP ∪ LAr\P , it holds that ∃B : (B, A) ∈ att with 
L(B) = in; 
Theorem 2. The canonical local function of admissible semantics is FAD, as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 23.
Proof. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ), where AF = (Ar, att), let AF′ = (Ar ∪ I ′, att ∪
R ′I ) be the standard argumentation framework w.r.t. (AF, I , LI , RI ). We have to show that {L′↓Ar | L′ ∈ LAD(AF′)} =
FAD(AF, I , LI , RI ).
As to {L′↓Ar | L′ ∈ LAD(AF′)} ⊆ FAD(AF, I , LI , RI ), given an admissible labelling L′ of AF′ , we prove that L′↓Ar ∈
FAD(AF, I , LI , RI ), i.e. satisﬁes the conditions of Deﬁnition 23. Given an argument A ∈ Ar such that L′↓Ar(A) = in, ob-
viously L′(A) = in, thus by the deﬁnition of admissible labelling all the attackers of A in AF′ are labelled out, entailing 
the condition ((∀B ∈ Ar : (B, A) ∈ att, Lab(B) = out) ∧ (∀B ∈I : (B, A) ∈ RI , LI (B) = out)). Similarly, given an argument 
A ∈ Ar such that L′↓Ar(A) = out, since L′ is an admissible labelling of AF ′ there is an attacker of A labelled in, entailing 
the condition ((∃B ∈ Ar : (B, A) ∈ att ∧ Lab(B) = in) ∨ (∃B ∈I : (B, A) ∈ RI ∧ LI (B) = in)).
As to {L′↓Ar | L′ ∈ LAD(AF′)} ⊇ FAD(AF, I , LI , RI ), consider a labelling L ∈ FAD(AF, I , LI , RI ): letting L∗ be the 
grounded labelling of AF′↓I ′ , we prove that L∗ ∪ L is an admissible labelling of AF ′ . Since L∗ is an admissible labelling 
of AF′↓I ′ , it is easy to see that L∗ ∈ FAD(AF′↓I ′ , ∅, ∅, ∅). Moreover, since GR is complete-compatible L∗↓I = LI , thus 
L ∈ FAD(AF′↓Ar, I , L∗↓I , RI ) (where it has been taken into account that AF = AF′↓Ar). Then the conclusion that L∗ ∪ L is 
an admissible labelling of AF ′ holds by Theorem 1. 
Theorem 3. Complete semantics CO is fully decomposable and FCO is its canonical local function.
Proof. We have to prove that, for any argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att) and any partition {P1, . . . , Pn} of Ar, 
LCO(AF) = {LP1 ∪ . . . ∪ LPn | LPi ∈ FCO(AF↓Pi , Pi inp, (
⋃
j=1...n, j =i L P j )↓Pi inp , Pi R)}.
First, given L ∈ LCO(AF), let us consider a generic P = Pi and let LP = L↓Pi and LAr\P = L↓(⋃ j=1...n, j =i P j): we have to 
prove that LP ∈ FCO(AF↓P , P inp, LAr\P↓P inp , P R). Since by Theorem 1 LP ∈ FAD(AF↓P , P inp, LAr\P↓P inp , P R), we have only to 
prove that the third condition of Deﬁnition 24 is satisﬁed for LP . Given a generic argument A ∈ P , if LP (A) = undec then 
L(A) = undec, and since L is a complete labelling there is no B such that (B, A) ∈ att with L(B) = in, and there is an 
argument C such that (C, A) ∈ att and L(C) = undec. The ﬁrst condition entails that ((∀B ∈ Ar : (B, A) ∈ att, LP (B) = in) ∧
(∀B ∈ P inp : (B, A) ∈ P R , LAr\P↓P inp (B) = in)). The second condition in turn entails that ((∃B ∈ Ar : (B, A) ∈ att ∧ LP (B) =
undec) ∨ (∃B ∈ P inp : (B, A) ∈ P R ∧ LAr\P↓P inp (B) = undec)).
As for the other direction of the proof, let LP1 , . . . , LPn be n labellings of P1, . . . , Pn such that ∀i LPi ∈ FCO(AF↓Pi , Pi inp,
(
⋃
j=1...n, j =i L P j )↓Pi inp , Pi R). Letting L = LP1 ∪ . . . ∪ LPn , we prove that L ∈ LCO(AF). Since by Theorem 1 L is admissible, we 
have only to prove the third condition of Deﬁnition 6. We consider a generic argument A ∈ Ar, denoting as P the set Pi
such that A ∈ Pi , as LAr\P the labelling (⋃ j=1...n, j =i L P j ). If L(A) = undec then LP (A) = undec. For every B ∈ Ar : (B, A) ∈
att, according to Deﬁnition 24 if B ∈ P then L(B) = LP (B) = in, if B /∈ P then B ∈ P inp, thus L(B) = LAr\P↓P inp (B) = in. 
Moreover, ∃B ∈ P : (B, A) ∈ att ∧ LP (B) = undec or ∃B ∈ P inp : (B, A) ∈ P R ∧ LAr\P↓P inp (B) = undec. Since P R ⊆ att and 
L = LP ∪ LAr\P , this entails that ∃B ∈ Ar : (B, A) ∈ att ∧ L(B) = undec.
Finally, since the proof adopts FCO as the local function and CO is complete-compatible, by Proposition 5 it holds that 
FCO is the canonical local function of complete semantics. 
Theorem 4. Stable semantics ST is fully decomposable and FST is its canonical local function.
Proof. First, consider a labelling L ∈ LST(AF). By deﬁnition, L is a complete labelling. Since complete semantics is fully 
decomposable and thus in particular top-down decomposable, for any partition {P1, . . . , Pn} of Ar it holds that ∀i L↓Pi ∈
FCO(AF↓Pi , Pi inp, L↓Pi inp , Pi R). From the absence of undec-labelled arguments according to L, it also holds that L↓Pi ∈
FST(AF↓Pi , Pi inp, L↓Pi inp , Pi R).
As to the other direction of the proof, let LP1 , . . . , LPn be n labellings of P1, . . . , Pn such that ∀i LPi ∈ FST(AF↓Pi , Pi inp,
(
⋃
j=1...n, j =i L P j )↓Pi inp , Pi R). Let L = LP1 ∪ . . . ∪ LPn . By deﬁnition of FST , there are no undec-labelled arguments according 
to L. Moreover, since FST always returns a set of complete labellings, bottom-up decomposability of complete semantics 
entails that L ∈ LCO(AF), thus L is a stable labelling.
Finally, similarly to the proof of Theorem 3, by Proposition 5 it holds that FST is the canonical local function of stable 
semantics. 
Proposition 6. The canonical local function of grounded and preferred semantics are deﬁned as
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• FPR(AF, I , LI , RI )  {L | L is a maximal (w.r.t. 	) labelling in FCO(AF, I , LI , RI )}.
Proof. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ), where AF = (Ar, att), let AF′ = (Ar ∪I ′, att ∪ R ′I )
be the standard argumentation w.r.t. (AF, I , LI , RI ).
As to FGR , let L′ be the grounded labelling of AF ′: we prove that {L′↓Ar} coincides with {L | L is minimal in FCO(AF, I ,
LI , RI )}. Notice that we do not assume that the deﬁnition of FGR is well founded, i.e. that there is a unique minimal 
labelling in FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ): this is obtained as a by-product of the proof.
First we prove that L′↓Ar is a minimal labelling of FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ). Since L′ is by deﬁnition a complete la-
belling and complete semantics is top-down decomposable (see Theorem 3), it holds that L′↓I ′ ∈ FCO(AF′↓I ′ , ∅, ∅, ∅) and 
L′↓Ar ∈ FCO(AF, I , L′↓I , RI ). Since by Proposition 2 it holds that L′↓I = LI , the latter condition can be rewritten as 
L′↓Ar ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ), entailing in particular that FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ) is nonempty. Suppose now by contradiction 
that L′↓Ar is not a minimal labelling returned by FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ): then there is a labelling L∗ ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI )
such that L∗ 	 L′↓Ar and L∗ = L′↓Ar . Note that L′↓I ′ and L∗ are compatible (since L′↓I ′ coincides in I with LI ), thus 
from bottom-up decomposability of complete semantics L′↓I ′ ∪ L∗ is a complete labelling of AF ′ . Since (L′↓I ′ ∪ L∗) 	 L′
and (L′↓I ′ ∪ L∗) = L′ , this contradicts the fact that L′ is by deﬁnition the minimal (w.r.t. 	) complete labelling of AF .
Let us now consider a labelling L of AF which is minimal among those of FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ): we prove that L = L′↓Ar , 
thus also showing that there is a unique minimal labelling in FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ). Since L′ is by deﬁnition a complete 
labelling and complete semantics is decomposable, it must be the case that L′↓I ′ ∈ FCO(AF′↓I ′ , ∅, ∅, ∅), thus by bottom-up 
decomposability of complete semantics L′↓I ′ ∪ L is a complete labelling of AF ′ (recall that L′ coincides in I with LI ). 
By deﬁnition of grounded labelling, L′ 	 (L′↓I ′ ∪ L). Assume by contradiction that (L′↓I ′ ∪ L) = L′: since the grounded 
labelling is minimal (w.r.t. 	) among all complete labellings, it must be the case that L′↓Ar 	 L and L′↓Ar = L. However, 
by top-down decomposability of complete semantics L′↓Ar ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ), contradicting the minimality of L. This 
completes the proof as far as the canonical local function of grounded semantics is concerned.
As to FPR , we have to show that {L′↓Ar | L′ ∈ LPR(AF′)} = {L | L is maximal in FCO(AF, I , LI , RI )}. The proof is similar 
to that for FGR .
First, given a preferred labelling L′ of AF′ , we prove that L′↓Ar is a maximal labelling in FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ). Since 
L′ is by deﬁnition a complete labelling, by top-down decomposability of complete semantics L′↓I ′ ∈ FCO(AF′↓I ′ , ∅, ∅, ∅)
and L′↓Ar ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ), where we exploit the fact that, by Proposition 2, L′↓I = LI . Assume by contradiction 
that L′↓Ar is not a maximal labelling in FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ): this entails that there is a labelling L∗ ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI )
such that L′↓Ar 	 L∗ and L′↓Ar = L∗ . Note that L∗ and L′↓I ′ are compatible since L′ coincides in I with LI , thus from 
bottom-up decomposability of complete semantics L∗ ∪ L′↓I ′ is a complete labelling of AF ′ . However, L′ 	 (L∗ ∪ L′↓I ′ ) and 
L′ = (L∗ ∪ L′↓I ′ ), contradicting the fact that L′ is by deﬁnition a maximal (w.r.t. 	) complete labelling.
Let us now consider a labelling L of AF which is maximal among those of FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ): letting L∗ be the 
grounded labelling of AF ′ , we prove that L∗↓I ′ ∪ L is a preferred labelling of AF ′ . By bottom-up decomposability of com-
plete semantics L∗↓I ′ ∪ L is a complete labelling of AF′ . Assume by contradiction that it is not maximal: then there is 
a preferred labelling L′ of AF′ such that (L∗↓I ′ ∪ L) 	 L′ and (L∗↓I ′ ∪ L) = L′ . Since, by Proposition 2, L′↓I ′ = L∗↓I ′ , 
this entails that L 	 L′↓Ar and L = L′↓Ar . However, top-down decomposability of complete semantics also entails that 
L′↓Ar ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ), contradicting the maximality of L among the labellings of FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ). 
Lemma 1. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ), where AF = (Ar, att), let L be a labelling such that 
L ∈ FAD(AF, I , LI , RI ) and L /∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ). Then there is an argument A ∈ Ar such that L(A) = undec and a labelling 
LA ∈ FAD(AF, I , LI , RI ) such that LA(A) ∈ {in, out} and ∀B ∈ Ar : B = A, LA(B) = L(B).
Proof. Since L ∈ FAD(AF, I , LI RI ) and L /∈ FCO(AF, I , LI RI ), according to Deﬁnitions 23 and 24 there must be at least 
an undec-labelled argument A such that either (∀B ∈ Ar : (B, A) ∈ att, L(B) = out) ∧ (∀B ∈I : (B, A) ∈ RI , LI (B) = out)
or (∃B ∈ Ar : (B, A) ∈ att ∧ L(B) = in) ∨ (∃B ∈ I : (B, A) ∈ RI ∧ LI (B) = in). Then the labelling LA is constructed such 
that ∀B = A LA(B) = L(B), and LA(A) = in in the ﬁrst case and LA(A) = out in the second case. It is easy to see that 
LA ∈ FAD(AF, I , LI , RI ) by checking the conditions of Deﬁnition 23. In particular, A satisﬁes the conditions of in-labelled 
arguments (in the ﬁrst case) or the conditions of out-labelled arguments (in the second case) by construction, all of the 
arguments besides A labelled in by LA are labelled in by L and thus have their attackers labelled out by L (and LI ) and 
thus by LA (and LI ), all of the arguments besides A labelled out by LA are labelled out by L and thus have an attacker 
which is labelled in by L (or LI ) and thus by LA (or LI ). 
Lemma 2. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ), for every labelling L1 ∈ FAD(AF, I , LI , RI ) there 
exists a labelling L2 ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ) such that L1 	 L2 .
Proof. Given L1 ∈ FAD(AF, I , LI , RI ), if L1 ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ) then the conclusion trivially follows, otherwise ac-
cording to Lemma 1 there is an argument A ∈ Args and a labelling L1 A ∈ FAD(AF, I , LI , RI ) such that L1 	 L1 A , 
L1(A) = undec and L1 A(A) ∈ {in, out}. Since AF is ﬁnite and it is thus impossible to indeﬁnitely turn undec-labelled 
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L1 	 L2 holds by construction. 
Proposition 7. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ), let LI 1, LI 2 ∈ LI be two labellings of I such 
that LI
1 	 LI 2 . Then it holds that
1. ∀L1 ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI 1, RI ), ∃L2 ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI 2, RI ) such that L1 	 L2; and
2. ∀L2 ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI 2, RI ), ∃L1 ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI 1, RI ) such that L1 	 L2 .
Proof. As to the ﬁrst point, since L1 ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI 1, RI ) and all arguments in I that are labelled in (respectively out) 
by L1I are also labelled in (respectively out) by L
2
I , it is easy to see that L1 ∈ FAD(AF, I , LI 2, RI ). Then the conclusion 
follows from Lemma 2.
As to the second point, given L2 ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI 2, RI ) consider the set of labellings ΛL2 = {L ∈ FAD(AF, I , LI 1, RI ) |
L 	 L2}. Note that ΛL2 is nonempty, as it includes the labelling that assigns undec to all arguments, and since AF is ﬁnite 
there is at least a maximal (w.r.t. 	) labelling among those of ΛL2 . Let L1 be a maximal labelling in ΛL2 : we prove the 
claim by showing that L1 ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI 1, RI ). Suppose by contradiction that this is not the case: then, by Lemma 1
there is an argument A ∈ Args and a labelling L1 A ∈ FAD(AF, I , LI 1, RI ) such that L1(A) = undec, L1 A(A) ∈ {in, out}
and ∀B ∈ Ar : B = A, L1 A(B) = L1(B). There are two cases to consider.
• If L1 A(A) = in, then it must be the case that L2(A) = in, otherwise from L1 	 L2 we would also have L1 A 	 L2 and L1
would not be a maximal element of ΛL2 (observe that L1 	 L1 A and L1 A 	 L1). Since L2 ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI 2, RI ), this 
in turns entails that ∃B ∈ Ar : (B, A) ∈ att ∧ L2(B) = out, or ∃B ∈ I : (B, A) ∈ RI ∧ LI 2(B) = out (otherwise L2(A)
would be in according to Deﬁnition 24). However, since L1 	 L2 and LI 1 	 LI 2, the same condition holds for L1 and 
LI
1, i.e. ∃B ∈ Ar : (B, A) ∈ att ∧ L1(B) = out, or ∃B ∈ I : (B, A) ∈ RI ∧ LI 1(B) = out. This contradicts the fact that 
L1 A ∈ FAD(AF, I , LI 1, RI ), since A does not satisfy the conditions of Deﬁnition 23 required by in-labelled arguments.
• The other case to consider is L1 A(A) = out, which similarly to the ﬁrst case entails L2(A) = out, otherwise L1 A 	 L2
and L1 would not be a maximal element of ΛL2 . Since L2 ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI 2, RI ), this in turns entails that ∀B ∈
Ar : (B, A) ∈ att, L2(B) = in and ∀B ∈ I : (B, A) ∈ RI , LI 2(B) = in. However, since L1 	 L2 and LI 1 	 LI 2, the 
same condition holds for L1 and LI 1, i.e. ∀B ∈ Ar : (B, A) ∈ att, L1(B) = in and ∀B ∈ I : (B, A) ∈ RI , LI 1(B) = in, 
contradicting the fact that L1 A ∈ FAD(AF, I , LI 1, RI ). 
Theorem 5. Given an argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att), let L be the grounded labelling of AF. For any set P ⊆ Ar, L↓P ∈
FGR(AF↓P , P inp, L↓P inp , P R).
Proof. Let Q = Ar \ P . Since L is the grounded labelling of AF which by deﬁnition is also complete, letting LQ = L↓Q
and LP = L↓P we have by Theorem 3 that LQ ∈ FCO(AF↓Q , Q inp, LP↓Q inp , Q R) and LP ∈ FCO(AF↓P , P inp, LQ ↓P inp , P R). 
Suppose by contradiction that LP is not the minimal element w.r.t. 	 in FCO(AF↓P , P inp, LQ ↓P inp , P R), and let LP 2 	 LP
(with LP 	 LP 2) be the minimal element. Since in particular LP 2↓Q inp 	 LP↓Q inp , by Proposition 7 (second point) there 
is a labelling LQ 2 ∈ FCO(AF↓Q , Q inp, LP 2↓Q inp , Q R) such that LQ 2 	 LQ . Since in particular LQ 2↓P inp 	 LQ ↓P inp , again 
by Proposition 7 there is a labelling LP 3 ∈ FCO(AF↓P , P inp, LQ 2↓P inp , P R) such that LP 3 	 LP 2. Iterating the same rea-
soning, for any i > 2 we get ∃LP i ∈ FCO(AF↓P , P inp, LQ i−1↓P inp , P R) such that LP i 	 LP i−1 	 . . . 	 LP 2 	 LP , and ∃LQ i ∈
FCO(AF↓Q , Q inp, LP i↓Q inp , Q R) such that LQ i 	 LQ i−1 	 . . . 	 LQ 2 	 LQ . Since the argumentation framework is ﬁnite, there 
must be an i∗ such that ∀ j > i∗LP j = LP i∗ and LQ j = LQ i∗ . This in turn yields LP i∗ ∈ FCO(AF↓P , P inp, LQ i∗↓P inp , P R) and 
LQ i
∗ ∈ FCO(AF↓Q , Q inp, LP i∗↓Q inp , Q R), which by Theorem 3 entails that (LP i
∗ ∪ LQ i∗ ) is a complete labelling of AF . How-
ever, since LP i
∗ 	 LP and LQ i∗ 	 LQ it holds that (LP i∗ ∪ LQ i∗ ) 	 L, and since LP 	 LP 2 it must also be the case that 
L 	 (LP i∗ ∪ LQ i∗ ), contradicting the fact that L is the grounded labelling of AF . 
Theorem 6. Given an argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att), let L be a preferred labelling of AF. For any set P ⊆ Ar, L↓P ∈
FPR(AF↓P , P inp, L↓P inp , P R).
Proof. Let Q = Ar \ P . Since L is a preferred labelling of AF and thus complete, letting LQ = L↓Q and LP = L↓P we 
have by Theorem 3 that LQ ∈ FCO(AF↓Q , Q inp, LP↓Q inp , Q R) and LP ∈ FCO(AF↓P , P inp, LQ ↓P inp , P R). Suppose by contra-
diction that LP is not a maximal element w.r.t. 	 in FCO(AF↓P , P inp, LQ ↓P inp , P R), and let LP 2 be a maximal element 
such that LP 	 LP 2 (with LP 2 	 LP ). Since LP↓Q inp 	 LP 2↓Q inp , by Proposition 7 (ﬁrst point) there is a labelling LQ 2 ∈
FCO(AF↓Q , Q inp, LP 2↓Q inp , Q R) such that LQ 	 LQ 2. Since in particular LQ ↓P inp 	 LQ 2↓P inp , again by Proposition 7 there is a 
labelling LP 3 ∈ FCO(AF↓P , P inp, LQ 2↓P inp , P R) such that LP 2 	 LP 3. Iterating the same reasoning, for any i > 2 we get ∃LP i ∈
FCO(AF↓P , P inp, LQ i−1↓P inp , P R) such that LP 	 LP 2 	 . . . 	 LP i−1 	 LP i , and ∃LQ i ∈ FCO(AF↓Q , Q inp, LP i↓Q inp , Q R) such 
that LQ 	 LQ 2 	 . . . 	 LQ i−1 	 LQ i . Since the argumentation framework is ﬁnite, there must be an i∗ such that ∀ j > i∗LP j =
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and LQ j = LQ i∗ . This in turn yields LP i∗ ∈ FCO(AF↓P , P inp, LQ i∗↓P inp , P R) and LQ i
∗ ∈ FCO(AF↓Q , Q inp, LP i∗↓Q inp , Q R), 
which by Theorem 3 entails that (LP i
∗ ∪ LQ i∗ ) is a complete labelling of AF . However, since LP 	 LP i∗ and LQ 	 LQ i∗ we 
have that L 	 (LP i∗ ∪ LQ i∗ ), and since LP 2 	 LP it must also be the case that (LP i∗ ∪ LQ i∗ ) 	 L, contradicting the fact that L
is a preferred labelling of AF . 
Lemma 3. Let S be a complete-compatible semantics which is top-down decomposable, with the canonical local function FS. Given an 
argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ), consider a labelling L ∈ FS(AF, I , LI , RI ) and let P ⊆ Ar be an arbitrary 
set of arguments of AF. Then, letting P F-inp  P inp ∪ {A ∈I | ∃B ∈ P , (A, B) ∈ RI } and P RF  P R ∪ (RI ∩ (I × P )), it holds that 
L↓P ∈ FS(AF↓P , P F-inp, (L∪ LI )↓P F-inp , P RF ).
Proof. Let AF′ = (Ar ∪I ′, att ∪ R ′I ) be the standard argumentation w.r.t. (AF, I , LI , RI ). Since L ∈ FS(AF, I , LI , RI ), 
according to the deﬁnition of canonical local function (see Deﬁnition 13) it holds that ∃L′ ∈ LS(AF′) such that L′↓Ar = L. 
By top-down decomposability of S applied to AF′ and P , it must be the case that L′↓P ∈ FS(AF′↓P , (P inp)′, L′↓(P inp)′ , (P R)′), 
where we use (P inp)′ and (P R)′ to denote P inp and P R in the context of AF′ , respectively. Then the conclusion follows by 
observing that L′↓P = L↓P , AF′↓P = AF↓P , (P inp)′ = P F-inp, L′↓(P inp)′ = LI ↓(P F-inp∩I ) ∪ L↓P inp , and (P R)′ = P RF . 
Theorem 7. Grounded and preferred semantics are decomposable w.r.t. F∪SCC.
Proof. Since grounded and preferred semantics are top-down decomposable, we have only to prove bottom-up decompos-
ability w.r.t. F∪SCC .
Let us ﬁrst consider grounded semantics. Given an argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att), consider a parti-
tion {P1, . . . , Pn} ∈ F∪SCC(AF), and let LP1 , . . . , LPn be n labellings of P1, . . . , Pn such that ∀i LPi ∈ FGR(AF↓Pi , Pi inp,
(
⋃
j=1...n, j =i L P j )↓Pi inp , Pi R). Letting L = LP1 ∪ . . . ∪ LPn , we prove that L is the grounded labelling of AF . Since FGR re-
turns a labelling of FCO and complete semantics is bottom-up decomposable, we know that L is a complete labelling of AF: 
assume by contradiction that it is not the grounded labelling, thus letting L′ be the grounded labelling of AF it must be the 
case that L′ 	 L and L′ = L. Taking into account that the graph obtained by considering strongly-connected components as 
single nodes is acyclic, there must be a strongly connected component S ∈ SCCSAF such that L′↓S 	 L↓S and L′↓S = L↓S , 
while L′↓S inp = L↓S inp (otherwise, considering a strongly connected component S1 ∈ SCCSAF such that L′↓S1 = L↓S1 , from 
L′↓S1inp = L↓S1inp we have L′↓S2 = L↓S2 where S2 is a strongly connected component such that S1inp ∩ S2 = ∅, and it-
erating this step we either obtain an inﬁnite number of strongly connected components, which is impossible since AF
is ﬁnite, or end up with a cycle of strongly connected components, which is impossible as well). By top-down decom-
posability of grounded semantics we have L′↓S ∈ FGR(AF↓S , S inp, L′↓S inp , SR) = FGR(AF↓S , S inp, L↓S inp , SR). Now, according 
to the deﬁnition of F∪SCC , there is an element Pk of the partition such that S ⊆ Pk , and by Lemma 3 applied to 
LPk ∈ FGR(AF↓Pk , Pk inp, (
⋃
j=1...n, j =i L P j )↓Pk inp , PkR) it must be the case that L↓S ∈ FGR(AF↓S , S inp, L↓S inp , SR). However, 
this contradicts the two conditions L′↓S ∈ FGR(AF↓S , S inp, L↓S inp , SR) and L′↓S = L↓S , since FGR always returns a unique 
labelling.
The proof for preferred semantics is similar. Given an argumentation framework AF = (Ar, att), consider a parti-
tion {P1, . . . , Pn} ∈ F∪SCC(AF), and let LP1 , . . . , LPn be n labellings of P1, . . . , Pn such that ∀i LPi ∈ FPR(AF↓Pi , Pi inp,
(
⋃
j=1...n, j =i L P j )↓Pi inp , Pi R). Letting L = LP1 ∪ . . . ∪ LPn , we prove that L ∈ LPR(AF). By deﬁnition of FPR and bottom-up 
decomposability of complete semantics, we know that L is a complete labelling of AF: assume by contradiction that it is 
not preferred, thus ∃L′ ∈ LPR(AF) such that L 	 L′ and L = L′ . Taking into account that the graph obtained by consider-
ing strongly-connected components as single nodes is acyclic, there must be a strongly connected component S ∈ SCCSAF
such that L↓S 	 L′↓S and L↓S = L′↓S , while L↓S inp = L′↓S inp . By top-down decomposability of preferred semantics we have 
L′↓S ∈ FPR(AF↓S , S inp, L′↓S inp , SR) = FPR(AF↓S , S inp, L↓S inp , SR). According to the deﬁnition of F∪SCC , there is a k such that 
S ⊆ Pk , and by Lemma 3 it holds that L↓S ∈ FPR(AF↓S , S inp, L↓S inp , SR). However, from L′↓S ∈ FPR(AF↓S , S inp, L↓S inp , SR) ⊆
FCO(AF↓S , S inp, L↓S inp , SR), L↓S 	 L′↓S and L↓S = L′↓S we get a contradiction, since L↓S should be a maximal labelling in 
FCO(AF↓S , S inp, L↓S inp , SR) by deﬁnition of FPR . 
Proposition 8. The canonical local function of ideal semantics is deﬁned as F ID(AF, I , LI , RI )  {L∗}, where L∗ is the maximal 
(w.r.t. 	) labelling in FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ) such that for each LP ∈ FPR(AF, I , LI , RI ) it holds that L∗ 	 LP .
Proof. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ), let AF′ = (Ar ∪ I ′, att ∪ R ′I ) be the standard 
argumentation framework w.r.t. (AF, I , LI , RI ). Taking into account Proposition 2, it is immediate to see that
FCO
(
AF′↓I ′ ,∅,∅,∅
)= FPR
(
AF′↓I ′ ,∅,∅,∅
)= {{(A′,in) | A ∈ out(LI )
}∪ LI
}
(A.1)
As a preliminary result, we prove that
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L′↓Ar | L′ ∈ LCO
(
AF′
)∧ ∀L′P ∈ LPR
(
AF′
)
L′ 	 L′P
}
= {L ∈ FCO(AF,I , LI , RI ) | ∀LP ∈ FPR(AF,I , LI , RI ) L	 LP
}
(A.2)
• As to the ﬁrst direction of this proof, consider a labelling L′ ∈ LCO(AF′) such that ∀L′P ∈ LPR(AF′) L′ 	 L′P . Since complete 
semantics is top-down decomposable and, by Proposition 2, L′↓I = LI , L′↓Ar ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ). Moreover, Propo-
sition 2 and condition (A.1) entail that L′↓I ′ ∈ FPR(AF′↓I ′ , ∅, ∅, ∅), thus by bottom-up decomposability of preferred 
semantics w.r.t. F∪SCC it must be the case that ∀LP ∈ FPR(AF, I , LI , RI ) (L′↓I ′ ∪ LP ) ∈ LPR(AF′). As a consequence, 
by the hypothesis on L′ it holds that L′ 	 (L′↓I ′ ∪ LP ), entailing in particular L′↓Ar 	 LP .
• As to the other direction, consider a labelling L ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ) such that ∀LP ∈ FPR(AF, I , LI , RI ) L 	 LP . 
By bottom-up decomposability of complete semantics and condition (A.1) there is a labelling L′ ∈ LCO(AF′) such that 
L′↓Ar = L. Moreover, ∀L′P ∈ LPR(AF′) Proposition 2 entails that L′P↓I ′ = L′↓I ′ , and by top-down decomposability of 
preferred semantics L′P↓Ar ∈ FPR(AF, I , LI , RI ) thus L 	 L′P↓Ar . As a consequence, (L′↓I ′ ∪ L′↓Ar) 	 (L′P↓I ′ ∪ L′P↓Ar), 
i.e. L′ 	 L′P .
Let us now prove the desired result. Let L′I D be the ideal labelling of AF ′: we prove that {L′I D↓Ar} coincides with {L |
L is maximal in FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ) such that ∀LP ∈ FPR(AF, I , LI , RI ) L 	 LP }. Notice that we do not assume that the 
deﬁnition of F ID is well founded, i.e. that there is a unique maximal labelling in the latter set: this is obtained as a 
by-product of the proof.
First consider the ideal labelling L′I D . According to (A.2), L′I D↓Ar ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ) and ∀LP ∈ FPR(AF, I , LI ,
RI ) L′I D↓Ar 	 LP . Assume by contradiction that L′I D↓Ar is not maximal, i.e. there is a labelling L ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI )
such that ∀LP ∈ FPR(AF, I , LI , RI ) L 	 LP , L′I D↓Ar 	 L and L′I D↓Ar = L. According to (A.2), there is a labelling L′ ∈ LCO(AF′)
such that ∀L′P ∈ LPR(AF′) L′ 	 L′P and L′↓Ar = L. However, we can write L′I D as L′I D↓I ′ ∪ L′I D↓Ar , and since L′I D↓I ′ = L′↓I ′
(Proposition 2) and L′I D↓Ar 	 L, L′I D 	 (L′↓I ′ ∪ L), which is in turn equal to L′ since L′↓Ar = L, i.e. L′I D 	 L′ . Taking into 
account that L′I D↓Ar = L it is also the case that L′I D = L′ , contradicting the maximality of L′I D .
Let us turn to the proof of the reverse condition. Let L be a maximal labelling among those in FCO(AF, I , LI , RI )
that satisfy the condition ∀LP ∈ FPR(AF, I , LI , RI ) L 	 LP . According to (A.2), there is a labelling L′ ∈ LCO(AF′) such 
that L′↓Ar = L and ∀L′P ∈ LPR(AF′) L′ 	 L′P . Assume by contradiction that L′ is not maximal, i.e. there is a labelling 
L′′ ∈ LCO(AF′) such that ∀L′P ∈ LPR(AF′) L′′ 	 L′P , L′ 	 L′′ and L′ = L′′ . Note in particular that L′↓Ar 	 L′′↓Ar , and since, by 
Proposition 2, L′↓I ′ = L′′↓I ′ , it must be the case that L′↓Ar = L′′↓Ar . According to (A.2), L′′↓Ar ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ) and 
∀LP ∈ FPR(AF, I , LI , RI ) L′′↓Ar 	 LP . However, since L′↓Ar = L, it holds that L 	 L′′↓Ar and L = L′′↓Ar , contradicting the 
maximality of L among the labellings of FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ). 
Proposition 9. The canonical local function of semi-stable semantics is deﬁned as FSST(AF, I , LI , RI )  {L | L ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI ,
RI ) such that undec(L) is minimal w.r.t. set inclusion}.
Proof. Given an argumentation framework with input (AF, I , LI , RI ), let AF′ = (Ar ∪ I ′, att ∪ R ′I ) be the standard 
argumentation w.r.t. (AF, I , LI , RI ). It is immediate to see that
FCO
(
AF′↓I ′ ,∅,∅,∅
)= {{(A′,in) | A ∈ out(LI )
}∪ LI
}
(A.3)
We have to show that {L′↓Ar | L′ ∈ LSST(AF′)} = {L ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ) | undec(L) is minimal}.
First, given a semi-stable labelling L′ of AF′ , by top-down decomposability of complete semantics L′↓Ar ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI ,
RI ), where we exploit the fact that, by Proposition 2, L′↓I = LI . Assume by contradiction that undec(L′↓Ar) is not mini-
mal, i.e. there is a labelling Lm ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ) such that undec(Lm)  undec(L′↓Ar). By Proposition 2 and condition 
(A.3) L′↓I ′ ∈ FCO(AF′↓I ′ , ∅, ∅, ∅), thus, letting L′′ = (L′↓I ′ ∪ Lm), by bottom-up decomposability of complete semantics 
L′′ ∈ LCO(AF′). However, since undec(Lm)  undec(L′↓Ar) it must also be the case that undec(L′′)  undec(L′↓I ′ ∪L′↓Ar), 
i.e. undec(L′′)  undec(L′). This contradicts the fact that L′ is a semi-stable labelling of AF ′ , and thus undec(L′) should 
be minimal among the complete labellings of AF .
Let us now consider a labelling L ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ) such that undec(L) is minimal. By bottom-up decomposability 
of complete semantics and condition (A.3), there is a labelling L′ ∈ LCO(AF′) such that L′↓Ar = L. Assume by contradiction 
that L′ /∈ LSST(AF′), i.e. there is a labelling L′′ ∈ LCO(AF′) such that undec(L′′)  undec(L′). Since, by Proposition 2, L′′↓I ′ =
L′↓I ′ , it must be the case that undec(L′′↓Ar)  undec(L′↓Ar) = undec(L). Moreover, by top-down decomposability of 
complete semantics and Proposition 2 it holds that L′′↓Ar ∈ FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ). These conditions, however, contradict the 
hypothesis that undec(L) is minimal among the labellings in FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ). 
A.3. Proofs of Section 5
Lemma 4. Given a set of arguments I , two labellings L1I , L
2
I ∈ LI , a set of arguments Args such that I ∩ Args = ∅ and a relation 
RINP ⊆I × Args, if L1 	 L2 then effArgs(I , L1 , RINP) 	 effArgs(I , L2 , RINP).I I I I
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effArgs(I , L2I , RINP), and if it is labelled out by effArgs(I , L
1
I , RINP) then it is labelled out by effArgs(I , L
2
I , RINP). In 
the ﬁrst case, either A has not attackers in I or all of its attackers in I are labelled out by L1I . Since L
1
I 	 L2I , all these 
attackers are labelled out also by L2I , thus A is labelled in by effArgs(I , L
2
I , RINP). In the second case, A has an attacker 
B ∈I which is labelled in by L1I . Again, since L1I 	 L2I the attacker B is labelled in also by L2I , thus A is labelled out
by effArgs(I , L2I , RINP). 
Proposition 10. Every semantics S ∈ {AD, CO, ST, GR, PR, ID, SST} is effect-dictated.
Proof. By inspection of Deﬁnition 23 and Deﬁnition 24, it is easy to see that the proposition holds for S ∈ {AD, CO}. As to 
the other semantics, according to Deﬁnition 25, Proposition 6 and Proposition 9 the deﬁnition of FST , FGR , FPR , FSST select 
those labellings of FCO that satisfy a requirement which does not depend on the input to the local function (i.e. absence 
of undec-labelled arguments, minimality w.r.t. 	, maximality w.r.t. 	 and minimality of undec arguments, respectively): 
thus the conclusion is entailed by the result for FCO . Finally, according to Proposition 8 F ID(AF, I , LI , RI ) is completely 
determined by FCO(AF, I , LI , RI ) and FPR(AF, I , LI , RI ), thus the result follows from the above ones for CO and 
PR. 
A.4. Proofs of Section 6
Proposition 11. Consider a semantics S such that LS(AF∅) = {∅}. Given a set of arguments E and a labelling LE ∈ LE , it holds that 
S-effE (M∅, LE ) = {{(A, in) | A ∈ E}}.
Proof. According to Deﬁnition 29, S-effE(M∅, LE ) = {effE (∅, ∅, ∅) | L ∈ FS(AF∅, ∅, ∅, ∅)}. By Proposition 1, FS(AF∅, ∅, ∅, ∅) =
LS(AF∅), which by the hypothesis is nonempty. Thus, S-effE (M∅, LE) = {effE (∅, ∅, ∅)} = {{(A, in) | A ∈ E}}. 
Proposition 12. Consider a semantics S such that LS(AF∅) = {∅} and a replacement R = (AF, M1, M2) with invariant set E = ∅. 
Letting AF2 = T (R), the following conditions are equivalent:
• R is S-legitimate
• R is contextually S-legitimate
• |LS(AF)| > 0 ∧ |LS(AF2)| > 0, or LS(AF) = LS(AF2) = ∅
• R is S-safe.
Proof. Since E = ∅, according to Deﬁnition 31 M1 = (AF, ∅, ∅) and M2 = (AF2, ∅, ∅). Moreover, according to Deﬁni-
tion 32 it turns out that LSR = {FS(AF↓∅, ∅, ∅, ∅)}, which by Proposition 1 is equal to LS(AF∅), in turn equal to {∅}
by the hypothesis. Since it also holds that LE = {∅}, R is S-legitimate if and only if it is contextually S-legitimate. In 
particular, R is legitimate if and only if M1 and M2 are S-equivalent, which according to Deﬁnition 30 holds if and 
only if S-eff∅(M1, ∅) = S-eff∅(M2, ∅). Following Deﬁnition 29, S-eff∅(M1, ∅) = {eff∅(∅, L↓∅, ∅) | L ∈ FS(AF, ∅, ∅, ∅)}, 
which by Proposition 1 is equal to {eff∅(∅, L↓∅, ∅) | L ∈ LS(AF)}, i.e. {∅} if |LS(AF)| > 0, ∅ if LS(AF) = ∅. By the same 
reasoning, S-eff∅(M2, ∅) = {∅} if |LS(AF2)| > 0, ∅ if LS(AF2) = ∅. As a consequence, R is S-legitimate if and only if 
|LS(AF)| > 0 ∧ |LS(AF2)| > 0, or LS(AF) = LS(AF2) = ∅. Let us ﬁnally consider the last condition. According to Deﬁnition 32, 
R is S-safe if and only if {L↓∅ | L ∈ LS(AF)} = {L↓∅ | L ∈ LS(AF2)}. It is easy to see that the ﬁrst term of this equality is equal 
to {∅} if |LS(AF)| > 0, it is equal to ∅ if LS(AF) = ∅. Analogously, the second term is equal to {∅} if |LS(AF2)| > 0, it is equal 
to ∅ if LS(AF2) = ∅. Thus R is S-safe if and only if the third condition holds. 
Proposition 13. Let AF = (Ar, att) be an argumentation framework. Consider a sequence of replacements (R1, R2, . . . , Rn) where 
Ri = (AFi, Mi,1, Mi,2), Ei is the invariant set of Ri, AF1 = AF and, for any 1 < i ≤ n, AFi = T (AFi−1, Mi−1,1, Mi−1,2). Let AF∗ be the 
result of the sequence of replacements, i.e. AF∗ = T (AFn, Mn,1, Mn,2). If all replacements Ri are S-safe, then letting E = E1 ∩ . . .∩ En
it holds that {L↓E | L ∈ LS(AF)} = {L↓E | L ∈ LS(AF∗)}. Moreover, any argument A ∈ E is skeptically/credulously justiﬁed according to 
S in AF if and only if it is skeptically/credulously justiﬁed according to S in AF∗ .
Proof. In order to prove the thesis, we show by induction on i that for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} {L↓Ei | L ∈ LS(AF)} = {L↓Ei | L ∈
LS(AFi+1)}, where Ei = E1 ∩ . . . Ei .
For i = 1, since AF2 = T (AF, M1,1, M1,2), E1 = E1 and (AF, M1,1, M1,2) is S-safe it holds that {L↓E1 | L ∈ LS(AF)} =
{L↓E1 | L ∈ LS(AF2)}.
For i > 1, we assume inductively that {L↓Ei−1 | L ∈ LS(AF)} = {L↓Ei−1 | L ∈ LS(AFi)}, and we prove that {L↓Ei | L ∈ LS(AF)} ={L↓Ei | L ∈ LS(AFi+1)}. First, since Ei = Ei−1 ∩ Ei it holds that Ei ⊆ Ei−1, thus the inductive hypothesis yields {L↓Ei | L ∈
LS(AF)} = {L↓Ei | L ∈ LS(AFi)}. Since Ri is S-safe, it holds that {L↓Ei | L ∈ LS(AFi)} = {L↓Ei | L ∈ LS(AFi+1)}. Taking into account 
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As to the last point, an argument A ∈ E is skeptically justiﬁed according to S in AF if and only if ∀L ∈ LS(AF), L↓E(A) = in, 
and by the previous point this holds if and only if ∀L ∈ LS(AF∗), L↓E (A) = in, i.e. if and only if A is skeptically justiﬁed in 
AF∗ . The proof for credulous justiﬁcation is analogous. 
A.5. Proofs of Section 7
The proof of Theorem 8 requires two preliminary lemmas, proving that any semantics satisﬁes a property corresponding 
to top-down and bottom-up decomposability in the degenerate case of two subframeworks including an empty one.
Lemma 9. Let S be a semantics such that LS(AF∅) = {∅}, AF = (Ar, att) be an argumentation framework, and E ⊆ Ar be a sub-
set of its arguments. Let D = Ar \ E and M = (AF↓D , RINP, ROUTP), where RINP = att ∩ (E × D) and ROUTP = att ∩ (D × E). 
Given a labelling L ∈ LS(AF), let LE = L↓E and LD = L↓D . If D = ∅, then LE ∈ FS(AF↓E , M outp, LD↓M outp , ROUTP) and LD ∈
FS(AF↓D , M inp, LE↓M inp , RINP).
Proof. In the speciﬁc case that D = ∅, it obviously holds that E = Ar, AF↓D = AF∅ , RINP = ∅, ROUTP = ∅, M inp = ∅ and 
M outp = ∅. It is then easy to see that LD = ∅ and LE = L ∈ LS(AF). By Proposition 1, LS(AF) = FS(AF, ∅, ∅, ∅), which is equal 
to FS(AF↓E , M outp, LD↓M outp , ROUTP). Moreover, LD = ∅ ∈ LS(AF∅) by the hypothesis, and again by Proposition 1 it holds 
that LS(AF∅) = FS(AF∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), where the latter is equal to FS(AF↓D , M inp, LE↓M inp , RINP). 
Lemma 10. Let S be a semantics such that LS(AF∅) = {∅}, AF = (Ar, att) be an argumentation framework, and E ⊆ Ar be a subset of 
its arguments. Let D = Ar \ E and M = (AF↓D , RINP, ROUTP), where RINP = att ∩ (E × D) and ROUTP = att ∩ (D × E). Given two 
labellings LE and LD such that LE ∈ FS(AF↓E , M outp, LD↓M outp , ROUTP) and LD ∈ FS(AF↓D , M inp, LE↓M inp , RINP), if D = ∅ then 
(LE ∪ LD) ∈ LS(AF).
Proof. In the speciﬁc case that D = ∅, it obviously holds that E = Ar, AF↓D = AF∅ , RINP = ∅, ROUTP = ∅, M inp = ∅ and 
M outp = ∅. Then the hypothesis yields LD ∈ FS(AF∅, ∅, ∅, ∅), which is equal to LS(AF∅) by Proposition 1. Since by the hypoth-
esis LS(AF∅) = {∅}, it must be the case that LD = ∅. Moreover, LE ∈ FS(AF, ∅, ∅, ∅), which is equal to LS(AF) by Proposition 1. 
Thus, (LE ∪ LD) = LE ∈ LS(AF). 
Theorem 8. Consider an effect-dictated semantics S such that LS(AF∅) = {∅}. If S is decomposable w.r.t. a partition selector F then S
is strongly transparent w.r.t. F .
Proof. Consider a F -preserving and contextually S-legitimate replacement R = (AF1, M1, M2) with invariant set E , where 
M1 = (AF1↓D1 , R1INP, R1OUTP) and M2 = ((D2, RD2 ), R2INP, R2OUTP), and let AF2 = T (AF1, M1, M2): we have to prove that the 
replacement is S-safe, i.e. that {L1↓E | L1 ∈ LS(AF1)} = {L2↓E | L2 ∈ LS(AF2)}. Since (AF1, M1, M2) is F -preserving, {E, D1} \
∅ ∈F (AF1) and {E, D2} \ ∅ ∈F (AF2).
First, in the particular case where E = ∅ the replacement is S-safe by Proposition 12. Thus, in the remainder of the proof 
we assume E = ∅.
Let us ﬁrst prove that {L1↓E | L1 ∈ LS(AF1)} ⊆ {L2↓E | L2 ∈ LS(AF2)}, i.e. that given an arbitrary labelling L1 ∈ LS(AF1)
there is a labelling L2 ∈ LS(AF2) such that L1↓E = L2↓E . Let LE1 = L1↓E and LD11 = L1↓D1 . If D1 = ∅, since S is decomposable 
w.r.t. F and {E, D1} ∈ F (AF1), by top-down decomposability it holds that LE1 ∈ FS(AF1↓E , M1outp, LD11 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP) and 
LD11 ∈ FS(AF1↓D1 , M1inp, LE1↓M1inp , R1INP). In the case where D1 = ∅, the same conditions are entailed by Lemma 9. Note that 
LE1 ∈ LSR . Since M1 and M2 are S-equivalent under LSR , there is a labelling LD22 ∈ FS(AF2↓D2 , M2inp, LE1↓M2inp , R2INP) such 
that effE(M2outp, L
D2
2 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP) = effE (M1outp, L
D1
1 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP). Taking into account that S is effect-dictated, 
this condition entails that FS(AF1↓E , M1outp, LD11 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP) = FS(AF1↓E , M2outp, L
D2
2 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP), and since AF1↓E =
AF2↓E it holds that LE1 ∈ FS(AF2↓E , M2outp, LD22 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP). Now, we have two cases to consider. In case D2 = ∅, 
{E, D2} ∈ F (AF2) and bottom-up decomposability w.r.t. F entails that (LE1 ∪ LD22 ) ∈ LS(AF2). Otherwise, the same condi-
tion holds by Lemma 10. In both cases, the conclusion follows by letting L2 = (LE1 ∪ LD22 ).
Taking into account that AF1 = T (AF2, M2, M1) and that also (AF2, M2, M1) is a contextually S-legitimate replacement, 
by a symmetric reasoning it can be proved that {L2↓E | L2 ∈ LS(AF2)} ⊆ {L1↓E | L1 ∈ LS(AF1)}.
Thus, {L1↓E | L1 ∈ LS(AF1)} ⊆ {L2↓E | L2 ∈ LS(AF2)} and {L2↓E | L2 ∈ LS(AF2)} ⊆ {L1↓E | L1 ∈ LS(AF1)} entail the desired 
conclusion. 
Theorem 9. Let S be an effect-dictated single-status semantics such that LS(AF∅) = {∅}. Suppose that S is top-down decomposable w.r.t. 
a partition selector F and satisﬁes the following property: for any argumentation framework AF and any partition {E, D} ∈F (AF), 
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and LD ∈ FS(AF↓D , D inp, LE↓D inp , DR), then L 	 LE ∪ LD . Then S is strongly transparent w.r.t. F .
Proof. Consider a F -preserving and contextually S-legitimate replacement R = (AF1, M1, M2) with invariant set E , where 
M1 = (AF1↓D1 , R1INP, R1OUTP) and M2 = ((D2, RD2 ), R2INP, R2OUTP), and let AF2 = T (AF1, M1, M2). We have to prove that the 
replacement is S-safe, i.e. letting L1 and L2 be the labellings prescribed for AF1 and AF2, respectively, that L1↓E = L2↓E .
As in the proof of Theorem 8, in the case that E = ∅ the replacement is S-safe by Proposition 12, thus in the remainder 
of the proof we assume E = ∅.
Let LE1 = L1↓E and LD11 = L1↓D1 . If D1 = ∅, {E, D1} ∈F (AF1) and since S is top-down decomposable w.r.t. F it holds that 
LE1 ∈ FS(AF1↓E , M1outp, LD11 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP) and L
D1
1 ∈ FS(AF1↓D1 , M1inp, LE1↓M1inp , R1INP). Otherwise, if D1 = ∅ then the same 
conditions hold by Lemma 9. Note that LE1 ∈ LSR . Since M1 and M2 are S-equivalent under LSR , there is a labelling LD22 ∈
FS(AF2↓D2 , M2inp, LE1↓M2inp , R2INP) such that effE (M2outp, L
D2
2 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP) = effE(M1outp, L
D1
1 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP), entail-
ing that FS(AF1↓E , M1outp, LD11 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP) = FS(AF1↓E , M2outp, L
D2
2 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP). Taking into account that AF1↓E =
AF2↓E , it holds that LE1 ∈ FS(AF2↓E , M2outp, LD22 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP). We have two cases to consider. If D2 = ∅, then {E, D2} ∈
F (AF2) and the hypothesis condition applied to L1E and L2D2 in AF2 yields L2 	 (L1E ∪ L2D2 ), thus in particular 
L2↓E 	 L1↓E . In the other case, D2 = ∅ and by Lemma 10 it holds that (L1E ∪L2D2 ) ∈ LS(AF2). Since S is single-status, it must 
be the case that (L1E ∪ L2D2 ) = L2, thus in particular L1↓E = L2↓E , which is a special case of the condition L2↓E 	 L1↓E .
Taking into account that AF1 = T (AF2, M2, M1) and that also (AF2, M2, M1) is a contextually S-legitimate replacement, 
by a symmetric reasoning with L2 it can be proved that there exists a labelling L1D1 of D1 such that L1 	 (L2↓E ∪ L1D1 )
and in particular L1↓E 	 L2↓E .
Now, from L2↓E 	 L1↓E and L1↓E 	 L2↓E it turns out that L1↓E = L2↓E . 
A.6. Proofs of Section 8
Theorem 10. Admissible semantics AD, complete semantics CO and stable semantics ST are strongly transparent.
Proof. Since decomposability and strong transparency of a semantics are equivalent to decomposability w.r.t. FALL and 
strong transparency w.r.t. FALL , respectively, an immediate consequence of Theorem 8 is that an effect-dictated decompos-
able semantics is strongly transparent. Then the conclusion follows from Proposition 10 and Theorem 1 (for AD), Theorem 3
(for CO) and Theorem 4 (for ST). 
Theorem 11. Grounded semantics GR is strongly transparent.
Proof. We prove that grounded semantics satisﬁes the hypotheses of Theorem 9 that ensure strong transparency. First, 
grounded semantics is single-status by deﬁnition. Moreover, we know by Proposition 10 that GR is effect-dictated and 
by Theorem 5 that it is top-down decomposable. Finally, consider an argumentation framework AF , an arbitrary parti-
tion {E, D} ∈ FALL(AF) and two labellings LE ∈ LE and LD ∈ LD such that LE ∈ FGR(AF↓E , E inp, LD↓E inp , ER) and LD ∈
FGR(AF↓D , D inp, LE↓D inp , DR): taking into account that FGR returns a subset of FCO (see Proposition 6), by bottom-up de-
composability of complete semantics (see Theorem 3) (LE ∪LD) is a complete labelling of AF . Thus, letting L be the grounded 
labelling of AF , by deﬁnition it must be the case that L 	 LE ∪ LD . 
Theorem 12. For any contextually PR-legitimate replacement R = (AF, M1, M2) with invariant set E, any argument A ∈ E is cred-
ulously justiﬁed according to PR in AF if and only if it is credulously justiﬁed according to PR in T (AF, M1, M2).
Proof. First, if E = ∅ then the claim is trivially veriﬁed, thus in the following we consider the case that E = ∅.
Assume that M1 = (AF↓D1 , R1INP, R1OUTP), AF2 = T (AF, M1, M2) and M2 = (AF2↓D2 , R2INP, R2OUTP). Given an argument A ∈
E which is credulously justiﬁed in AF , there is a preferred labelling L1 ∈ LPR(AF) such that L1(A) = in. Letting L1E = L1↓E
and L1D1 = L1↓D1 , we have that LE1 ∈ FPR(AF↓E , M1outp, LD11 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP) and L
D1
1 ∈ FPR(AF↓D1 , M1inp, LE1↓M1inp , R1INP). 
In particular, if D1 = ∅ these conditions hold by top-down decomposability of preferred semantics (see Theorem 6), 
otherwise by Lemma 9. Note that, according to the ﬁrst condition, L1E ∈ LPRR . Since M1 and M2 are PR-equivalent 
under LPRR , there is a labelling L
D2
1 ∈ FPR(AF2↓D2 , M2inp, LE1↓M2inp , R2INP) such that effE (M2outp, L
D2
1 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP) =
effE (M1outp, L
D1
1 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP), thus it is the case that FPR(AF↓E , M1outp, L
D1
1 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP) = FPR(AF↓E , M2outp,
LD21 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP). Taking then into account that AF↓E = AF2↓E , it holds that LE1 ∈ FPR(AF2↓E , M2outp, L
D2
1 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP). 
Since FPR returns a subset of FCO (see Proposition 6), the previous conditions yield LE1 ∈ FCO(AF2↓E , M2outp, LD21 ↓M2outp ,
R2OUTP) and L
D2
1 ∈ FCO(AF2↓D2 , M2inp, LE1↓M2inp , R2INP), thus by bottom-up decomposability of complete semantics proved in 
Theorem 3 (if D2 = ∅) or by Lemma 10 (if D2 = ∅), (L1E ∪ L1D2 ) is a complete labelling of AF2. As a consequence, there is 
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L2(A) = in, i.e. A is credulously justiﬁed under preferred semantics in AF2.
Since the hypotheses are symmetric for AF and AF2, the other direction of the proof is proved in the same way. 
Theorem 13. Any replacement R = (AF1, M1, M2) with invariant set E, such that M1 and M2 are homogeneously PR-equivalent 
under LPRR , is PR-safe.
Proof. First, if E = ∅ then the replacement is PR-safe by Proposition 12, thus in the following we consider the case that 
E = ∅.
Assume that M1 = (AF1↓D1 , R1INP, R1OUTP), AF2 = T (AF1, M1, M2) and M2 = (AF2↓D2 , R2INP, R2OUTP). We have to prove that {L1↓E | L1 ∈ LPR(AF1)} = {L2↓E | L2 ∈ LPR(AF2)}. Similarly to previous proofs, we only prove that {L1↓E | L1 ∈ LPR(AF1)} ⊆
{L2↓E | L2 ∈ LPR(AF2)}, since the reverse inclusion relation can be proved in the same way by exploiting the fact that the 
hypotheses are symmetric for AF1 and AF2.
Let L1 ∈ LPR(AF1) be an arbitrary preferred labelling of AF1: we have to identify a labelling L2 ∈ LPR(AF2) such that 
L1↓E = L2↓E . Letting LE1 = L1↓E and LD11 = L1↓D1 , by top-down decomposability of preferred semantics proved in Theorem 6
(if D1 = ∅) or by Lemma 9 (if D1 = ∅), LE1 ∈ FPR(AF1↓E , M1outp, LD11 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP) and L
D1
1 ∈ FPR(AF1↓D1 , M1inp, LE1↓M1inp ,
R1INP). Note that, by the ﬁrst condition, L
E
1 ∈ LPRR . Since M1 and M2 are PR-equivalent under LPRR , there is a labelling 
LD21 ∈ FPR(AF2↓D2 , M2inp, LE1↓M2inp , R2INP) such that effE(M2outp, L
D2
1 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP) = effE (M1outp, L
D1
1 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP), 
entailing that FPR(AF1↓E , M1outp, LD11 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP) = FPR(AF1↓E , M2outp, L
D2
1 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP). Taking then into account 
that AF1↓E = AF2↓E , it holds that LE1 ∈ FPR(AF2↓E , M2outp, LD21 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP). Since FPR returns a subset of FCO (see Propo-
sition 6), the previous conditions yield LE1 ∈ FCO(AF2↓E , M2outp, LD21 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP) and L
D2
1 ∈ FCO(AF2↓D2 , M2inp, LE1↓M2inp ,
R2INP), thus by bottom-up decomposability of complete semantics proved in Theorem 3 (if D2 = ∅) or by Lemma 10
(if D2 = ∅), (L1E ∪ L1D2 ) is a complete labelling of AF2. We prove that L2 = (L1E ∪ L1D2 ) ∈ LPR(AF2), which yields the 
desired conclusion. Assume by contradiction that L2 is not a preferred labelling of AF2: then there is a preferred labelling 
L∗2 ∈ LPR(AF2) such that L2 	 L∗2 and L2 = L∗2. Letting L∗2E = L∗2↓E and L∗2D2 = L∗2↓D2 , by top-down decomposability of pre-
ferred semantics (if D2 = ∅) or by Lemma 9 (if D2 = ∅), it holds that L∗2E ∈ FPR(AF2↓E , M2outp, L∗2D2↓M2outp , R2OUTP) and 
L∗2
D2 ∈ FPR(AF2↓D2 , M2inp, L∗2E↓M2inp , R2INP). Note that L∗2
E ∈ LPRR . It must be the case that L1 E 	 L∗2E and L1E = L∗2E . The ﬁrst 
condition is entailed by L2 	 L∗2 and L2↓E = L1E . The second condition holds since otherwise L1 E = L∗2E , entailing both LD21
and L∗2
D2 to belong to FPR(AF2↓D2 , M2inp, LE1↓M2inp , R2INP): since L
D2
1 	 L∗2D2 and FPR returns maximal (w.r.t. 	) elements 
of FCO , we would have L
D2
1 = L∗2D2 besides L1E = L∗2E , violating the condition L2 = L∗2. Now, taking into account the hypoth-
esis that M1 and M2 are homogeneously PR-equivalent under LPRR , from L
D2
1 ∈ FPR(AF2↓D2 , M2inp, LE1↓M2inp , R2INP), L∗2
D2 ∈
FPR(AF2↓D2 , M2inp, L∗2E↓M2inp , R2INP), L
D2
1 	 L∗2D2 , L1E 	 L∗2E , LD11 ∈ FPR(AF1↓D1 , M1inp, LE1↓M1inp , R1INP) and effE (M1outp,
LD11 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP) = effE (M2outp, L
D2
1 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP), there is a labelling L∗1D1 ∈ FPR(AF1↓D1 , M1inp, L∗2E↓M1inp , R1INP)
such that LD11 	 L∗1D1 and effE (M1outp, L∗1D1↓M1outp , R1OUTP) = effE (M2outp, L∗2D2↓M2outp , R2OUTP). Since L∗2E ∈ FPR(AF2↓E ,
M2
outp, L∗2
D2↓M2outp , R2OUTP) and AF2↓E = AF1↓E , the latter condition entails L∗2E ∈ FPR(AF1↓E , M1outp, L∗1D1↓M1outp , R1OUTP). 
Since FPR returns a subset of FCO and complete semantics is decomposable, L∗2
E ∪ L∗1D1 is a complete labelling of AF1
(again, in case D1 = ∅ this is a consequence of Lemma 10). However, from L1E 	 L∗2E , LD11 	 L∗1D1 and L1E = L∗2E it holds 
that L1 	 (L∗2E ∪ L∗1D1 ) and L1 = (L∗2E ∪ L∗1D1 ), contradicting the fact that L1 ∈ LPR(AF1), i.e. that it is a maximal (w.r.t. 	) 
complete labelling of AF1. 
Lemma 5. Consider two multipoles M1 = (AF1, R1INP, R1OUTP) and M2 = (AF2, R2INP, R2OUTP) w.r.t. a set E which are internally 
S-homogeneous under a set of labellings L′ ⊆ LE . If M1 and M2 are S-equivalent under L′ , then they are homogeneously S-equivalent 
under L′ .
Proof. We have to prove the two conditions of Deﬁnition 34. We prove the ﬁrst condition, since the other one 
can be obtained by a symmetric reasoning. Given L1E , L
2
E ∈ L′ such that L1E 	 L2E , consider two labellings LD11 ∈
FS(AF1, M1
inp, L1E↓M1inp , R1INP) and L
D1
2 ∈ FS(AF1, M1inp, L2E↓M1inp , R1INP) such that L
D1
1 	 LD12 . Consider also a labelling LD21 ∈
FS(AF2, M2
inp, L1E↓M2inp , R2INP) such that effE (M2outp, L
D2
1 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP) = effE (M1outp, L
D1
1 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP). Since L
D1
1 	
LD12 , by Lemma 4 it holds that effE (M1
outp, LD11 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP) 	 effE (M1outp, L
D1
2 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP), thus effE (M2outp,
LD21 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP) 	 effE(M1outp, L
D1
2 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP). Moreover, since M1 and M2 are S-equivalent under L′ , there is 
a labelling LD22 ∈ FS(AF2, M2inp, L2E↓M2inp , R2INP) such that effE(M2outp, L
D2
2 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP) = effE (M1outp, L
D1
2 ↓M1outp ,
R1 ), thus it holds that effE (M2outp, L
D2↓ outp , R2 ) 	 effE (M2outp, LD2↓ outp , R2 ). Summing up, ∃LD2 ∈OUTP 1 M2 OUTP 2 M2 OUTP 1
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inp, L1E↓M2inp , R2INP), L
D2
2 ∈ FS(AF2, M2inp, L2E↓M2inp , R2INP) such that effE (M2outp, L
D2
1 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP) 	
effE (M2outp, L
D2
2 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP), with L1E , L2E ∈ L′ and L1E 	 L2E . The conclusion can then be derived from the fact that 
M2 is internally S-homogeneous under L′ , since this entails that there is a labelling L′D22 ∈ FS(AF2, M2inp, L2E↓M2inp , R2INP)
such that effE(M2outp, L
′D2
2 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP) = effE (M2outp, L
D2
2 ↓M2outp , R2OUTP), where the latter is equal to effE(M1outp,
LD12 ↓M1outp , R1OUTP), and L
D2
1 	 L′D22 . 
Corollary 1. Any replacement R = (AF1, M1, M2) with invariant set E, such that M1 and M2 are PR-equivalent under LPRR and 
both M1 and M2 are internally PR-homogeneous under LPRR , is PR-safe.
Proof. Since M1 and M2 are internally PR-homogeneous under LPRR and PR-equivalent under L
PR
R , by Lemma 5 they are 
homogeneously PR-equivalent under LPRR . The desired conclusion then follows from Theorem 13. 
Theorem 14. Preferred semantics PR is strongly transparent w.r.t. F∪SCC.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 7 and Theorem 8. 
Lemma 6. Let M be an argumentation multipole (AF, RINP, ROUTP) w.r.t. a set E which is CO-univocal under a set of labellings 
L′ ⊆ LE . Then ∀LE ∈ L′ , FCO(AF, M inp, LE↓M inp , RINP) = FS(AF, M inp, LE↓M inp , RINP) for any S ∈ {GR, PR, ID, SST}.
Proof. According to the relevant deﬁnitions, FGR , FPR , F ID and FSST return a subset of the labellings returned by FCO and 
are always able to return at least a labelling. Then the conclusion follows by taking into account that M is CO-univocal 
under L′ . 
Lemma 7. Let M be an argumentation multipole (AF, RINP, ROUTP) w.r.t. a set E which is CO-univocal under a set of la-
bellings L′ ⊆ LE , and let L1E , L2E be two labellings of L′ such that L1E 	 L2E . Then, for any two labellings L1 , L2 such that L1 ∈
FPR(AF, M inp, L1E↓M inp , RINP) and L2 ∈ FPR(AF, M inp, L2E↓M inp , RINP), it holds that L1 	 L2 .
Proof. Taking into account Lemma 6, L1 ∈ FCO(AF, M inp, L1E↓M inp , RINP), thus by Proposition 7 there must be a labelling 
L′2 ∈ FCO(AF, M inp, L2E↓M inp , RINP) such that L1 	 L′2. By Lemma 6 it also holds that L2 ∈ FCO(AF, M inp, L2E↓M inp , RINP), and 
since |FCO(AF, M inp, L2E↓M inp , RINP)| = 1 it must be the case that L′2 = L2. Thus L1 	 L′2 = L2. 
Lemma 8. Let M be an argumentation multipole (AF, RINP, ROUTP) w.r.t. a set E which is CO-univocal under a set of labellings 
L′ ⊆ LE . Then M is internally PR-homogeneous under L′.
Proof. Let L1E , L
2
E be two labellings of L
′ such that L1E 	 L2E , and let L1, L2 be two labellings such that L1 ∈ FPR(AF, M inp,
L1E↓M inp , RINP), L2 ∈ FPR(AF, M inp, L2E↓M inp , RINP). By Lemma 7, L1 	 L2. Then the condition required in Deﬁnition 35 is 
trivially veriﬁed with L′2 = L2. 
Theorem 15. Any contextually CO-legitimate replacement R = (AF1, M1, M2) with invariant set E, such that M1 and M2 are 
CO-univocal under LCOR , is ID-safe.
Proof. As in previous proofs, the claim in the case where E = ∅ is a direct consequence of Proposition 12, thus in the 
following we assume E = ∅.
Let AF2 = T (AF1, M1, M2), and let L∗1 and L∗2 be the ideal labellings of AF1 and AF2, respectively. We prove that L∗1↓E 	
L∗2↓E (the other direction of the proof can be obtained by a symmetric reasoning). Since by deﬁnition L∗1 is a complete 
labelling of AF1 and CO is strongly transparent, there is a complete labelling L2 of AF2 such that L2↓E = L∗1↓E . We prove 
that for any preferred labelling L2P of AF2 it holds that L2 	 L2P : since L∗2 is by deﬁnition the maximal (w.r.t. 	) complete 
labelling satisfying this condition, it must be the case that L2 	 L∗2, thus in particular L2↓E = L∗1↓E 	 L∗2↓E .
First we prove that the hypotheses of Corollary 1 are satisﬁed for R , thus R is PR-safe. Since M1 and M2 are 
CO-equivalent under LCOR , by Lemma 6 they are also PR-equivalent under L
CO
R , and since FPR always returns a subset 
of FCO it holds that LPRR ⊆ LCOR , therefore M1 and M2 are PR-equivalent under LPRR . Moreover, by Lemma 8 M1 and M2
are internally PR-homogeneous under LPRR .
Let us turn to the proof that L2 	 L2P . Let Args2 be the set of arguments of AF2, and D2 = Args2 \ E . First, it must be 
the case that L2↓E 	 L2P↓E : since R is PR-safe, there is a preferred labelling L1P of AF1 such that L2P↓E = L1P↓E , and by 
deﬁnition of ideal labelling L∗1 	 L1P , thus in particular L∗1↓E 	 L1P↓E , and the conclusion follows by taking into account that 
L2↓E = L∗↓E . Second, by top-down decomposability of complete semantics (if D2 = ∅) or by Lemma 9 (if D2 = ∅), L2↓D2 ∈1
196 P. Baroni et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 217 (2014) 144–197FCO(AF2↓D2 , M2inp, L2↓M2inp , R2INP) and L2P↓D2 ∈ FCO(AF2↓D2 , M2inp, L2P↓M2inp , R2INP), thus by Lemma 7 L2↓E 	 L2P↓E also 
entails that L2↓D2 	 L2P↓D2 . Summing up, it holds that L2↓E 	 L2P↓E and L2↓D2 	 L2P↓D2 , i.e. L2 	 L2P . 
Proposition 14. An acyclic argumentation multipole M = (AF, RINP, ROUTP) w.r.t. a set E is CO-univocal under any set of labellings 
L′ ⊆ LE .
Proof. Consider a labelling LE ∈ L′ . We reason by contradiction, assuming that there are two distinct labellings L1, L2 ∈
FCO(AF, M inp, LE↓M inp , RINP). Let LD be the set of arguments which are assigned different labels by L1 and L2. Since M
is acyclic, there must be at least an argument A ∈ LD such that all arguments of AF that attack A (possibly none) are 
assigned the same labels from L1 and L2. However, according to the conditions of Deﬁnition 24 the label of A is univocally 
determined by the labels of its attackers, both in the case A does not attack itself and in the case that A is self-attacking 
(in particular, if A is self-attacking then A is out-labelled if it has an in-labelled attacker, it is undec otherwise). This 
contradicts the fact that A ∈ LD . 
Proposition 15. Any contextually PR-legitimate (ID-legitimate) replacement R = (AF1, M1, M2)with invariant set E, such that M1
and M2 are acyclic, is PR-safe (ID-safe).
Proof. Considering preferred semantics, Proposition 14 and Lemma 8 entail that M1 and M2 are internally PR-homogeneous 
under any set L′ ⊆ LE , thus according to Corollary 1 the replacement R is PR-safe. The result for ideal semantics is en-
tailed by Theorem 15, taking into account that M1 and M2 are CO-univocal under LCOR by Proposition 14, and they are 
CO-equivalent according to Lemma 6. 
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